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Then and Now:
Blackfeet Subsistence and Glacier National Park 
Chair: J D a n  Flores
The exportation of the national park idea around the world has produced, and continues 
to produce, detrimental consequences for indigenous peoples residing on or near lands 
desirable for aesthetic reserves. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in 
America, changing cultural images of native peoples, the economic realities involved 
with creating and perpetuating the park idea, and scientific notions about humankind’s 
rightful place in nature created the atmosphere in which the federal government 
established the first national parks under the premise that native inhabitation and 
subsistence usage of the park units should be prohibited or strictly regulated.
One of the most long-standing and contentious examples of the interplay between the 
National Park Service and native communities developed around Glacier National Park 
and its adjoining reservation inhabited by the Blackfeet Nation. The Blackfeet sold the 
western portion of their reservation to the federal government, which later included the 
ceded land in Glacier National Park and subsequently denied the tribe their explicitly- 
reserved usufruct rights upon the land in question. With the support of federal legal 
representatives, officials at Glacier set a lasting precedent of native exclusion from the 
tribe’s former resource base within the park. In the 1970s, the Blackfeet channeled 
activist impulses into pressuring the Park Service for recognition of rights in Glacier and 
achieved some policy changes. Nevertheless, the park continued to prohibit subsistence 
activities that posed a challenge to the underlying goals of the national park ideal.
In addition to clamoring for recognition of expressly-reserved usufruct rights, many 
Blackfeet in the modern era have interpreted the binding agreement with the federal 
government to mean that the tribe retained a number of implied rights upon the ceded 
lands that transcend the specific language contained in the agreement. In recent decades, 
controversies over the grazing of livestock near the park border and employment and 
business licensing practices have created further tension between the National Park 
Service and the Blackfeet. Some policy changes have resulted, but I conclude here that 
those activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea still meet with 
interdiction and regulation, and very likely will in the future.
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Introduction
Many Americans consider national parks part of their cultural heritage and 
include an imagined wilderness in their national identity. As preservationists succeeded 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century in persuading the government to set aside large 
tracts of land as national parks, it became apparent that some of the designated areas 
contained resident populations of indigenous peoples who threatened the desired 
“pristine” character of the park system. Notions of primordial wilderness did not include 
human inhabitants and federal officials refused to deal with the contradictions generated 
by native habitation. Thus, authorities employed whatever means necessary to remove 
native peoples in order to create ideal, uninhabited landscapes, thereby denying native 
access to ancestral lands deemed necessary for physical and cultural survival.
Native Americans throughout the United States have had a long and complex 
history of interacting with the National Park Service. Except in a few instances, the 
government had removed most tribes onto reservations before creating national parks, so 
land-ownership disputes have not loomed very large in the dialogue between native tribes 
and park officials. Nevertheless, tribes have historically argued for the right to continue 
using parklands for subsistence activities, with varying degrees of success. Some parks, 
Glacier for example, have been adamant in their refusal to allow native use of park units, 
arguing that such usage may jeopardize the NPS mandate to “preserve the natural and 
cultural resources for future generations.”
The debate between park officials at Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet 
Nation represents, perhaps, the most bitter and protracted struggle by a native group for
recognition of subsistence rights on park lands. In a land cession agreement in 1896, the 
tribe reserved specific subsistence rights that were honored in writing. The dedication of 
the ceded land as part of a national park fifteen years later set in motion a heated drama 
that continues largely unabated to this day as park officials have consistently denied the 
tribe access to their traditional subsistence resources in the Glacier region. Historically, 
the exercise of certain native subsistence activities in Glacier National Park has posed a 
serious challenge to the founding principles of the National Park System. In this work, I 
will focus primarily on the controversy surrounding the exercise of Blackfeet material 
subsistence activities, whether explicitly listed in the Agreement of 1896 or implied, from 
the 1970s until the present, which for simplicity’s sake I dub “the modern era.”
The first full treatment of the historical relationship between the Blackfeet and 
Glacier National Park appeared not as a major work published by an academic press, but 
rather as an unpublished M.S. thesis crafted at the University of Montana. In “The 
Blackfeet Agreement of 1895 and Glacier National Park: A Case History,” completed in 
1985, Christopher S. Ashby traced the history with special emphasis on the major legal 
events and their impacts. Not until the mid-to-late 1990s did one find major works on 
America’s park system that discussed Indian issues and interests, and a handful emerged 
within a few years’ span. In The H unter’s Game: Poachers and Conservationists in 
Twentieth Century America (1997), Louis Warren showed how social conflicts erupted as 
local commons gave way to state and federal commons. He did not confine his study to 
national parks, and his chapter on the Blackeet and Glacier National Park provided just 
one example of how state and federal hunting laws in different parts of the nation 
transformed subsistence and market hunting into “poaching,” which frequently generated
resistance to game laws. His chapter on the Blackfeet and Glacier focused on wildlife 
management and hunting, one of four usufruct rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896, 
in the first half of the twentieth century.
In American Indians and National Parks (1998), Robert H. Keller and Michael F. 
Turek provided a sweeping review of the historical tensions between national park units 
and neighboring tribal communities. Although the scope and variety of relationships 
makes generalization difficult, many similarities exist in the conflicts between native 
communities and the Park Service and the authors showed how earlier disputes set the 
stage for modem tensions. Their chapter on the Blackfeet and Glacier briefly detailed the 
major developments regarding the controversy over explicitly-reserved usufruct rights 
through the 1970s, and also listed a few modern points of contention. In Dispossessing 
the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making o f the National Parks (1999), Mark 
David Spence brilliantly exposed the “dark side” of the conservation movement and 
showed how the federal government removed Indian peoples from three flagship parks-— 
Yellowstone, Glacier, and Yosemite— and later erased the history of their occupancy in 
order to create uninhabited wilderness. With penetrating insight, Spence profiled the 
methods by which early park managers eliminated most Indian occupancy and use in 
three of the “crown jewels” of the national park system. His chapter on the Blackfeet and 
Glacier described traditional tribal use of the area and closely analyzed Blackfeet 
resistance to exclusionary policies and how park responses generated an atmosphere of 
hostility in the region. Spence focused on the events around the turn of the century up 
through the mid-1930s, and only briefly explored the subsequent history of the 
relationship.
In Indian Country, G od’s Country: Native Americans and the National Parks 
(2000), Philip Burnham further highlighted land use conflicts in Glacier, Badlands, Mesa 
Verde, Grand Canyon, and Death Valley National Parks. Burnham shed great light on 
the topic by introducing native voices into the debate. By conducting extensive 
interviews with Indians living near park units, the author breathed life into the subject 
and provided a counter-point to the document bias inherent in so many studies of Indian 
peoples. Of all the aforementioned works, Indian Country, G od’s Country most 
adequately addressed recent issues of contention in the Glacier region, conveyed the 
feelings held by some Blackfeet towards the park and its policies, and opened up avenues 
for further exploration, several of which I have tread to formulate the second half of this 
study.
Through personal interviews with tribal members and several unpublished works 
penned by scholars in recent years, I learned that recent issues of contention, although not 
centered around the explicit usufruct rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896, are 
inextricably linked to the agreement and that disparate interpretations of that pact 
underscore much of the dialogue between the 21st-century Blackfeet and the National 
Park Service. In “The Ceded Strip: Blackfeet Treaty Rights in the 1980s”(1987),
“Glacier National Park on Blackfoot Territory: The Assertion of Rights on Traditional 
Lands”(2001), and “Blackfeet Oral Tradition of the 1895 Agreement”(2002), authors 
Kenneth P. Pitt, Tarissa Spoonhunter, and Jim Kipp, respectively, highlighted the 
importance of the oral tradition in Blackfeet culture and argued that the oral history of the 
agreement negotiations, still very much alive in Blackfeet country, does not agree with 
many of the provisions laid out in the written Agreement of 1896. In order to determine
the true intentions of the tribal signatories, these scholars analyzed the transcripts of the 
negotiations and concluded that the tribe retained rights not listed in the written 
agreement, such as the right to graze cattle, water rights, access to sacred sites, and so on. 
In this work, I analyze just a select few of the many issues that face the Blackfeet and the 
Park Service in the modem era.
The nuances of the written document and the minutes of the council meetings 
have generated much bickering over the years, but analysis and judgment of the 
competing arguments is not the purpose of this study. However complex the intricacies 
of the negotiation process and the resultant document may appear to legal-minded 
academic observers, for many tribal members the true intent of the tribal representatives 
is quite simple to discern. According to Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, a traditionalist well- 
versed in tribal language and culture, Blackfeet cultural law mandates that tribal 
representatives always act with the future of the Blackfeet people in mind.1 For many 
Blackfeet, implicit in the controversial agreement is the intention to reserve for future 
generations of Blackfeet the ability to lead the good life upon the lands in question— to 
subsist indefinitely.2 For many tribal members in the modem era, survival has little to do 
with the hunting, fishing, and wood-gathering rights listed in the Agreement of 1896. 
Subsistence needs and the means employed to obtain those needs have evolved and 
diversified over time as the Blackfeet, like all humans, have lived through and adapted to 
changing times. Thus, many believe that the implications of the Agreement of 1896 
confer to the Blackfeet general subsistence rights that transcend the specific language 
contained therein.
1 Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
2 Ibid.; Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, September 28, 2005.
Before addressing controversies over the exercise of implied subsistence rights on 
the ceded strip in the modern era, I analyze the formative influences on early park 
management policies regarding native peoples and show how they applied to the exercise 
of Blackfeet reserved rights throughout the twentieth century. Chapter 1 takes a holistic 
approach in examining the roots of exclusionary park policy and suggests ways in which 
cultural, economic, and scientific factors shaped early park management of Indian affairs. 
Chapter 2 traces the history of the relationship between the Blackfeet and Glacier 
National Park with a focus on conflicts over reserved agreement rights, with special 
attention to the years following 1970. The second half of the work addresses controversy 
over implied subsistence rights in the modern era. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the 
history of livestock trespass from the Blackfeet Reservation into the park and highlights 
the role that different interpretations of the Agreement of 1896 has played in shaping the 
debate. Chapter 4 traces the history of Blackfeet attempts to procure an economic stake 
in lands formerly belonging to the tribe and illustrates how community solidarity and 
activism yielded positive results.
My ultimate goal is to demonstrate that Blackfeet agency and assertiveness in 
recent decades has yielded some positive results, but that many of the long-standing 
exclusionary policies remain intact. Thus, although Blackfeet pressures upon the park 
have engendered some policy changes in recent decades, the founding ideals of the 
national park system have continued to trump native rights and the exercise of 
subsistence activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea still meet 
with strict interdiction.
A NOTE ON SOURCES
Much of the primary material that went into the making of this work was derived 
from park archival sources and government documents, i.e. Superintendent reports, 
briefing statements, legal rulings, task directives, correspondence letters, etc. When 
possible, I have tried to be specific when notating sources by providing box and folder 
numbers. Due to a backlog at the park’s archives, most park documents from the last two 
decades have not been screened for privacy concerns and are not open for public viewing. 
Therefore, I had to request many documents through the Freedom of Information Act, 
and those that I received did not include specific box and folder numbers. These 
documents are listed as “GNPA,” meaning from Glacier National Park Archives. I 
extend my gratitude to Deirdre Shaw, park archivist, and others who processed my 
requests in timely fashion.
I was also able to gather several documents from the tribe. The Tribal Documents 
Department is understaffed and has more pressing concerns than assisting academic 
projects; therefore, tribal documents are few and underrepresented in this study. I 
heartily thank Anna Lee Pemberton and the other staff at the Tribal Documents 
Department for taking time out of their busy schedules to honor my requests. I have 
completed the necessary procedures required by the Institutional Review Board in order 
to conduct research on human subjects. Thank you to Edward DesRosier, Ted Hall, 
Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, Leon Rattler, and Keith Tatsey for sacrificing your personal 
time to meet with me. I hope that my interviews of tribal members will provide some
measure of balance to a study based primarily on documents. Last, but not least, I thank 
the A.B. Hammond Fund for supporting my research trips and making this possible.
None of the interviewees have claimed to speak for the tribe as a whole. In this 
study, I focus largely on the interplay between the park and the tribe, but there are 
obvious and inherent problems with treating each party as a collective entity. As Leon 
Rattler told me, “we (the Blackfeet) are a nation within a nation.” Using the term “tribe” 
implies homogeneity and obscures the diversity of opinion that exists within the tribal 
community. Park documents that use the term “tribe” refer only to the representative 
body in contact with park officials and do not necessarily include the opinions of all tribal 
members. Due to time considerations, I was unable to gain input from all segments of the 
tribal population and many voices remain unheard. For simplicity and brevity’s sake, I 
reluctantly, and frequently, employ vague terms such as “the park” and “the tribe.” I 
encourage other scholars of this subject to seek input from different factions of the 
population and challenge and revise my assertions and interpretations.
Chapter 1—Roots of Policy: Culture, Economics, Science
The withdrawal of vast tracts of public domain from private sale and the creation 
of federally-owned national parks in the latter nineteenth-century established the United 
States as the world leader in the conservation movement. Over time, other nations copied 
the American model and created federal reserves of their own; however, the exportation 
of the ideals of the American national park system frequently had, and continue to have, 
detrimental effects on indigenous populations. As noted before, most tribes in the United 
States had been removed to reservations before the establishment of national parks. This 
was not the case in many of the places that imported the national park idea, i.e. Africa 
and Australia. The establishment of national parks openly dispossessed native groups of 
their ancestral homelands, and park administrators subsequently denied them access to 
their resource bases, as was the case in Glacier National Park. The Blackfeet, like other 
tribes, have sought to regain cultural self-determination and procure subsistence rights on 
their former lands, but park administrators, adhering to established ideals, have denied 
them these objectives. Before delving into a focused case-study of the relationship 
between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park, I will try to illustrate some of the 
causes of the situation. More specifically, in this chapter I will suggest some reasons 
why American policy-makers established and managed the first national parks under the 
premise that native inhabitation and use of park lands should be strictly prohibited.
No single factor exists that can neatly answer the larger question posed here. 
Historians continue to debate what factors influence and explain historical processes; 
some stress cultural and intellectual forces, while others emphasize economic and
material elements. In order to understand why the American national park idea precludes 
native inhabitation and certain subsistence usages, I will adopt a multifaceted approach 
and posit that a combination of cultural, economic, and intellectual factors led to early 
park management policies that have continued, with slight alterations, to guide the 
objectives of the national park system.
First, from a cultural perspective I will trace the historical evolution of the 
perception of Native Americans’ relation to nature up through the early years of the 
National Park Service. From Biblical times until recently, most associated the wilderness 
with the domain of the “wild man,” and one’s moral evaluation of the one, whether 
positive or negative, conditioned his estimation of the other.1 Demographic pressures and 
nationalistic impulses in mid-nineteenth century America, however, severed this 
symbiotic relationship, and as a Romantic version of wilderness grew and matured, the 
version of “the Indian” as Nature’s Child fell out of favor with the public. Thus, the 
wilderness and the Indian diverged on different paths into what historian Mark David 
Spence called “separate islands of the mind.”
Although changing images influenced early park policy regarding native 
subsistence usage, they alone cannot explain the situation. Equally if not more important 
were the economic realities involved with creating and managing novel entities such as 
the national parks. In an era of rampant laissezfaire capitalism and political divisiveness, 
the early parks lived precarious lives, and in order to ensure their survival, park officials 
needed to equip the parks for tourist groups who would justify the park system’s
1 Hayden White, “The Forms o f Wildness: Archaeology o f an Idea,” in Edward Dudley and Maximilian E. 
Novak, eds., The W ild M an Within: An Image in Western Thought from  the Renaissance to Romanticism, 
(Pittsburgh: University o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 7.
2 Mark David Spence, D ispossessing the W ilderness: Indian Rem oval and the Making o f  the National 
Parks, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 37.
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existence. Hot on the heels of the Indian Wars, tourists most likely would not tolerate the 
presence of “wild” natives threatening tourists or preying on the parks’ wildlife, one of 
the main attractions of the park system, and park officials responded in kind. Native uses 
of the park that did not challenge the serene expectations of the tourist industry, however, 
would face less severe restrictions than activities like hunting.
In addition to cultural and economic factors, the tenets o f late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century science further precluded the use of park resources by native 
peoples. Early modern ecologists openly criticized the commercialized development and 
natural resource management enacted by early park officials and offered a competing 
vision of park management advocating the preservation of natural conditions based on 
scientific knowledge. Like Western religion and philosophy, ecology enforced the 
dichotomy between Man and Nature and claimed that man only disrupted the balance of 
nature. Early ecologists did differentiate between primitive and modern man, but 
surmised that native use of park-lands was so insignificant that it played no role in natural 
processes, thus they, like all other humans, should be left out of the picture.
Culture
Hebraic mythology has proved highly influential to the development of the 
concepts of the wilderness and the “wild man” in the Western world. Like all ancient 
cultures, the Hebrews held a conception of an earthly paradise, and their core myth, the 
Garden of Eden, is, as historian William Cronon puts it, “so deeply embedded in Western 
thought that it crops up almost anytime people speak of nature.” Eden, as a “garden,” 
boasted a benign and beautiful landscape, in stark contrast to the dark and foreboding
3 William Cronon, ed., introduction to Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, (New  
York: W .W . Norton & Company, 1995), 36.
character of wilderness. As shepherds who believed that wilderness harbored evil, early 
Hebrews ascribed cursedness and wildness to the wandering life of the hunter and to the 
desert, thereby projecting God’s curse upon the wild men who inhabited the wilderness.4 
The equation of wilderness and its inhabitants with sin and immorality formed a central 
theme in the Judeo-Christian tradition and influenced Christian Americans well into the 
twentieth century.
The Judeo-Christian view holding nature and its denizens as inherently corrupt 
persisted, for the most part, throughout the entire medieval period.5 During the 
Renaissance, some thinkers began to consider society as fallen from natural perfection, 
and a more benign view of nature, albeit a cultivated and pastoral one, began to emerge 
alongside the traditional Judeo-Christian view of nature as an evil environment accursed 
by God. In turn, these two contradictory and competing visions of nature endowed upon 
the Wild Man two distinct personalities.6 Thus, the perceptions of wilderness and the 
wild man became inextricably linked as one’s opinion of nature influenced one’s opinion 
of its resident “savage.” As Europeans developed new navigation technologies and 
launched far-reaching expeditions in the fifteenth century, the largely conceptual debate 
over the abstract idea of the wild man assumed a more practical air as Europeans 
“discovered” real-life, physical manifestations of the Wild Man existing in a true state of 
nature.
4 For more on the role o f wilderness and the “wild man” within the Judeo-Christian tradition, see Roderick 
Nash, W ilderness and the Am erican Mind, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 13-15.
5 For more on medieval conceptions o f the “wild man,” see White, 20-21; for a more detailed discussion o f  
the works o f  the medieval scholar Saint Augustine and his influential opinions regarding nature and 
wilderness-dwelling “pagans,” see Nash, 4  -5.
6 For a more thorough analysis o f  the two visions o f  society and nature and their influence on the 
perception o f  the Wild Man, see White, 28-30.
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Fortunately for historians, the first meeting between Europeans and the 
inhabitants of the West Indies is remarkably well-documented. Early reports of the 
native population shone with optimism.7 Observations from subsequent voyages 
provided the first negative images of the natives of the New World.8 The ambivalence 
expressed by Columbus towards the natives of the New World would persist for centuries 
and would become one of the primary attitudes and themes concerning the perception of 
“the Indian” in America. Drawing upon moral evaluations of tribal peoples, Europeans 
and later Americans projected two conceptions onto the image of the Indian: that of the 
“good” Indian and that of the “bad” Indian. Euro-Americans would manipulate this 
dualistic image to justify their own intentions. Those that wished to exploit Indians 
advanced the “good” image, at times, as a means to convince others of the easy 
fulfillment of white desires, and at other times advanced the “bad” image as rationale for 
the perceived necessity of land-grabbing and assimilation schemes. Numerous historians 
of images of Indians have established the link between attitudes and intentions, positing 
that in order to understand the image of the Indian and its evolution oyer time, one must 
look at white social and cultural developments, for the image is more of a reflection of 
white attitudes and desires than of those held by natives themselves.9
In addition to his observations of the native populations, Columbus commented 
on the natural features of the New World. He extolled the fertility of the islands, made 
frequent references to the lush vegetation, and boasted of a tropical land rich in natural
7 Christopher Columbus, Select Documents Illustrating the Four Voyages o f  Columbus, ed. Cecil Jane, 
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1930), 8.
8 Ibid., 32.
9 See Gary B. Nash, “The Image o f the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind,” in The W ild Man Within,
55; Robert Berkhofer, Jr., The White M an ’s Indian: Images o f  the Am erican Indian from  Columbus to the 
Present, (New York: Vintage Books: 1979), xiv-xvi.
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resources.10 Other early explorers of the Caribbean echoed Columbus’s writings and 
helped portray America as an earthly paradise, and promoters o f discovery and 
colonization embellished rumors from across the Atlantic and described America as the 
“land of milk and honey.” Authors, most of whom had never set foot in the Western 
Hemisphere, glorified the New World and produced entire books on the western lands 
and its inhabitants.11 The glorified version of America as a second Garden of Eden 
prompted many Europeans to migrate across the Atlantic; however, for many the paradise 
myth quickly shattered against the harsh realities of North America and those living in 
close proximity to wild country developed a strong antipathy towards the American
1 9wilderness that would persist for many generations.
Armed with the divine mandate to replenish and subdue the earth, early 
Americans set out on a recovery mission to reinvent the whole earth in the Garden image 
with the goal of creating a pastoral, cultivated natural landscape, and pioneers took pride 
in their conquest of wild lands and used the triumph over nature to bolster their national
19ego. In addition to posing a threat to the pioneer’s physical survival, the wilderness 
represented a dark and sinister symbol.14 This component held special importance for the 
Puritans who tended to view the world through Manichean lenses and held providential
10 Columbus, 6-7, 12.
11 Sir Thomas M ore’s Utopia  became a best-seller when it first appeared in Latin in 1516, portraying the 
N ew  World as an uncorrupted environment with which to critique European institutions. M ichel de 
M ontaigne used Brazilian cannibals to criticize French institutions and depicted the “savages” as living in a 
benign Nature far purer than the artificial environments o f Europe, see Michel de Montaigne, “Cannibals,” 
in Selected Essays, ed. Donald M. Frame. (New York: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1943), 91, 86.
12 See Roderick Nash, 23-24.
13 Carolyn Merchant, “Reinventing Eden: Western Culture as a Recovery Narrative,” in W illiam Cronon, 
ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, 134; for an example o f early frontier 
boasts o f  conquering the wilderness and its effect on the national ego, see J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, 
Letters from  an Am erican Farmer, ed. Susan Manning, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 40.
In this work the author, an emigrant French aristocrat turned American farmer, provides som e o f  the best 
glim pses into life on the early frontier.
14 Nash, 24.
14
interpretations of history. The Puritans adhered to the Augustinian belief that wild 
country was a moral vacuum and its resident wild men heathens. Moreover, the Puritans 
associated wild country with Satan, and as Christ’s chosen army, they felt it their duty to 
vanquish the devil’s disciples: the American Indians. Victory in King Philip’s War, one 
of the bloodiest wars in American history, convinced the Puritans that they had enacted 
God’s will on earth.15
By the time of Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, an apocalyptic view of Indian 
history was becoming prevalent and Americans on the Atlantic seaboard already 
considered Indians an unthreatening, “spectral presence.” Historian Brian Dippie, 
writing in 1982, contends that the notion of the “vanishing American,” despite the 
ambivalence that has historically surrounded the term, has been the major theme 
pertaining to federal Indian policy. The idea of the “vanishing American,” Dippie 
asserts, underwent periods of fluctuating popularity and reevaluation, and attained the 
status of cultural myth as well as that of self-fulfilling prophecy.16 In search of a national 
identity in the early nineteenth century, Americans advanced the image of the Noble 
Savage to flaunt their imagined indigenous heritage. Furthermore, many Americans 
included an imagined wilderness in their national identity and employed natural 
landscapes to achieve national renewal. As later American expansion destroyed native 
cultures and the wilderness condition, many mourned the passing of each.
Many historians credit Romanticism as the source of America’s fascination with 
its wilderness condition. Beginning in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
the Romantic Movement rebelled against modernity and exalted nature in its wild form.
15 Berkhofer, 81-83.
16 Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing Am erican: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy , (Connecticut: 
W esleyan University Press, 1982), xii-xvi.
The concept of the sublime suggested the association of wild nature with God; deism, 
born in the Enlightenment out of religious skepticism, used the relationship between God 
and the wild as the basis for religion.17 The new values associated with nature in turn led 
to transformations in the character of the Noble Savage. Primitivism, although not a new 
concept, flourished during the Romantic period as intellectuals intensified their critiques 
of civilized society.18
The Romantic concepts of the sublime, deism, and primitivism left indelible 
imprints on the Western psyche and greatly influenced the unique American 
Romanticism that began to develop in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The 
ideas espoused by European Romantics drifted over the Atlantic and acquired special 
meaning for American intellectuals, who, unlike Europeans, had direct contact with 
“primitive” people and the wilderness condition. While Romanticism took firm root on 
American soil and had a profound impact on arts and letters in early nineteenth century 
America, many of its proponents consisted of Eastern, urban intellectuals who held 
different opinions than those living on the frontier; consensus has always been a rare 
phenomenon in American history. For most of the early nineteenth century, the 
Romantic attitude coexisted and competed with the pioneer aversion to wilderness.19
Romanticism acquired a uniquely American flavor due to the nationalistic fervor 
that gripped the nation following the War of 1812. Cultural nationalists urged American 
themes to replace those inherited from abroad and assumed Jefferson’s burden of
17 Nash, 46.
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s A D iscourse on Inequality, first published in 1755, is the prime example of  
Romantic primitivism, and although the “Noble Savage” boasted a long career by Rousseau’s time, to most 
modern observers Rousseau is, as historian Geoffrey Sym cox put it, “the high priest o f  the cult o f 
primitivism.”
19 See Nash, 45-48, 55.
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defending the American environment and its aboriginal population against denigrating 
attacks from across the Atlantic.20 They took their duty a step further and transformed 
the mission from one of defensive posture into one of national pride, flaunting an 
indigenous wilderness heritage as a form of national identity. For several decades, 
American Romantics used both the Romantic wilderness and its Noble Savage as 
nationalist images; over time, however, the Noble Savage fell out of favor with the 
American public while wilderness appreciation grew, effectively divorcing Nature’s 
Child from his “natural environment.”
The use of Indian themes to boast cultural identity did not originate with the rise 
of Romanticism in America. Discontented colonists, seeking to construct an original 
identity apart from Britain, mimicked Indian customs and donned Indian garb years 
before the American Revolution, often staging protests disguised as Indians, such as the 
Boston Tea Party. Rebellious colonists transformed the symbol of the Indian into a form 
of national self-definition, thus articulating a revolutionary, patriotic identity that they 
transposed onto military flags, newspaper mastheads, and on numerous handbills. 
Furthermore, the rioters conflated Indians with the land itself, suggesting that the 
American environment bestowed freedom and liberty upon its aboriginal populations, as 
well as upon its early white settlers. The American Indian and the land became symbols 
of a unique North American past.21
After independence, the federal government embarked on an ill-fated “right of 
conquest” campaign to procure lands from native tribes. The tribes resisted fiercely, and
20 For more on Jefferson and his refutation o f  European critiques, see Anthony F.C. W allace, Jefferson and  
the Indians: The Tragic Fate o f  the First Americans, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 76-78.
21 For more on Revolution era uses o f  Indian symbols, see Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1998), 12-26.
patriotic commentators recast the Indian in negative, racial terms. In spite of harsh 
criticism, secret fraternal societies based on Indian themes continued to operate. As in 
the past, anxieties brought on by social dislocation, in this case the rise of market 
competition, rapid capitalism, and wage labor, made primitive themes attractive and some 
men kept the secret societies alive despite their declining public image. The War of 
1812, in which most tribes sided with the British, further tarnished the native patriotic 
reputation.22
The Romantic emphasis on indigenous traditions, folk customs, and the 
glorification of a national past inexorably led intellectual patriots to re-embrace the 
Indian as a literary and artistic symbol for America in the decades following the War of 
1812. Looking to match European boasts of ruins and ancient monuments, some 
American literati declared the mysterious Indian mounds as evidence of a long-lost 
Golden Age.23 With Indian removal in the early 1830s, the notion of the vanishing 
Indian gained further acceptance, and members of the general public, seeking to repudiate 
any and all sorts of Anglicization, began to define themselves by a fleeting, illusory 
Indian past. The rising popularity of Indian plays in American theaters between 1828 and 
1838 testifies to the ideological allure of the vanishing Indian.24 For example, Metamora; 
or. the Last of the Wampanoags, enjoyed immense popularity in American theater until
22 For more on the changing nature o f  early American images, see Deloria, 44-60.
23 Even Americans who found a link with natives demeaning settled on the Indian antiquities in their search 
for a usable past, simply denying that they were Indian and claiming they were the work o f  a vanished 
white race, or o f  a vanished, “civilized” native race, in the M ississippi Valley. For more on theories 
surrounding the ruins, see Robert E. Bieder, Science Encounters the Indian, 1820-1880: The Early Years o f  
Am erican Ethnology, (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1986), 104-146.
24 Deloria, 64.
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just before mid-century, casting King Philip as the first revolutionary hero, the honorable 
first patriot who fought against the tyranny of the king.25
Responding to European allegations that American soil contained no historical or 
cultural associations, intellectual patriots seized on America’s wilderness condition and 
deemed an innocent land of awe-inspiring landscapes preferable to European soil, stained 
as it was with bloodshed and despotism. Romantic conceptions of wilderness did not, 
however, exclude native peoples. American artists and writers, reflecting the 
romanticism that characterized much of Western thought since the late eighteenth 
century, in turn considered the Native American part of the landscape. This view was not 
confined to intellectuals and elites, however, and the image of the wilderness as the 
domain of the Indian prevailed among the American public in the early nineteenth
9 f tcentury.
Prior to the establishment of efficient transcontinental railroad passage, most 
Americans living in the first half of the nineteenth century could only experience the 
American wilderness and its Indians vicariously through the images conveyed by 
literature and art. George Catlin’s paintings comprise one of the first important pictorial 
records of the Plains Indians and their homelands west of the Mississippi River. Catlin 
joined the ranks of Americans who mourned the disappearing wilderness and the 
vanishing Indian, and he dedicated decades to preserving a record of the Indians “in the 
uncivilized regions of their uninvaded country.” Catlin divided all Indians into two 
categories: the,corrupted and the pure. Like many of his contemporaries who believed 
the only “true” Indians were those uncontaminated by Euroamerican culture, Catlin
25 For more on Metamora and its significance, see Jill Lepore, The Name o f  War: King P h ilip ’s W ar and  
the O rigins o f  Am erican Identity, (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 191-204.
26 Spence, 12.
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sought to preserve the image of the “noble savage” before he inevitably perished before 
the onslaught of civilization. He appointed the same destiny to the American wilderness, 
writing that “[B]lack and blue cloth and civilization are destined, not only to veil, but to 
obliterate the grace and beauty of Nature.”27
Many scholars, too numerous to list here, have identified George Catlin as the 
first to move beyond regret to the preservation concept and have called him the first 
proponent of the national park idea. His idea of a national park conformed to the 
contemporary paradigm that held the wilderness as the domain of the Indian, and he 
called for a large expanse of federally protected land containing both “man and 
beast...the Indian and the buffalo.” Catlin’s sentiments received approval from one of 
America’s most influential wilderness philosophers: Henry David Thoreau. In 1858, 
Thoreau voiced similar sentiments as George Catlin had two decades earlier in his plea 
for the preservation of land for wildlife and native use. He asked: “Why should not 
w e.. .have our national preserves.. .in which the bear and the panther, and some even of 
the hunter race, may still exist, and not be ‘civilized off the face of the earth?” ’29 This 
inquiry may represent the last gasp for a protected, Indian-inhabited landscape.
The Civil War serves as a major turning point in the histories of the conceptions 
of wilderness and native peoples. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Americans saw the 
wilderness as the domain of the Indian, for better or for worse. In the latter part of the 
century, however, the earlier appreciation for an Indian wilderness split into separate 
movements for the confinement of Indians to reservations and the preservation of scenic
27 George Catlin, Letters and N otes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions o f  North Am erican Indians 
(1844); reprint, with an introduction by Marjorie Halpin, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1973), 1:5, 2.
28 Ibid., 260 (emphasis in original).
29 Thoreau, “Chesuncook,” in Atlantic M onthly 2 (1858), 317; quoted in Spence, 22.
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areas.30 To what do we attribute this massive paradigm shift? In Dispossessing the 
Wilderness, historian Mark David Spence competently argues that westward expansion, 
jingoist nationalism, and the racism that accompanied such trends shattered the Romantic 
version of wilderness as one rightfully inhabited by native peoples.
Indian Territory in the early nineteenth century provided the type of wilderness 
that confirmed the romantic expectations held by artists and writers such as George 
Catlin. This frontier, however, proved to be ephemeral. The withdrawal of British 
claims to the Oregon Territory in 1846 and American victory in the Mexican War in 1848 
opened up vast areas of new lands for American settlement, eradicating any pretensions 
about a permanent Indian Frontier. With the end of the Civil War in 1865, westward 
expansion resumed in full force, and America justified any and all actions as fulfillment 
of its moral and biological duty to replace, through subjugation or extermination, the 
inferior “race’s” misuse of the western half of the continent.31 Manifest Destiny 
demanded it.
The nationalistic drive for westward expansion helped create changing 
perceptions of native peoples. Relations with western tribes appeared relatively peaceful 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. During the 1850s and 1860s, however, 
violence escalated as contact between natives and white land-seekers increased. Heavily 
publicized conflicts proliferated all around the West, and as a result of these Western 
wars, images of “real,” present-day savages occupying coveted lands replaced romantic 
images of disappearing aboriginals living harmoniously with nature.32 Widespread anti- 
Indian sentiment engulfed many settler communities in the West, despite growing
30 Spence, 37.
31 Ibid., 28.
32 Lepore, 224; Spence, 30.
sentimentalism adhered to by many elites in the East. The guiding evolutionary theory of 
the day asserted that in order to assimilate into the broader culture, tribal peoples must 
abandon their ties to nature, settle onto reservations, and embrace “civilized,” sedentary 
pursuits such as agriculture or the raising of livestock. Furthermore, the release of 
Darwin’s Origin o f  Species in 1859 provided strong evidence for a common origin 
among all humans and mitigated the controversy between polygenesis and 
monogenesis. For some, Darwin’s work proved that the Indian could progress to a 
“civilized” state if given the right conditions, i.e. those that promoted private property 
conceptions. This thought found expression in federal policy with the Dawes Allotment 
Act of 1887, which passed through the combined efforts of “friends of the Indians” and 
hungry land-seekers in the West. Whether Indian hater or “friend of the Indian,” almost 
everyone agreed that fulfillment of America’s Manifest Destiny required the physical 
destruction, physical removal, or cultural transformation of tribal peoples.34 The 
establishment of the reservation system just preceded the creation of the first national 
parks; thus, Indian removal became a familiar and accepted strategy.
Spence’s argument adequately illustrates how wilderness preservation was
oc
predicated on native dispossession. What he does not explore, however, was how the 
conditions in late nineteenth-century America he described affected the motivations for 
the American public actually to seek out and utilize such aesthetic reservations after the 
turn of the century. What role, or lack thereof, did native peoples play in the allure of the 
national parks for the potential tourist? By analyzing the impact that modernity had on 
the American sense of identity in the late nineteenth century, we see that Americans
33 Bieder, 142.
34 Spence, 30.
35 Ibid., 39.
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developed a new brand of primitivism that, instead of emulating the American Indian as 
in the past, embraced a perceived wilderness condition inherited from white ancestors. 
Thus, visitors to the national parks early in the twentieth century did not completely 
divorce the image of “the Indian” from that of the wilderness, but rather relegated 
him/her to the status of “obstacle overcome,” an “emblem of history.”
As Americans increasingly viewed reservations as the appropriate dwelling-places 
for native peoples, new nationalistic impulses would further contribute to the demise of 
an Indian wilderness in the American psyche. Many Americans in the early nineteenth 
century had harkened back to an Indian past when articulating a national identity. By 
mid-century, however, the use of the Indian, and of the Noble Savage specifically, as a 
source of cultural identity had fallen out of favor among white Americans as the nation 
matured and developed a history of its own.36 As the century progressed, more and more 
writers seized upon the wilderness condition as a source of national identity and, armed 
with growing public support for nature appreciation, convinced Congress to set aside 
national parks.37 Around the turn of the century we witness a surge in primitivism as 
many Americans came to view “over-civilization” as a threat to the virility and toughness 
of the American character, and publicists for the parks seized upon these industrial 
anxieties and promoted primitive, wilderness virtues as remedies to dreary city-life. As 
in the past, social dislocations led men/women to idealize and envy the freedom of the 
“wild man,” and, in America as elsewhere, this had frequently taken the form of the 
Noble Savage. However, in the late nineteenth century historical developments and
36 See Lepore, 224-225; Berkhofer, 95.
37 Historian Alfred Runte convincingly argued that the search for a distinct national identity provided the 
initial impetus behind scenic preservation. See Alfred Runte, National Parks: The Am erican Experience,
2 nd ed. (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1987), xx.
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nationalistic impulses would offer a new and more powerful “primitive” source of 
inspiration: the frontier pioneer.
In the antebellum years, industrialization, the rise of big business, urbanization, 
immigration, and other factors associated with “progress” led to widespread social and 
cultural dislocation, and many Americans came to view an effeminate urbanism as a 
threat to the development of the youth. Some, as in the past, sought to emulate the ways 
of the Noble Savage as remedies for urban life, but, more commonly, others looked back 
to a uniquely white past and advanced the frontier pioneer as a source Of inspiration for a 
patriotic, wilderness symbol.38 After a series of alarming reports decrying the end of the 
frontier appeared towards the end of the century, writers seeking to promote national 
parks employed the frontier pioneer as evidence of an inherited wilderness condition.
In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau Report officially announced the passing of the 
frontier. Moreover, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier essays after 1893 called the 
wilderness condition the essential formative influence on the national character and his 
works exerted great influence over writers who saw the passing of the frontier as 
depriving America of a unique past.39 In 1897, Teddy Roosevelt, co-founder of the 
Boone and Crockett Club, prolific writer, and advocate of the American wilderness, 
wrote The American Wilderness: Wilderness Hunters and Wilderness Game, in which the 
future president echoed Turner by arguing that the frontier life endowed the pioneers with 
fortitude, integrity, and strength of character, citing such legendary folk heroes as Davy
38 In Playing Indian, pp. 96-122, Philip Deloria analyzes these competing visions by comparing the lives o f  
Ernest Thompson Seton, founder o f the Woodcraft Indians and the Boy Scouts o f  America, and Charles 
Beard, Seton’s successor as head o f  the Boy Scouts. Whereas Seton advanced the image o f  the Noble 
Savage as Nature’s Child living in communion with nature, Beard, more characteristic o f  the time period, 
held Indians in low  esteem  and advanced the image o f the pioneer who succeeded in taming the wilderness.
39 In “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground, 72, 
W illiam Cronon cites the “frontier myth,” in addition to the Romantic notion o f  the sublime, as one o f  the 
sources for a widespread positive reappraisal o f  nature in America.
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Crockett, Daniel Boone, and Kit Carson. As did Turner, Roosevelt viewed the Indian as 
an obstacle to progress and civilization, making frequent references to the glorious 
triumphs of the pioneers, who, as “heralds of the oncoming civilization,” overcame the 
savage, warrior tribes, the “red lords of the land.”40 Teddy Roosevelt greatly contributed 
to the nascent form of primitivism that excluded the American Indian, but it was his 
contemporary, fellow primitivist John Muir, who developed this theme more specifically 
within the context of the National Park System.
Most historians acknowledge John Muir as one of the foremost writers in 
awakening public opinion to the benefits of preserving natural landscapes. In Our 
National Parks, Muir echoed the primitivist sentiments of the age and wrote that many 
over-civilized Americans were “[A]wakening from the stupefying effects of the vice of 
over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury,” and “are beginning to find out 
that.. .wildness is a necessity.”41 Like the Transcendentalists before him, Muir believed 
that nature held intrinsic value and mystic qualities, and he relayed his thoughts in many 
essays that became minor bestsellers around the turn of the century. Muir promoted the 
national park experience as the perfect remedy to rid oneself of the “dust and disease” of 
modernity. Although he inherited many of his core tenets from the Romantic Movement, 
Muir held a less romantic view of wilderness areas populated by native peoples.
Several environmental historians have argued that Muir ignored Native 
Americans when formulating his own wilderness philosophy and that his idea of
40 See Theodore Roosevelt, “The American Wilderness: Wilderness Hunters and the Wilderness Game,” in 
J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson, eds., The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1998), 66-68.
41 John Muir, “Selections from Our N ational Parks, ” in The G reat New W ilderness Debate, 48.
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wilderness held no place for the American Indian.42 While I do not dispute these 
assertions, I find it helpful to relate M uir’s opinions of native cultures to larger cultural 
conceptions in order to reinforce the declining role that the Indian played in America’s 
growing wilderness identity. Although Muir made numerous derogatory remarks 
regarding the Indians he initially met in both California and in Alaska, using terms like 
“dirty,” “lazy,” “superstitious,” “hideous,” etc., elsewhere in his abundant commentary 
on Native American cultures he reflected more favorably on native cultures and their 
relationship with the environment.43 How, then, do we explain this ambivalence?
M uir’s experience with native tribes in Alaska after 1879 piqued his interest in 
Indian views of nature, and as he had more contact with the Alaskan natives his 
appreciation for native ways grew as he realized the similarities between his own 
philosophy and those held by native cultures relatively uncorrupted by white civilization. 
Like Catlin and Thoreau before him, Muir believed that “civilized” Indians were no, 
longer “true” Indians and he held little respect for the “degraded” Indian who had fallen 
from grace. Writing of an Indian he met in the California mountains, Muir regretted that 
“unfortunately he proved to be a tame Indian from the Tule Reservation.. .claimed to be 
civilized, and spoke contemptuously of ‘Wild Indians,’ and so of course his inherited 
instincts were blurred or lost.” For Muir, early primal cultures lived harmoniously on the 
land before the coming of the whites, whereas Indians tainted by civilization had lost 
their environmental instincts.44
42 See Spence, 23; Michael P. Cohen, The Pathless Way: John M uir and Am erican Wilderness, (Madison: 
The University o f W isconsin Press, 1984), 189.
43 In Henry Thoreau and John M uir Among the Indians, Richard F. Fleck collects, presents, and analyzes, 
many o f  Muir’s writings, especially those concerning the Alaskan natives, that provide a counterpoint to 
the pejorative remarks highlighted by historians such as Spence and Cohen. See Richard F. Fleck, Henry 
Thoreau and John M uir Among the Indians, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1985), 28-70, 84-90.
44 See Fleck, 21-30, 69.
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Muir was not alone in his view of late nineteenth-century American Indians.
After the Civil War, popular artists using new mediums such as photography and sound 
recordings portrayed reservation Indians as drunk and lazy and impressed upon the public 
the transition of the American Indian from “wild, Noble Savage” to “degraded, inferior 
reservation Indian.”45 For primitivists like Muir, the noble, ecological Indian was a 
vanishing race, doomed before the inexorable juggernaut of white civilization, and the 
“real” Indian had no rightful place in the American wilderness. He expressed his view 
succinctly in Our National Parks when he wrote: “[As] to Indians, most of them are dead 
or civilized into useless innocence.”46
Economics
In addition to analyzing changes in cultural perceptions of the wilderness and the 
Indian, it is important to inquire whether the preservation of nature in its perceived 
natural condition constituted the primary goal of early park management. The enabling 
acts for the early parks did include preservation as a mandate, but also provided 
allowances for use and development. The inherent juxtaposition in early park legislation 
generated much ambiguity and left park officials with considerable freedom to interpret 
the dual mandate as they saw fit. By analyzing early park programs and activities, we 
can safely conclude that the use element took precedence over preservation as economic 
realities necessitated that the parks take steps to meet the aesthetic expectations of a 
nascent tourist industry. Furthermore, early preservation efforts largely served to 
enhance the tourist experience and consisted of protective and selective measures to 
safeguard the scenic attractions of the parks. For native groups who had used the parks
45 For more on late nineteenth century negative Indian imagery, see Berkhofer, 101-102; Deloria, 104-105, 
117-118.
46 John Muir, “Selections from O ur National Parks,” in The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, 57..
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as resource bases, this meant that some of their customary subsistence activities, 
especially hunting, became prohibited as undesirable, consumptive use of park resources, 
while others, if they proved compatible to the national park ideal, came under restrictive 
regulations.
In “The Wilderness Narrative and the Cultural Logic of Capitalism,” British 
environmental philosopher Carl Talbot offers a Marxist critique of the national park idea 
and challenges the myth that national parks serve as sanctuaries of untransformed nature. 
He argues that human activity has made the parks artificial, social constructs in which 
Nature is made to conform to the economic and psychological needs of capitalism. After 
analyzing, in true Marxist fashion, the reification of nature and the role of wilderness as a 
leisure resource, Talbot concludes that capitalism’s management of nature in the parks 
results in “nature emerging as a ‘stylized spectacle’ packaged for easy consumption.”47 
Although this cynical interpretation may offend some who consider the national park 
system the unselfish side of the conservation movement, Marxist philosophers are not the 
only thinkers who have considered material elements in analyzing the park system. 
Several renowned environmental historians, such as Alfred Runte and Richard W.
Sellars, too, have highlighted the powerful influence that economic factors and the tourist 
industry have exerted upon the creation and management of the national park system.
Both Sellars and Runte have argued that from the beginning, the national parks 
served corporate profit motives. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, anticipating a 
monopoly on tourist travel through the Montana Territory, lobbied relentlessly for the
47 Carl Talbot, “The Wilderness Narrative and the Cultural Logic o f Capitalism,” in The G reat N ew  
W ilderness D eba te , 326-328.
28
Yellowstone National Park proposal.48 Decades later, Louis Hill and the Great Northern 
Railway, also with a clear profit motive in mind, weighed in heavily on the movement to 
establish Glacier National Park and initiated a fierce advertising campaign, generating ad 
brochures and printing magazine spreads to promote the park and the scenery within.49 
Corporate park proponents sought to establish parks around monumental scenery and 
held little regard for the preservation of ecological integrity through large nature reserves, 
thus highlighting the role that economic motivations played in the birth of the national 
parks.50
The collaboration between private business and the federal government, 
established during the creation of Yellowstone and continuing through the creation of the 
early parks, helped create a new kind of public land use in the West as the railroads, 
boasting magnificent landscapes on protected lands, contributed to the emergence of 
tourism as an economically realistic form of land use.51 In a period of voracious resource 
exploitation, park proponents assured politicians of the potential economic returns 
tourism could provide as soon as the parks were ready to accommodate them; thus, in 
order to maintain a politically viable rationale for the national parks, park administrators 
had to develop the parks to please future tourists, the parks’ primary constituents and 
bases of political support. For this reason, absolute preservation of natural areas was 
unrealistic; at the same time, too many unsightly intrusions into the landscape would
48 For more on corporate involvement in establishing the first national park, see Richard W. Sellars, 
Preserving Nature in the National Parks, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 8-11.
49 See Runte, 92-93.
50 The concept o f  “monumentalism” is one o f  the main underlying themes in Runte’s National Parks, and 
he applies it in his analysis o f all the parks established before 1934, see pp. 1-138.
51 Sellars, 10.
29
detract from the parks’ aesthetic appeal. Some sort of balance between these 
contradictory goals had to be reached.
The dual objectives of the national park idea found first expression in the enabling 
legislation for the early parks. The Act of 1864 that spelled out the objective of Yosemite 
Valley dictated that the lands be preserved for “public use, resort and recreation,” thus 
providing for a reserve for nonutilitarian purposes.52 Similarly, Yellowstone’s enabling 
act expressed the anticipation of recreational tourism as the Park’s purpose by setting 
apart over two million acres “as a public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and 
enjoyment of the people” and by making allowances for leases “for building 
purposes... the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors” to provide for the 
comfort and convenience of tourists. Protection of the natural landscape coexisted with 
recreation as a stated purpose of the park, as Yellowstone’s enabling act also called for 
the “preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural 
curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition.”53
Although nearly two decades passed between the creation of Yellowstone and the 
next national parks, the national park idea moved into the twentieth century with few 
alterations from the standards set in 1864 and 1872.54 Other parks created before 1916, 
when Congress established the National Park Service in order to provide centralized 
management for the growing park system, also contained ill-defined concepts in their 
enabling acts with little indication of their true intent. For example, Glacier National 
Park’s enabling act of 1910 conferred exclusive control of the park to the Secretary of the
52 “An Act authorizing a Grant to the State o f  California o f the ‘Yo-Sem ite V alley,’ and o f the Land 
embracing the ‘Mariposa Big Tree Grove,” June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 325.
53 “An Act to set apart a certain Tract o f  Land lying near the Head-waters o f  the Yellowstone River as a 
public Park,” March 1, 1972, 17 Stat. 32.
54 Runte, 64.
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Interior, who was responsible for “the care, protection, management, and improvement” 
of the park, and whose duty it was to “provide for the preservation of the park in a state 
of nature.” In clear deference to use interests, the Act also specifically allowed for the 
harvest of dead timber, railroad right of way, the leasing of hotels, mining, and water 
reclamation projects.55 Early administrators of the national parks interpreted the enabling 
acts in similar fashions, liberally manipulating the extant conditions of the parks through 
development for tourism and natural resource management in order to ensure public 
enjoyment.56
As Richard Sellars noted, scenery “provided the primary inspiration for national 
parks and, through tourism, their primary justification... Thus, a kind of ‘facade’ 
management became the accepted practice in parks: protecting and enhancing the scenic 
facade of nature for the public’s enjoyment.”57 Yellowstone National Park, established 
decades before the next national parks, served as a testing ground for the national park 
idea and policies and attitudes developed there set precedents for managers of later parks. 
In Yellowstone, as elsewhere, Mother Nature had created the monumental scenery, but it 
was left to human vigilance to ensure and guarantee the safety of the park’s scenery and 
clientele.
The Indian Wars on the northern plains worried early park officials at 
Yellowstone who feared that the presence of Indians could deter tourist traffic in the 
park. Hoping to quell tourist apprehension, the first park guidebook reassured visitors that
55 “An Act To establish ‘The Glacier National Park’ in the Rocky Mountains south o f the international 
boundary line, in the State o f  Montana, and for other purposes,” May 11, 1910, 36 Stat. 354.
56 Sellars, 27, 4.
57 Ibid., 4-5.
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“ [DJangers from Indians there is none.” This reassurance proved premature, and the 
spillover of conflicts into Yellowstone cast doubt on the government’s ability to maintain 
the park as a safe vacation destination. From 1877 to 1879, a series of Indian outbreaks 
near Yellowstone negatively impacted the park’s public relations image and influenced 
exclusionary park policy towards Indians in the decades that followed. For five days in 
August of 1877, Chief Joseph and his band of Nez Perce wound through Yellowstone 
National Park during their famous flight from federal troops. While there, the Nez Perce 
took tourists prisoner and left two dead. During the next two years, conflicts with other 
regional tribes, the Bannock and the Sheep-Eaters, contributed to the bad publicity as 
local rumors and newspaper reports portrayed the park as a haven for violent Indian 
marauders. Park officials responded by minimizing the past incidents and publicly 
condemning them as unprecedented anomalies. In order to deter future problems, park 
officials extended great effort toward eliciting promises from tribal leaders pledging to 
stay out of the park and advertised these agreements to reassure the public and comfort 
potential visitors. Furthermore, park officials initiated an effective campaign of 
characterizing the thermal features of the park as taboo to the Indians in the area.59 The 
erasure of natives from the history of the park served two primary purposes. First, the 
argument that natives did not regularly use the area lent support to the claim that the 
hostile incidents were highly unusual. Second, the portrayal of the park as unused by 
humans reinforced the image of the park as a “pristine” wilderness area. Thus, early park
58 Peter Nabokov and Lawrence Loendorf, Restoring a Presence: Am erican Indians and Yellowstone 
N ational Park, (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 2004), 236, 23.
59 For more on the Indian outbreaks and the responses o f park officials, see Nabokov and Loendorf, 225- 
238.
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managers at Yellowstone considered banning Indians from the park, both physically and 
historically, necessary for the continued security and integrity of the park.60
In Restoring a Presence: American Indians and Yellowstone National Park, 
authors Peter Nabokov and Lawrence Loendorf argued that the “anxieties raised by 
native peoples moving freely in and around the park’s western boundary presented 
opportunities for military authorities to argue for their own protective necessity to the 
park.”61 The military did assume stewardship of the park in 1886; nevertheless, images 
of hostile Indians running loose through the park lingered in the public memory, and as 
late as 1900, Yellowstone’s acting superintendent, a captain of the 1st Cavalry, reassured 
prospective visitors that the park was safe from renegade Indians.62 The highly 
publicized Indian outbreaks in Yellowstone in the late 1870s jeopardized the success of 
the national park idea, and subsequent efforts to dissociate the park from freely-roaming 
bands of Indians influenced managers in later parks who adopted similar exclusionary 
policies for similar reasons.
Even after concerns over tourist safety had abated, park officials at Yellowstone 
and elsewhere considered native groups, especially hunters, threats to the parks’ 
preservation mandate and continued enforcing exclusionary policies. Although early 
park officials focused largely on development for tourism, they also engaged in natural 
resource management as part of the preservation mandate in the enabling legislation. 
Natural resource management, argued Sellars, largely served tourism purposes and 
functioned as an adjunct to tourism management. Monumental scenery may have
60 Ibid., xi.
61 Ibid., 224.
62 Ibid., 230.
63 Sellars, 70.
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provided the initial impetus for the parks’ creation and constituted the parks’ principal 
attraction early on, but wildlife quickly became another significant feature of the parks 
and added to their tourist appeal. Early efforts to preserve monumental scenery and 
wildlife assumed a protective, and selective, nature as park officials deemed only certain 
types of wildlife desirable for the tourist experience. The desirable species consisted 
primarily of game animals, and protective, anti-poaching measures did not differentiate 
between game hunters and natives who had traditionally hunted on park lands for 
subsistence purposes.
General attitudes regarding desirable and undesirable wildlife greatly affected the 
aesthetic expectations of the tourist industry, and in turn directly influenced early national 
park wildlife policy. Early park managers, in efforts to preserve selective elements of the 
park experience, enacted programs to protect game species, prized by hunters and highly 
popular for public viewing, by eliminating undesirable predators and by developing anti­
poaching regulations.64 Decades before ecological principles gained a foothold in 
national park wildlife management, the common belief assumed natural predators would 
not check game populations, but would outright destroy entire herds.65 Predator 
reduction programs, an established management practice well before the birth of the 
National Park Service, constituted the major preservation policy in Glacier National Park 
as attention toward wildlife dominated most preservation activity during the first decade 
of the park’s existence. There, as elsewhere, rangers used strychnine to reduce the coyote
64 Managers focused on protecting populations o f ungulates (hoofed grazing animals such as elk, m oose, 
bison, deer, and bighorn sheep) and bears. Bears, although predatory, were popular among tourists, and 
early park officials allowed roadside bear feeding and bear shows at garbage dumps. Bears attracted much 
attention in Glacier National Park, and pictures o f  roadside bear feeding appear frequently in summer 
editions o f the Hungry H orse News until the practice was discontinued in the late 1960s. Hungry Horse 
News back issues available at the Glacier National Park Archives, W est Glacier, MT.
65 Thomas R. Dunlap, Saving A m erica’s Wildlife, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 70.
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population and hunted mountain lions with hounds.66 First instituted in 1914, predator 
reduction programs continued for nearly two decades and brought wolves and mountain 
lions to near extinction in most parks.67
Another game protection strategy that outlived and proved far more consequential 
to tribes like the Blackfeet focused on the elimination of human predation in the national 
parks. A concern for GNP’s first Superintendent, the threat of poaching represented a 
major obstacle for the early administrators of Yellowstone, the first national park.68 
Yellowstone, which boasted, and still boasts, the most impressive variety of large 
mammals, dominated the formulation of wildlife policy in the parks and the steps taken 
by its early civilian and military caretakers established precedents that influenced nature 
management throughout the entire park system for decades.69
The enabling legislation for Yellowstone National Park made wildlife protection 
the legal responsibility of its caretakers; however, the legislation failed to provide 
specific laws for governing the region or legal machinery by which officials could 
enforce regulations or punish transgressors. The ambiguities and omissions of the 
enabling legislation created major difficulties for the early civilian administration of the 
park that struggled, and largely failed, to protect the park’s attractions from vandals and
7flpoachers. Nathaniel P. Langford, upon his appointment as the first Superintendent of
66 For more on early wildlife preservation policy in Glacier National Park, see C.W. Buckholtz, “The 
Historical Dichotomy o f U se and Preservation in Glacier National Park,” (M.A. Thesis, University of 
Montana, 1969), 23-26.
67 Sellars, 24.
68 W illiam R. Logan, first Superintendent o f GNP, heeded Secretary o f  the Interior Walter L. Fisher’s 
instructions regarding protection o f the park from poachers and other depredations and, like other park 
Superintendents, sought to preserve the park by protecting it from outside influences. See Buckholtz, 15.
69 Sellars, 24.
70 For a brief interpretation o f the shortcomings o f  Y ellow stone’s enabling legislation, see Duane Hampton, 
H ow the U.S. C avalry Saved Our National Parks, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 32-33.
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the park, urged prohibiting all hunting, fishing, and trapping within the park under severe 
penalties. However, legal machinery to enforce rules and punish transgressors remained 
decades away and reports of skin-hunting parties ruthlessly slaughtering the park’s game 
animals and depleting its herds continued to plague Langford’s civilian successors. Early 
civilian administrators posted lists of prohibitions throughout the park, but, lacking any 
legal backing or public sentiment, such efforts failed to deter vandals and poachers who 
scoffed at the park’s weak enforcement efforts.71 After fourteen years of civilian 
administration, during which time a parsimonious and divided Congress failed to provide 
an administrative framework for a sometimes-scandalous and ill-reputed park 
government, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the Secretary of War to detail troops 
to the park, ushering in a new era of national park administration.
In How the U.S. Cavalry Saved Our National Parks, Duane Hampton argued that 
during the thirty-two years of military protection of Yellowstone, the officers in charge 
revised and enforced the rules and regulations governing the park, overcame various 
threats to the park’s existence, determined policy, and set a precedent for a national park 
system. Like their civilian predecessors, the military officers initially lacked a clearly- 
defined protection policy and judicial framework; unlike their predecessors, the military 
developed extralegal measures and created an atmosphere of general respect for park 
rules. Through its activities, the military administration gradually developed policy that 
later park officials would adopt and transform into National Park policy.72
As the title indicates, Hampton argued throughout the work that the military administration.succeeded 
where the civilian administration failed, thereby saving the national park system.
71 For reports about game losses, see Hampton, 35, 39-41, 48, 50, 52, 55, 61; for early civilian attempts to 
establish and enforce regulations, see pp. 36, 3 8 ,4 4 , 50, 61, 70-71.
72 Ibid., 81 ,90-111 .
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In the years following the park’s establishment in 1872, park employees had 
occasionally expressed concern over poaching by Indian hunters. As signs of wildlife 
depletion became more visible in the late 1870s, conservationist groups pressured park 
officials to ban Indian interlopers in the park, decrying the slaughter of the buffalo by the 
“red ones” and condemning the “deviltry” of the hunting by fire-drive method.73 The 
first military superintendent of Yellowstone, Captain Moses Harris, took very seriously 
his task of preventing Indians from entering the park. Harris viewed bands of Shoshone 
and Bannock Indians along the western border as serious threats to the park’s game. Like 
many sport hunters and settlers of the time, Harris believed natives recklessly slaughtered 
game in a more destructive manner than did white sport-hunters. Scout details easily 
tracked native hunting bands who tended to travel in large groups, shadowing the natives 
and warning them off when encountered. Such strategies did not completely prevent 
natives from entering the park, but did serve to regulate their movements. Smaller bands 
continued to enter the park through the late 1880s, and by the early 1890s reservation 
agents proved more successful in restricting native movements off of their respective 
reservations. By this time, however, the threat of local white hunters had eclipsed 
concerns over native use of the region.74
The efficacy of military policing and patrolling in protecting the park’s natural 
resources attracted widespread attention and approval, and the Secretary of War, at the 
bequest of the Secretary of the Interior, deployed the military to perform similar duties in 
Yosemite, General Grant, and Sequoia National Parks in California beginning in 1891.75
73 Nabokov and Loendorf, 238.
74 For information on early military efforts to deter native hunting, see Spence, 62-64.
75 Historian Richard Sellars acknowledged that by the time o f  the creation o f the National Park Service in 
1916, illegal hunting had diminished due to the aggressive protectionist policies o f  the military. See
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After decades of impassioned pleas requesting legal machinery to reinforce park 
regulations failed to have any effect, a high-profile poaching case involving bison and the 
national press finally coerced Congress into taking action. The Act of May 7, 1894, in 
addition to establishing a formal government for Yellowstone National Park, prohibited 
all hunting, killing, wounding, or capturing of any bird or wild animal, laying the 
foundation for all subsequent park wildlife legislation.76
As Congress created new national parks around the turn of the century, park 
managers remained committed to the protection of game from human predators, native or 
otherwise. Many officials at the new parks, however, chose to break from the 
Yellowstone tradition of dissociating the national park idea from the image of “the 
Indian.” As Americans settled the West and the dangers of the frontier passed, a Western 
antiquity began to command attention and received approval by the tourist industry.77 At 
many national parks, the corporate interests so crucial in the establishment of the parks 
isolated Indians in model settlements as curiosities in order to draw tourist dollars. 
Drawing upon larger cultural conceptions of the Indians as a vanishing race, park 
concessionaires used native peoples to represent relics of a lost age, as part of a 
“museumized” presentation based on romantic, frontier themes, as part of the scenery. In 
1928, NPS Director Horace Albright wrote that the “best place for the Dude to see the 
Indian in his natural state is in some of the national parks,” echoing George Catlin’s
Sellars, 71. John Muir lauded the army’s presence in California’s parks in Our National Parks, 1901. See 
Muir, in The G reat N ew Wilderness D ebate, pp. 50.
76 For more on the successful battle to achieve legal structure and the events leading up to the Act o f May 7, 
1894, see Hampton, 113-127.
77 Earl Pomeroy, In Search o f  the Golden West: The Tourist in Western America, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1957), 37.
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sentiment uttered almost a century earlier that national parks should be closely associated 
with Native Americans.78
During the early years in Yellowstone, concerns about tourism as well as game 
species motivated efforts to exclude Indians from the park as their presence threatened 
both the recreation and preservation objectives of the national park ideal. As time passed 
and conditions changed, the park system incorporated the image of the “traditional 
Indian” into its aesthetically-oriented policy of fagade management. Formerly a liability 
to the park system’s recreation element, Indians became a profitable marketing tool.
What park officials did not condone, however, was the spectacle of “real” Indians 
running loose and threatening the safety of tourists, as they had done in Yellowstone’s 
infant years, or consuming the park’s prized natural resources. Hunting, the primary 
point of contention between Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet in the first half of 
the twentieth-century, held no place within the American national park ideal.
Science
In 1916 Congress created the National Park Service to provide a unified 
administrative framework for the growing system of national parks. Overall, the National 
Park Service continued the management practices of its military and civilian predecessors
7Qdiscussed in the preceding section. The park service’s bent towards development for 
recreational tourism did not, however, remain unchallenged as a growing number of 
ecologists condemned the utilitarian nature of park management. Although the influence 
and impact of ecology on the national parks was minimal and short-lived in the early 
twentieth century, spanning roughly a decade in the 1930s, its ideas experienced a
78 Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek, Am erican Indians & National Parks, (Tucson: University o f  
Arizona Press, 1998), 232.
79 Sellars, 48.
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resurgence in the late 1960s and had direct influence on the formulation of environmental 
law. Early ecologists criticized the predator control programs, excessive commercial 
development, and the general nonscientific approach taken by the National Park Service 
towards park management; nevertheless, they considered the national parks the ideal 
places for the preservation of nature in its original state and fought bitterly to set aside 
protected wilderness areas in the parks. Largely unsuccessful, their ideas about 
mankind’s, and the Indian’s, role in natural processes would inform later park legislation, 
culminating in the Wilderness Act of 1964. Although early ecologists differentiated 
between primal and modern man, in the end all humans, including Native Americans, 
were no longer recognized as agents of natural change and thus held no rightful place in 
the national park system.
In a 1920 article for Ecology, Barrington Moore wrote that ecology represented 
the third stage in the development of the biological sciences. First, Darwin and others 
developed evolutionary biology that told humankind of its origins and connections to 
other forms of life. Later in the nineteenth century, academics specialized in different 
branches of biological science, constituting Moore’s second stage. Within this milieu of 
academic, specialized studies at major universities emerged the third, or synthetic, stage: 
ecology.80 The “very essence of ecology,” according to Victor E. Shelford and Frederick 
C. Clements, two of the leading pioneers in the field, “is the synthesis derived from the 
exhaustive analysis of the community and its habitat.”81 Ecology went beyond focused 
studies of individual species and analyzed the relations of organisms to their environment 
and the interactions between them. Given its focus on habitats and community
80 Barrington Moore, “The Scope o f  Ecology,” Ecology, v .l n o .l (January 1920): 3.
81 Frederick E. Clements and Victor E. Shelford, Bio-Ecology, (New York: John W iley & Sons, Inc., 1939),
populations, the pursuit of ecological knowledge required vast ecosystems in somewhat- 
natural states; thus, the strict preservation of natural areas became a primary goal for 
early ecologists. As Shelford wrote, a “branch of biological science which obtains its 
inspiration in the natural order of original habitats must depend upon the preservation of 
natural areas for the solution of many problems.”82
In 1917, a committee of about twenty-five members from the Ecological Society 
of America set out to create a list of all preserved areas in North America in which 
natural conditions existed. The result of the project, The Naturalist’s Guide to the 
Americas, was published in 1925, and in addition to listing a number of such areas, the 
work contained essays by ecologists eliciting the uses and values of preserving natural 
areas. Contributors to the volume suggested many reasons besides scientific research and 
education, the central objectives for ecologists, for the importance of natural areas. Some
highlighted cultural elements, noting the value of natural areas to literature, art, and
0-1
landscape architecture. Others underscored the practical and economical importance 
natural areas held for silviculture, geography, biology, and agriculture, arguing that the 
study of such areas could contribute to knowledge of pest control, possible medicines,
Q,1
and the raising of livestock. In addition to scientific and utilitarian reasons, some 
contributors noted the rising appreciation of protected landscapes for scenic and
82 Victor E. Shelford, ed., introduction to The N atu ralist’s Guide to the Am ericas, (Baltimore: The W illiams 
and W ilkins Company, 1926), 3.
83 See Seldon Lincoln Whitcomb, “The Value o f Natural Areas to Literature and Art,” in Shelford, ed., The 
N atu ralist’s Guide to  the Americas, 7-8; Stanley White, “The Value o f Natural Preserves to the Landscape 
Architect,” in N aturalist’s  Guide, 8-9.
84 See W .W . Ashe, “The Value to Silviculture o f Reserved Areas o f National Forest Types,” in N aturalist’s 
Guide, 10-11; Stephen Sargent Visher, “The Importance to Geography o f the Preservation o f Natural 
Areas,” in N atu ralist’s  Guide, 12-13; V.E. Shelford, “The Importance o f Natural Areas to B iology and 
Agriculture,” in N atu ralist’s Guide, 13-14.
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recreational purposes and provided commentary on the potential opportunities and 
problems associated with the national parks.85
Ever since its inception in 1915, the Ecological Society of America expressed a 
keen interest in the national parks and in 1920 gained representation on the National 
Parks Committee, which later changed its name to the Council on National Parks, Forests 
and Wild Life.86 In a 1920 brief in the society’s journal Ecology, editor Victor E. 
Shelford wrote that the national parks “are as yet practically untouched and are, in fact,
87nature museums.” Years later, Shelford wrote in the same journal that the “Society has 
always realized that these Parks are the country’s largest natural areas, and, if  kept 
undisturbed, afford vast possibilities for science and education.”88 The National Park 
Service’s devotion to the development of recreational tourism did not, however, go 
unnoticed by early ecologists who viewed commercial encroachments, such as excessive 
road construction and the development of extraneous amusement features, as 
endangerments to the scientific and educational purposes of the parks, as well as possible 
encroachments on the “scenic and recreational aspects in which the general public is so
O Q
deeply concerned.”
In addition to critiquing the pro-development policies of the National Park 
Service, early ecologists voiced objections to wildlife management in the parks, most 
notably the predator reduction programs, and stressed that scientific research should play
85 See C.F. Korstian, “The Preservation o f  Natural Conditions in the National Forests,” in N atu ralist’s 
Guide, 17-19; E. Lucy Braun, “National Parks and National Monuments,” in N atu ralist’s Guide, 20-27.
86 “Council on National Parks, Forests and W ild Life,” E cology , v.5 no.2 (April 1924): 224.
87 V.E. Shelford, “The National Parks,” Ecology, v .l  no.4 (October 1920): 310.
88 V.E. Shelford, “A Change o f Policy for the National Parks,” E cology , v.7 n o.l (January 1926): 112.
89 Direct quote from V.E. Shelford, “The National Parks,” 311. For more on early ecologists’ critiques o f  
park development, see Korstian, “The Preservation o f  Natural Conditions in the National Forests;” E. Lucy 
Braun, “National Parks and National Monuments;” “Council on National Parks, Forests and W ild Life;” 
“National Park Standards,” Ecology, v .10 no.4 (October 1929): 558.
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a larger role in park management.90 In the summer of 1929, biologist George Wright 
answered their prayers by privately funding the first major scientific survey of park 
wildlife, initiating a decade-long stint of scientific involvement in natural resource 
management in the national park system.91
In 1933, George M. Wright, Joseph S. Dixon, and Ben H. Thompson formally 
published the results of a field survey begun in May of 1930 entitled Fauna o f  the 
National Parks o f  the United States: A Preliminary Survey ofFaunal Relations in 
National Parks. The report, the National Park Service’s first comprehensive statement of 
natural resource management policies, recommended scientifically-based management of 
the parks’ natural resources. Moreover, the authors of the report proposed a radical 
departure from earlier practices. Not only did they suggest perpetuating the extant 
natural conditions of the park, but, where necessary, they recommended restoring certain 
areas to their original, “pristine” states.92 This was not the first such expression voiced 
by ecologists; years earlier Charles Adams had suggested that the National Parks should 
remain a “virgin” wilderness, for, if  “parks are to be managed so as to pass them on to 
future generations unharmed, they must in the main remain wild.” What, then, did 
ecologists envision when advocating the restoration and maintenance of “primitive,” 
“pristine” wilderness areas? And furthermore, for the purposes of this study, what 
preconceptions did they hold about mankind’s agency in natural processes?
90 See Charles C. Adams, “The Administration o f Wild Life in State and National Parks,” in N atu ralist’s 
Guide, 46; Sellars, 86.
91 Sellars, 91.
92 See George M. Wright, Joseph S. Dixon, and Ben H. Thompson, Fauna o f  the National Parks o f  the 
United States: A Prelim inary Survey ofF aunal Relations in N ational Parks, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing O ffice, 1933) n.p.; see also Sellars, 96-97.
93 Adams, in Shelford, ed., N aturalist’s Guide, 49, 47.
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In 1916, Frederick C. Clements published his ideas on the concept that dominated 
ecology for the next half-century-- holism and the climax theory of plant succession.94 
For Clements and the ecologists who subscribed to his paradigm, natural processes 
followed a simple and harmonious pattern. Plant biologist Michael G. Barbour wrote 
that the “Clementsian landscape is a balance of nature, a steady-state condition 
maintained so long as every species remains in place. Everything is cooperatively and 
interdependently linked; if one element is disturbed, the whole will be changed.”95 
Adams, Wright, and other ecologists sought to restore sections of the national parks to 
their “pristine” states by allowing natural communities to undergo natural succession and 
reach their climax, or final, stages. In order to do so, the biotic communities required 
protection from outside, “unnatural” forces that would disrupt nature’s inexorable 
journey towards a steady state. For the ecologists, the hand of man posed the greatest 
threat.96
More than half a century before Clements published his groundbreaking work on 
plant succession, George Perkins Marsh published the visionary Man and Nature, which 
not only influenced conservation philosophy but also affected policy makers and business 
leaders. The work called for the preservation of large natural areas and anticipated many 
of the tenets of modern ecology. M arsh’s view of humanity’s role in the natural world 
reflected the contemporary accepted dichotomy between Man and Nature, and his 
thoughts on mankind’s relation to nature influenced the ideas of early modern ecologists 
like Clements and Shelford. Marsh did not consider humankind an element of the natural
94 Dunlap, 144; Michael G. Barbour, “Ecological Fragmentation in the Fifties,” in Cronon, ed., Uncommon 
Ground, 234.
95 Barbour, 235.
96 See Clements and Shelford, Bio-Ecology, 21, 93, 249; Edward N. Munns, “Park and Forest,” Ecology, 
v.4 no.2 (April 1923): 221.
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world, but perceived us as a separate entity. He wrote “man is, in both kind and degree, a 
power of a higher order than any other forms of animated life,” and although he lives “in 
physical nature, he is not of her.” Man, then, is not part of nature; henceforth, the “earth 
was not, in its natural condition, completely adapted to the use of man.”97
Like most naturalists of his time, Marsh believed that the natural world exhibited 
stability and permanence when left undisturbed by humans. For Marsh, “man is 
everywhere a disturbing agent. Wherever he plants his foot, the harmonies of nature are 
turned to discords.” Marsh supported his assertion by detailing the irreparable damages 
that humankind had enacted upon the natural world and by describing the despicable 
profligacy humans had exhibited in utilizing the earth’s resources. Thus, successful 
preservation of large natural areas required the exclusion of human activity from those 
areas, for “the action of man upon the organic world tends to derange its original 
balances.”98
Versed in Darwinian evolutionary biology linking humans and the natural world, 
early modem ecologists did not consider, as Marsh did, humans apart from the natural 
order. Stephen A. Forbes, a pioneer in the field, wrote in 1922 that man “is a part, and in 
a multitude of cases an all-important part, of the environment of other forms of life.”99 
The ecologists did, however, place mankind on a higher level than other life forms, 
arguing that because of his intellect man has adapted himself to any terrestrial 
environment, modifying and evading local climates by erecting shelters and devising
97 George Perkins Marsh, The Earth as M odified by Human Action, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1885), vii, 34, 35.
98 Ibid., 26, 33, vii.
99 Stephen A. Forbes, “The Humanizing o f  E cology,” Ecology, v.3 no.2 (April 1922): 89.
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technology for heating and cooling.100 Of all the motive forces affecting the succession 
of biotic communities, Clements and Shelford asserted, “those of man are paramount.” 
The threat of man’s actions upon climax stages loom ominously, as his disturbances, such 
as fire, lumbering, clearing, hunting, and trapping, “have destroyed of modified the 
climax in practically all forest regions.”101 Thus, for the early modern ecologists, as well 
as for Marsh, the preservation and restoration of “natural” conditions could only succeed 
where “ecological conditions will remain unchanged except through natural agencies,” 
where “the hand of man will not be found.”102
Where, then, did native peoples fit into ecology’s ideas about man and the natural 
world? Both Marsh and the early modem ecologists addressed primitive cultures and 
held similar views regarding their impact on the natural world. Marsh wrote that 
“[P]urely untutored humanity, it is true, interferes comparatively little with the 
arrangements of nature,” doubting that the “purely savage tribes” had caused any sensible 
geographical change in the two millennia prior to “discovery” and colonization. For 
Marsh, nomadic tribes did little damage to the environment; however, as man adopted a 
stationary life, he “at once commences an almost indiscriminate warfare upon all the 
forms of animal and vegetable existence around him.” As human societies advance in 
civilization, the “destructive agency of man becomes more and more energetic and
i n i
unsparing.” Marsh, like many contemporaries, considered the Indian a vanishing race 
and wrote of primitive cultures in the past tense. Fate destined man to succumb to 
civilization, and in doing so, sentenced him to derange the harmonies of nature.
100 See J.W. Redway, “Human Ecology,” Ecology , v.2 no.3 (July 1921): 229; Clements and Shelford, Bio- 
Ecology, 94.
101 Ibid., 249.
102 Munns, 221.
103 Marsh, 38-40, 42.
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The early modern ecologists held similar views of primal cultures, but they wrote 
with less certainty when pressing their claims. Clements and Shelford subscribed to the 
unilinear model of cultural evolution, with successive stages progressing from hunting to 
pastoral to agricultural.104 They argued that at the most primitive, hunter-gatherer levels, 
human societies were merely integral parts of the biome; in pastoral areas, “man perhaps 
is still to be reckoned as a constituent of the biome rather than the superdominant in 
it.”105 Only with the advent of agriculture and the mastery over steel did man acquire 
dominance within the biome. Like Marsh, the early modem ecologists recognized 
differences in the intensity of reactions exerted by man at various culture levels, and, like 
Marsh, they doubted native tribes had enacted any considerable change on the land before 
the arrival of Columbus. Shelford wrote in 1933 that primitive man, “who could not 
remove the forest or exterminate the animals, is probably properly called a part of nature. 
At the time of the discovery of America, a scattered population of Indians had locally 
modified the vegetation, but had not destroyed any of the vegetation types.”106
Nine years earlier, Clark Wissler, one of the first ethnographers of native peoples, 
contributed an article to Ecology advancing the opposite position. In the article, Wissler 
attacked the general conception that grouped all native tribes into a collective, 
homogenous stereotype. Before the arrival of Columbus, argued Wissler, “the American 
Indian did not stand still, some tribes advancing to an agricultural level and others to an 
age of bronze. Thus, the Indian tribes not only furnish us examples o f primitive hunters,
104 Clements and Shelford, 156.
105 Ibid., 24 (italics added).
106 Victor E. Shelford, “The Preservation o f  Natural Biotic Communities,” Ecology, v.14 no.2 (April 1933): 
241 (italics added).
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but of agriculturalists, and of higher forms of society.”107 He proceeded to argue that 
tribal societies, be they hunting or farming, actively manipulated the flora and the fauna 
in their environments. Unlike Marsh and the early modem ecologists, Wissler claimed 
“there is reason to believe that in prehistoric times whole areas were devastated by man.” 
He concluded: “It is thus clear that man is by inheritance a disturber o f nature.”108 
Despite his recognized expertise and impressive credentials regarding native 
cultures, W issler’s opinion of native land use represented and remained the minority 
opinion until the latter twentieth-century, when scholars challenged the dominant 
paradigm and began to re-examine core assumptions and present research suggesting 
natives had manipulated and modified the land more than previously thought. The 
authors of Fauna o f  the National Parks advanced the belief that native peoples only 
lightly modified their environment and, in their quest to determine “original” conditions 
in the park units, used as a reference point “the period between the arrival of the first 
whites and the entrenchment of civilization in that vicinity.” Like other early modern 
ecologists, the authors wrote hypothetically when addressing pre-contact conditions, 
noting that “[W]e can know little of the other pictures that preceded this period,” but 
certain that “violent changes occurred immediately afterward.” Eager and confident in 
their speculation, they asserted that the “rate of alteration in the faunal structure has been 
so rapid since, and relatively so slow before, the introduction of European culture that the 
situation which obtained on the arrival of the settlers may well be considered as 
representing the original or primitive condition that it is desired to maintain.”109
107 Clark Wissler, “The Relation o f  Nature to Man as Illustrated by the North American Indian,” Ecology, 
v5 no.4 (October 1924): 313.
108 Ibid., 317 (italics added).
109 Fauna o f  the National Parks, n.p.
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How, then, does one apply early ecological notions of native land-use to ideas 
regarding native access to park lands? If, as the early modem ecologists maintained, 
natives hardly altered natural conditions, why deny them access to the “pristine” areas of 
the national parks? One reason may have to do with temporal considerations. Clements 
and Shelford wrote in 1939 that bio-ecology concerned itself primarily with modem man, 
and, like other early modem ecologists, wrote of “primitive” cultures in the past tense.110 
Having evinced adherence to unilinear models of cultural evolution, perhaps the early 
ecologists considered early twentieth-century Indians, at the end of the assimilation era, 
closer to “civilized” modes of life and therefore possessed of far greater destructive 
capacities than their primal ancestors.
Another reason justifying native exclusion lay with presumptions regarding 
traditional native use of the areas the ecologists sought to set aside as nature reserves. 
Prior to the late twentieth-century, when serious studies of historical native use of the 
park areas first appeared, the common assumption was that native societies had not 
historically used the park areas to any considerable extent; thus, they held no agency in 
the natural processes contributing to the climax states of the park units. Shelford 
expressed this opinion succinctly in 1933 when he wrote that “most of the areas which 
are now available for reservation as nature sanctuaries or nature reserves were probably 
not much affected by these primitive men. This is the argument for leaving them out of 
the picture.”111
110 Clements and Shelford, 24.
111 Shelford, “The Preservation o f  Natural Biotic Communities,” 241.
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Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to convey the atmosphere within which American 
policy-makers established the first national parks under the premise that native 
inhabitation and use of park lands should be strictly regulated. From a cultural 
perspective, conditions unique to a maturing nation essentially bifurcated the Romantic 
vision of an Indian wilderness, with the images of the Indian and the wilderness 
diverging on separate paths later in the nineteenth century. From an economic 
perspective, the corporate nature of the park system sought to create a serene 
environment to meet the aesthetic expectations of a nascent tourist industry; thus, the 
permission of native activities assumed a selective nature. From an intellectual 
perspective, the emerging science of ecology presented a competing vision of park 
management policies and goals that, although unsuccessful at first, greatly influenced 
later park notions of mankind’s, and the Indian’s, rightful exclusion from natural areas in 
the park system.
Thus far this study has taken a generalized approach to the history of the 
formative years of the national park system and the concepts introduced provide 
underlying themes for the rest of this work. As C.W. Buckholtz claimed, development 
and preservation policies in Glacier National Park’s early years were part of a national 
policy generally instituted in all national parks.112 The relationship between Glacier 
National Park and its neighboring tribe the Blackfeet, however, was not typical within the 
overarching national park system. The Blackfeet based their claim to subsistence rights 
on park lands on explicit language in a land-cession agreement predating Glacier 
National Park’s inception, thus their struggle evolved within a highly-disputed legal
112 Buckholtz, 12.
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framework. Controversy over subsistence rights explicitly listed in the agreement, most 
notably hunting, comprises the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2—Language and the Law: The Blackfeet, Glacier, and Reserved
Subsistence Rights
The historical relationship between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park may 
represent the most protracted and contentious example of the interplay between national 
parks and native groups. As was the case with many other tribes, the coming of Anglo- 
American civilization heralded the erosion of the Blackfeet traditional subsistence base. 
Left with land as its only commodity, the tribe proceeded to sell its lands and ultimately 
sank into a dependent and marginalized status on reservation land. In a land cession in 
1895, the tribe reserved specific subsistence rights that were honored in writing. When 
Congress dedicated much of the ceded land as part of a national park fifteen years later, 
park managers initiated a century-long campaign repudiating those native subsistence 
rights deemed impermissible in the National Park System.
In this chapter, I will trace the history of the tribe’s attempts to force the National 
Park Service to recognize the explicit usufruct rights reserved in a binding agreement 
with the federal government, with special focus on the decades since 1970. More than 
any other tribe, the Blackfeet has fiercely resisted exclusionary park policies and has 
repeatedly forced the park to justify its actions. Adamant in its opposition to certain 
native activities within park boundaries, the park has found a powerful ally in the federal 
government whose legal representatives have repeatedly ruled against the tribe in the 
legal arena. The historical evolution of the themes introduced in the previous chapter, 
cultural perceptions of native peoples and the dialectic dialogue that shapes park 
management (use vs. preservation), provides a stage upon which the drama in
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northwestern Montana has unfolded and continues to do so. By tracing historical 
developments pertaining to such overarching themes alongside the history of the 
contentious relationship between Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet, I hope to 
explain why the general policy of native exclusion and denial of resource extraction is not 
ironclad within the overarching National Park System, nor within Glacier National Park 
itself. Furthermore, I will show how Blackfeet pressures upon the park in the 1970s 
forced park officials to become more accommodating to native interests. Yet, native uses 
of park lands that compromised either of the dual objectives of the park system still 
commonly met, and continue to meet, with strict regulation or outright prohibition.
Pre-Park Tribal History 
Until recent times, many historians agreed that the Blackfeet migrated from the 
Great Lakes region to the northern plains sometime during the seventeenth century. 
However, new archaeological and ethnographic research of genetic and linguistic 
evidence, oral history, and fur trade documents suggests that the tribe has resided in the 
region for thousands years.1 Furthermore, oral histories collected and preserved by a 
group of Anglo-American writers around the turn of the twentieth-century suggest that 
Blackfeet use of the Glacier area was extensive and regular prior to the reservation era. 
Beginning in the late 1880s and continuing throughout the Assimilation era (roughly 
from 1887 until 1934), a group of Anglo-American writers offered a competing vision to 
the dark and racist view of tribal cultures that gained many adherents in the late 
nineteenth century. Many of these writers, i.e. George Bird Grinnell, James Willard
1 Brian Reeves and Sandy Peacock, Our Mountains Are Our Pillows: An Ethnographic O verview  o f  
G lacier N ational Park, (Glacier National Park, Montana, 2001), 77. This study focuses on the Southern 
Piikani tribe that lives on the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, and in em ploying the term “Blackfeet,” I 
refer to this tribe.
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Shultz, Walter McClintock, Clark Wissler, and Mary Roberts Rinehart, spent time with 
the Blackfeet and published literary works replete with Blackfeet legends, folklore, 
mythology, and common tales of daily life among the tribe. Prisoners to nineteenth 
century conventions, these writers lamented the inevitable demise of tribal cultures and 
sought to record and convey the value of Blackfeet culture while accepting the notion that 
it could not prevail in the industrial world. Oral history and recent archaeological 
research indicate that the Blackfeet gathered a wide array of food and medicinal plants in 
the foothills and mountains, and bighorn sheep, mountain goats, elk, deer, and smaller 
animals of the Glacier region provided important meat and hide resources.3 Although the 
Blackfeet regularly used the mountains for material and spiritual subsistence purposes, 
the tribe most commonly found its “staff of life” roaming the plains.
Even before the introduction of the horse, the buffalo provided the mainstay of 
Blackfeet subsistence. During the Blackfeet’s pre-horse “dog days,” nomadic hunting 
units enticed buffalo into rude corrals on foot, and the buffalo complex influenced tribal 
migration patterns and cultural developments. The Blackfeet saw no whites for nearly 
250 years after Columbus’s “discovery.” Nevertheless, elements of European material 
culture appeared in the Northwest early in the eighteenth century. First exposed to the , 
horse during a skirmish with Shoshoni warriors in 1730, the tribe spent the rest of the
2 For a generalized summary o f the writers’ collective contribution to influencing attitudes towards Indians, 
see Sherry L. Smith, Reimagining Indians: N ative Am ericans Through Anglo Eyes, 1880-1940, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-16. She also devotes a full chapter to George Bird Grinnell, pp. 45-67, 
and a chapter covering both Walter McClintock and Mary Roberts Rinehart, pp. 67-95.
3 These writers generated too many works detailing Blackfeet uses o f the Glacier area to name all here. For 
a start, see George Bird Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tales: The Story o f  a Prairie People (1892); James 
Willard Shultz, Blackfeet Tales o f  G lacier National Park  (1916); Walter McClintock, The O ld North Trail 
or Life, Legends and Religion o f  the Blackfeet Indians (1910); Clark W issler and D.C. Duvall, “M ythology  
o f  the Blackfeet Indians,” originally published in 1908 in the Anthropological Papers o f  the American  
Museum o f  Natural History, vol. 2, part 1; for a list o f traditional plant materials found in Glacier National 
Park and a map o f  traditional hunting and plant-collecting locales in the region, see Reeves and Peacock, 
231-233, 147; for a synthesis o f  these works and a concise summary o f Blackfeet traditional use o f the 
Glacier region, see Spence, 73-76.
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eighteenth century perfecting the equestrian arts and securing steady access to firearms 
through French and British traders. Neighboring tribes feared the Blackfeet, who further 
strengthened their hegemony by restricting the western tribes’ access to firearms. By the 
end of the century, the Blackfeet had become “masters of the northwestern plains.”4
Although relations with the British and the French had been relatively amicable, 
the Blackfeet quickly developed hostile relations with American fur companies. Despite 
repeated defeats and withdrawals, American fur companies persevered and gradually 
established trading forts along the Missouri and Marias rivers, which prompted a 
southward shift among the Blackfeet tribes. In the 1830s, demand for beaver declined 
and trade in buffalo robes increased with the buffalo robe becoming the standard of value 
in the Blackfeet trade. By the 1850s, the tribe had been trading directly with whites for 
nearly 75 years and had grown accustomed to the traders’ wares. Whites were few on the 
Northwestern Plains, however, and the Blackfeet remained ignorant o f  the true nature of 
the larger white man’s civilization and its insatiable thirst for tribal lands.5
Desire for tribal lands quickly became an obsession for the United States 
government shortly after its inception in the 1780s. After encountering fierce tribal 
resistance in its initial attempts to procure native lands through force, the government 
abandoned its policy of the “right of conquest” based on pure military coercion and 
adopted the “right of purchase” policy, based on treaty negotiations with tribes as 
sovereign nations, in order to acquire western lands. Certainly, the government 
subsequently broke many of the treaties it initiated; moreover, the government frequently 
inserted vague clauses that, contingent upon assumed future developments, would
4 For more on early Blackfeet history, see John C. Ewers, The Blackfeet: Raiders on the Northwestern  
Plains, (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1958), 11-30.
5 Ibid., 45-72.
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eventually render the treaties obsolete. This strategy often proved successful in securing 
exclusive ownership over lands formerly utilized by tribal peoples. Predictably, it also 
generated much controversy and conflict. The situation that developed around Glacier 
National Park provides a case in point.
The Blackfeet first entered into formal relations with the United States with the 
Lame Bull Treaty of 1855. Unlike most treaties of the mid-nineteenth century, the Lame 
Bull Treaty did not extinguish aboriginal land title through sales or cessions. Moreover, 
it did not transfer any land at all.. Although the treaty did designate a parcel of land as 
belonging exclusively to the Blackfeet, it did not provide for Indian removal to 
reservations, nor did it stipulate the division of communal lands; thus, it shared little in 
common with the reservation policy being enacted throughout the West.6 The Blackfeet 
remained too powerful to force land cessions from and expressed no desire to confine 
themselves to a reservation.
The goal of the treaty was to pacify the nomadic warring tribes residing both east 
and west of the Rocky Mountains so as to facilitate the safe passage, via railroad, of 
whites through the region.7 In order to impose peace among the native bands, the treaty 
established that a portion of the Blackfoot territory, as designated in the Treaty of Fort 
Laramie of 1851, “shall be a common hunting-ground for ninety-nine years, where all the 
nations, tribes and bands of Indians, parties to this treaty, may enjoy equal and 
uninterrupted privileges.” The notion of a common hunting ground was not foreign to 
the tribes of the Northwest; in fact, a regional Indian commons already existed. The
6 W illiam E. Farr, ‘“ When W e Were First Paid’: The Blackfoot Treaty, the Western Tribes, And the 
Creation o f  the Common Hunting Ground, 1855,” G reat P lains Quarterly, v.21 no.2 (2001): 131.
7 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, v.2, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1904), 738.
8 Ibid., 737.
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Lame Bull Treaty did not create a common hunting ground, rather, it merely recognized, 
defined, and limited the pre-existing commons.9 This local commons would live a short 
life, however, as the territory in question would constitute just one chapter in “the 
essential story at the heart of America’s western past: the local commons giving way to 
the extra-local, the community surrendering authority in resource allocation to state or 
national agents.”10
Along with the establishment of a common hunting grounds, the Lame Bull 
Treaty designated a large swath of land, extending east from current day Glacier National 
Park to the border of North Dakota, and extending north from the Mussellshell and 
Missouri Rivers to the border of Canada, as “the territory of the Blackfoot Nation, over 
which said nation shall exercise exclusive control.”11 In exchange for the concessions 
made by the Blackfeet and other tribes, the government promised annual payments of 
$20,000 for ten years. The architects of the Lame Bull Treaty, by creating both common 
and exclusive territories, sought to buy time until the federal government could mobilize 
a full reservation effort. Whites commonly perceived the decline of the buffalo as a 
parallel development to the demise of native populations, and believed that in short time 
precipitous declines in both buffalo and Indian populations would open lands and enable 
a full reservation effort. They were partially right— negotiations destroyed the common 
hunting ground within ten years, and the buffalo had all but disappeared within thirty
1 9years. The “vanishing” Indian, however, never vanished.
9 Farr, 148.
10 Louis S. Warren, The H unter’s Cam e: Poachers, Conservationists, and Twentieth-Century Am erica, 
(Ann Arbor: UM I Dissertation Services, 1995), 24.
11 Kappler, 737.
12 Farr, 150.
57
In 1860, the first steamboats reached Fort Benton, home to the first Blackfoot 
Agency on the recently created Blackfeet Reservation. After the establishment of 
Montana as a territory in 1864 and the end of the Civil War in 1865, prospectors flocked 
to northwestern Montana and the “Blackfeet Wars” ensued. The Massacre on the Marias 
in the winter of 1870, in which the army killed 173 Blackfeet, mostly women, children, 
and the elderly, “pacified” the tribe, put an end to the Blackfeet Wars, and ensured safe 
passage through Montana for white settlers.13
Increasing white immigration in the decades following the Lame Bull Treaty of 
1855 intensified efforts to acquire Blackfeet land. As the buffalo disappeared, tribes of 
the Plains lost their traditional means of survival. Disease and warfare ravaged native 
populations, which became less self-sufficient and more dependent upon the government 
for survival. Ever since the time of Jefferson, the government sought to procure native 
lands by creating states of dependence and by extending credit in hopes of generating 
debt.14 This tactic proved successful, on the Plains as well as across the whole continent. 
Situations of poverty and starvation forced tribes to sell the only commodity they had 
left: land.
Beginning with the Lame Bull Treaty, the Blackfeet entered into a series of 
treaties and agreements with the federal government that continually redefined their ever- 
shrinking land base. Treaties in 1865 and 1868 transferred Blackfeet lands and resources 
to government hands. In 1871, the United States ended formal treaty making with native 
tribes, and dealings with Indians took the form of Executive Orders and Acts of 
Congress. Two Executive Orders in 1873 and Acts of Congress in 1874 and 1888
13 Reeves and Peacock, 113.
14 W allace, 19.
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removed most of the land guaranteed to the Blackfeet in the Lame Bull Treaty of 1855. 
Militarily broken, the tribe’s economic independence suffered a fatal blow with the 
disappearance of the buffalo in the 1880s. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, designed to 
replace communal living patterns with individual, market-oriented ones, opened hundreds 
of thousands of acres to white settlement. By the time Congress passed the Indian 
Reorganization Act in 1934, 40% of reservation lands lay in the hands of whites.15 By 
1890, the Blackfeet Reservation was a small fraction of its original size, and in 1895, that 
fraction would shrink even further.
Glacier National Park 
In the early 1880s, James Willard Schultz, whose Blackfeet tales provide some of 
the earliest ethnographic accounts of Blackfeet life, noticed prospectors lured by rumors 
of gold in the hills near St. Mary Lake and suggested to a politically-connected 
acquaintance that the Blackfeet Reservation be opened to white settlers. The motion to 
open a mineral strip within the western border of the reservation made its way to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and to the Secretary of the Interior. George Bird 
Grinnell, editor of Forest & Stream, nature advocate, and adopted member of the 
Blackfeet tribe, doubted the mineral content of the area in question and feared the soil 
erosion that mining activities would produce. Nonetheless, Grinnell eventually became 
one of the government’s three negotiators for the government in the land cession. In 
1888, the Blackfeet sold the Sweet Grass Hills to the government, but by 1895 the 
proceeds from that sale had run out. Out of money and unsuccessful at farming on the
15 Reeves and Peacock, 121.
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semi-arid northern plains, the tribe turned to Grinnell, long considered a “friend,” to 
handle proceedings for additional land sales.16
Differing opinions concerning the selling price and provisions of the cession
t
divided the tribe, but, despite any dissent, all remained steadfast in their demand to retain
traditional subsistence rights on any land they ceded. After working the price down from
3 million to 1.5 million dollars, the commission and the tribe sealed the deal. Ratified by
Congress on June 10, 1896, the agreement drew the boundary of the new reservation, and
included a provision that would continue to haunt the National Park Service to this day:
Provided, That said Indians shall have, and do hereby reserve to 
themselves, the right to go upon any portion of the lands hereby conveyed 
so long as the same shall remain public lands of the United States, and to 
cut and remove therefrom wood and timber for agency and school 
purposes, and for their personal uses for houses, fences, and all other 
domestic purposes: And provided further, That the said Indians hereby 
reserve and retain the right to hunt upon said lands and to fish in the 
streams thereof so long as the same shall remain public lands of the United 
States under and in accordance with the provisions of the game and fish 
laws of the State o f Montana.17
In 1898, the ceded strip opened to miners. By 1902, the boom had become a bust. The
ceded land, however, would soon be incorporated into one of the “crown jewels” of the
American national park system.
George Bird Grinnell knew that no mineral wealth lay buried in the mountains the
Blackfeet called “The Backbone of the World,” but he did perceive an altogether
different kind of wealth. As early as 1891 he began to entertain the idea of creating
16 For a discussion of Schultz and Grinnell and their role in advancing the 1895 agreement, see Keller and 
Turek, 45-47.
17 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, v . l ,  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1904), 606. For consistency’s sake, I refer to the agreement negotiated in 1895 as the Agreement o f  1896, 
reflecting the year in which Congress ratified it.
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Glacier National Park.18 As editor of Forest & Stream, Grinnell-published articles 
advocating the preservation of the region, and aided by the lobbying of local politicians, 
managed to convince Congress to set aside the region as a national park. On May 11, 
1910, President William Howard Taft signed the necessary legislation, and Glacier 
National Park was bom.
Figure I: G lacier N ational Park and the Blackfeet Reservation (map taken from  Spence, pp. 92)
Wmtxrtan CrJit
*■’ * •
Q o i p q  fo  the
H ghw ay  J  ■*
iijjl Qfader Nation*ci partt
[SSiijsa A rm  C eded in JS95
P roposed p n rk  tyotm dary S x ten stm
0
I
I------------1
o  10 m*.
Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet reservation.
Language in the enabling act appears contradictory. The Act conferred exclusive 
control of the park to the Secretary of the Interior, who was responsible for “the care,
protection, management, and improvement” Of the park, and whose duty it was to
18 Keller and Turek, 48.
“provide for the preservation of the park in a state of nature.”19 The Act also specifically 
allowed for the harvest of dead timber, railroad access, and the leasing of hotels. These 
competing objectives highlight the dichotomy of use and preservation inherent in all early 
park legislation, and Glacier National Park’s enabling act provides just one example 
within the overarching national policy regarding the management of the early national 
park system. What the legislation did not mention, however, was the Blackfeet tribe or 
its rights guaranteed in the Agreement of 1896. Although the legislation failed to 
mention the tribe or its rights specifically, it would have serious consequences for the 
park’s eastern neighbors.
For some Blackfeet, the creation of the park meant opportunities for employment. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, early park officials adopted the mandate for 
recreational tourism as their chief intent, and Glacier was no exception. The powerful 
corporate interests guiding early park management in Glacier reserved a special role for 
native peoples. At the time of the park’s creation in 1910, the Great Northern Railway 
Company carried little commercial traffic through the area, so park bureaucrats joined 
with the Great Northern, its largest concessionaire, to build a park that would draw 
visitors. Works by Grinnell, Shultz, McClintock, Wissler, and Rinehart closely identified 
the Blackfeet with the Glacier area, and the railroad played upon larger cultural themes, 
such as the frontier myth and the “vanishing Indian” motif, to promote the Blackfeet as 
the “Glacier Park Indians.” The railroad did not attempt to portray the reality of tribal 
life under pressure to assimilate, but rather, judging by their choices and printed 
promotional materials, embraced and exploited the “noble savage” motif, advancing and
19 “An Act To establish ‘The Glacier National Park’ in the Rocky Mountains south o f  the international 
boundary line, in the State o f  Montana, and for other purposes,” May 11, 1910, 36 Stat. 354.
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employing “physically impressive, fullblooded, prototypical Indians of the great Plains, 
horse-riding tipi-dwelling buffalo-hunting real Indians, noble savages, who would give 
the visitor the thrill of a lifetime, straight out of the Westerns— as long as they were not 
too bloodthirsty.”20 The Great Northern Railway employed tribal members as dancers, 
greeters, and caddies for tourists staying at the company’s plush hotels. The railroad 
even hired a group of Blackfeet to live near Glacier Park Hotel in a small tipi 
encampment during the summer with nightly performances featuring singing, dances, 
sign language, and the occasional adoption ceremony. Officials heavily publicized the 
“Glacier Park Indians” in early park promotional literature, as well as through several 
notable trips for delegations of the “Glacier Indians” to the New York Travel Show, the 
Portland Rose Festival, and the Chicago Land Show.21 The railroad made the Blackfeet 
an integral and expected part of the Glacier experience.
By the early 1940s, company officials began expressing worries about the shows 
outside the Glacier Park Lodge, criticizing the show as monotonous, hokum, and worn 
out. Furthermore, the railroad experienced difficulty hiring older Blackfeet who matched 
the romantic image the company promoted. The younger generations proved too modem, 
disinterested in tribal matters, and hard to regulate. The Office of Indian Affairs had 
never been too enthused about the show, arguing that tribal employment for exhibition 
that showcased and encouraged traditional lifestyles hampered federal efforts towards 
assimilation. In 1950, the Great Northern officials decided to let the Blackfeet approach
20 Ann Regan, “The Blackfeet, the Bureaucrats, and Glacier National Park, 1910-1940,” unpublished paper 
presented at the Western History Association Conference, B illings, MT, October 1986, copy available in 
the George C. Ruhle Library, Glacier National Park, W est Glacier, MT, pp. 3.
21 For early native activities and promotional efforts for the park, see Regan, 3-5.
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them to arrange for entertainers; the tribe, perhaps tired of acting as show pieces, stayed
22away.
Whereas the fagade-management approach adopted by the corporate culture 
during Glacier’s early years allowed and even promoted the presence of regulated groups 
of Blackfeet as romantic parts of the scenic Glacier experience, the exercise of certain 
reserved treaty rights conflicted with the purposes of an aesthetic park and made 
management inconvenient and difficult. In addition to development for recreational 
tourism, the enabling legislation had also mandated the preservation of the park’s natural 
resources. Designation of the park gave administrators the power to begin shaping a 
landscape that would conform to the desired status of the park as one existing in a “state 
of nature.” Immediately, they banned hunting, the carrying of firearms, the cutting of 
live trees, homesteading, and fishing except by hook and line. Natives, whether claiming 
ignorance of park boundaries or openly defying park rules, persisted in their customary 
subsistence activities, and hunting remained widespread within the park until the mid- 
1910s.23 Park administrators considered Blackfeet hunting a threat to wildlife, but 
confusion over jurisdiction prevented clear courses of action. The confusion over 
jurisdiction ended in 1914, when Congress passed legislation conferring to the federal 
government exclusive jurisdiction over Glacier National Park. The legislation also 
specifically prohibited hunting in the park.24
Punishments resulting from hunting violations in the park aroused the ire of tribal 
members cognizant of the 1896 agreement guarantees. In November of 1915, two
22 See Regan, 7-8, 12.
23 See Warren, 290-293.
24 Glacier National Park Act, August 22, 1914, 63 P.L. 177, 63 Cong. Ch. 264, 38 Stat. 699. See Sections 1 
and 4.
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Blackfeet tribal members separately wrote Montana Senator Harry Lane requesting 
information regarding Indian hunting rights in the park. Unsure of how to respond, 
Senator Lane passed along the letters to the commissioner of Indian Affairs, who in turn 
forwarded them to the Department of the Interior.25 The Solicitor of the Interior, citing 
the 1896 Ward v. Race Horse ruling that terminated Bannock hunting rights in 
Yellowstone, referred back to the Agreement of 1896 and concluded that the “right to 
hunt and fish under this agreement was temporary and precarious.” He further replied that 
tribal rights to game in the park had ceased upon establishment of the national park.
Citing the Agreement of 1896, he asserted that, upon dedication of the ceded land as a
9 f \national park, it no longer qualified as public land of the United States.
Shortly after the creation of the National Park Service in 1916, Glacier National 
Park officials became concerned with deer and elk hunting on the reservation to the east,
97where ungulates migrated during winter storms. In an effort to protect wildlife 
populations, officials embarked on a decades-long struggle to extend the park boundary 
six miles to the east. The Park Service failed in its efforts to extend the park boundary; 
however, it did manage to secure jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Highway that ran along 
the eastern border of Glacier. Park control of the highway failed to deter hunting in the 
park or on the reservation, and disputes persisted.28
In 1924, Peter Oscar Little Chief circulated a petition on the reservation calling 
for recognition of native rights in Glacier, lamenting that “now we are all known as the
25 Spence, 90.
26 Letter from Solicitor Preston C. W est to the Secretary o f  the Interior, Jan. 4, 1916, on file at the Glacier 
National Park Archives, West Glacier, M T (hereafter referred to as GNPA): F19-11.
27 In the Superintendent’s Annual Report for 1923, Supt. Eakin complained that bands o f migrating elk “are 
being ruthlessly slaughtered by the Blackfeet Indians, and we have no recourse...the Indians are hunting
the elk to a point o f  extermination.” See S.A.R. 1923, GNPA: F7-2.
28  •Keller and Turek, 54. Superintendent Eakin complained in 1921 that train-men on the Great Northern
oftentimes tipped o ff the natives as to the rangers’ whereabouts. See Regan, 10.
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Glacier National Park [Indians] of M ontana... [But we Indians can’t] hunt there.”29 The 
fate of the petition remains a mystery, and Little Chief inquired twice more in writing in 
1926 and 1928 about its status. During this period of bureaucratic neglect, tensions 
between tribal members and park rangers sharpened and by the early 1930s, according to 
historian Mark David Spence, “a near state of war existed on the eastern side of the 
park.”30 Eight years after the fact, Little C hiefs petition was answered when in June of
1932 another solicitor’s report reinforced the judgment passed in 1916 that focused on a 
narrow, and legally disputable, definition of “public lands.” Solicitor Finney concluded 
that the reserved rights were determinably extinguished when the ceded lands ceased to 
be public lands, i.e. when Congress dedicated the land as a national park. He further 
noted that the Blackfeet reserved right to hunt, as stated in the Agreement of 1896, “was
31expressly subject to the provisions of the game and fish laws of the State of Montana.”
A poaching case involving four Blackfeet resolved in favor of the park in the spring of
1933 confirmed the park’s right to arrest Indians in the park and demonstrated that 
poachers would face prosecution. A local newspaper headline read: “All Hunters Barred 
from Park Reserve: Indians Do Not Hold Hunting Rights by Treaty.”32
A 1935 Court of Claims decision in the case of Blackfeet Indians (et al.) v. United 
States further strengthened the legal position of the National Park Service. The decision 
claimed that prior
to the act of May 11,1910, the Indians of the Blackfeet Reservation did 
not exercise to any appreciable extent the rights reserved in the aforesaid 
agreement of September 26, 1895, to hunt and fish in and remove timber
29 Quoted in Regan, 10-11.
30 See Spence, 93-94.
31 Letter from Solicitor Finney to the Secretary o f  the Interior, June 21, 1932, GNPA: F19-12.
32 See Christopher Ashby, “Blackfeet Agreement of 1895 and Glacier National Park: A Case History,” 
(M.A. Thesis, Forestry Department, University o f  Montana, 1985), 54-55.
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from the land ceded in the agreement, and such rights were authoritatively 
terminated by the limitations of the act of May 11, 1910.33
This decision surely came as a surprise to many Blackfeet who had been chastised by
park rangers for exercising their reserved rights, as it must have for tribal members old
enough to remember traditional use of the area before the creation of the park. James
Willard Schultz, among others, had testified that some two hundred Blackfeet had
actively used the land in question between 1895 and 1910, but personal observations and
oral history failed to convince the courts. Anglo-American cultural prejudice has led
many to dismiss oral tradition as mere superstition without any factual foundation and to
accept only written documentation as valid. The clash of cultures embodied in these
different forms of historical transmission has frequently proved disastrous for native
societies that have been forced to conform to the demands of written documentation and
have, in many cases like this one, failed. When discussing the important role that oral
tradition plays in Blackfeet culture, Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, referring to the writings of
James Willard Schultz, insisted that “it (our history) is in writing.”34 The opinion that
tribal groups had not extensively used park lands was not a novel one, as ecologists, park
officials, and bureaucrats made similar arguments in the case of Yellowstone and
elsewhere.35 In one of the earliest histories of GNP, Madison Grant wrote that the east
side of the park once “formed the westerly portion of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation,
but was not used by these Indians.’06
33 Blackfeet Et. Al. Nations v. U .S., United States Court o f  Claims, 81 Ct. Cl 101; 1935 U.S. Ct. Cl.
34 Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
35 A s noted in Chapter 1, pioneer ecologist Victor E. Shelford cited the absence o f  native use o f  park-lands 
as justification for their exclusion. See Shelford, “The Preservation o f  Natural Biotic Communities,” pp. 
241. For a brief summary o f  the widespread misconceptions holding that Indians feared national park 
areas, see Keller and Turek, 24.
36 Madison Grant, Early H istory o f  G lacier National Park, M ontana, (Washington: Government Printing 
O ffice, 1919), 6.
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In the 1930s, as the NPS vigorously enforced anti-hunting laws in GNP with the
Interior Department’s unwavering legal support, larger changes in federal Indian policy
prompted the park service to adopt new paradigms towards native peoples residing on
lands adjacent to newly-designated park units and it began loosening strictures pertaining
to native subsistence uses.’7 According to historian Sherry Smith, writers like Grinnell
and McClintock succeeded in creating new ways to conceptualize native peoples and
helped lay the intellectual and cultural groundwork for the Indian New Deal and for
deeper changes in popular conceptions of Indians in America that occurred in the 1920s
and 1930s.38 Their writings coincided with the rise of the professionalization in
anthropology. Anthropologists, led by Franz Boaz, joined with such popular writers in
challenging federal policies aimed at forced acculturation and, through their promotion of
cultural relativism, laid the philosophical basis for an enlightened Indian policy.39
Mounting pressure for substantial policy reform in the 1920s impacted the Roosevelt
i
administration, whose Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, ushered in the 
Indian New Deal. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, originally the brain-child of 
Collier, provided for tribal self-determination of lands, culture, and government, thereby 
constituting a sharp policy reversal from the assimilationist goal of allotment. Although 
none within the Indian Service directly supported native claims to the established national 
parks, respect for native cultures, a proclaimed cornerstone of the Indian New Deal, did 
affect policy formulation in newly formed park areas.40
37 Frank Norris, Alaska Subsistence: A N ational Park Service M anagement History, (Anchorage: U.S. 
Department o f the Interior, 2002), 21.
38 Smith, 5.
39 Dippie, 281.
40 See Spence, 134; Norris, 21.
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Although most of the new parks condoned only limited gathering activities of 
plant materials for nutritional, construction, craft, or ceremonial purposes, a few park 
units tacitly allowed hunting.41 At Everglades National Park(1934) and Olympic 
National Park(1938), park officials proved far less zealous in their enforcement efforts 
than officials at Glacier. In Everglades National Park and Olympic National Park, 
officials reluctantly accepted subsistence hunting so long as it remained both small in 
scale and away from the public view.42 Once hunting harvests violated either of these 
conditions, as they did in Olympic National Park: in the early 1980s, the guiding 
principles of the National Park System triumphed over native land rights. Changing 
perceptions of native peoples may have impacted the formation of subsistence regulation 
in newly-created parks, but they failed to make headway against the enshrined traditions 
of parks like Glacier, one of the emulated “crown jewels” of the National Park System.
After the Court of Claims ruling in 1935 officially terminated Blackfeet rights 
within the park, the park and the tribe locked into a stalemate that remains largely 
unresolved to this day. The Blackfeet were one of the first native groups to reorganize 
under the IRA and Blackfeet animosity towards the park became rooted in a centralized 
political body, which spread and became an integral part of tribal policy and an 
expression of Blackfeet national identity.44 In spite of overall negative opinions
41 For a concise list o f known subsistence uses in non-Alaskan NPS units established prior to 1976, see 
Norris, 24.
42 For a brief summary o f  subsistence regulation at Everglades National Park and Olympic National Park, 
see Norris, 21-23. For a more thorough treatment, see Keller and Turek, 90-131, 216-232.
43 For more on the Blackfeet and the IRA, see Paul C. Rosier, Rebirth o f  the Blackfeet Nation, 1912-1954, 
(Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 2001). Historian Graham D. Taylor argues that generally, during 
the Indian N ew  Deal, bureaucratic emphasis on tribal political organization, which failed to gain 
community support, precluded plans for econom ic native self-sufficiency. See Graham D. Taylor, The New  
D eal and Am erican Indian Tribalism: The Administration o f  the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-35, 
(Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1980). For claims about Blackfeet tribal government and general 
opinions towards the park, see Spence, 98.
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regarding the park, tensions eased in the late 1930s and for over two decades relations 
appeared relatively amicable and the Blackfeet abstained in their pressure upon park 
officials for the recognition of hunting rights in the park.44 During this temporarily 
dormant period in tribal-park tensions, changing historical conditions and opinions 
greatly impacted development and management in Glacier and throughout the entire 
National Park System.
The Bigger Picture
The end of WWII in 1.945 signaled an end to economic stringencies and 
unprecedented numbers of visitors ventured out to the national parks. Unlike other parks, 
Glacier was not totally inundated by tourists and the post-war tourism boom did not 
overwhelm the park’s facilities.45 By the mid- 1940s, most tourists visited the park by 
automobile and highway maintenance constituted a major factor in the park’s effort to 
enhance the tourist experience. In 1955, the National Park Service initiated its ambitious 
“Mission 66” program that sought to prepare the parks for anticipated increases in tourist 
numbers. Mission 66 dominated the National Park Service program at Glacier for a 
decade; however, it did not signify a blank check for rampant development.46 The 
fundamental principle of the program embodied the twin pillars of the park system: 
preservation and use. Assuming visitors would use certain areas, park officials made
44 In a March 24, 2005 interview Ted Hall, BIA em ployee with long experience dealing with tribal-park 
matters, claimed that the tribe and the park got along fine until Edward A. Hummel was appointed 
Superintendent in 1958. Supt. Hummel, according to Hall, took a hard line against the Indians and acted as 
i f  there was no agreement at all. Interview in possession o f  the author.
45 Buckholtz, 116.
46 For highway construction and M ission 66 projects in GNP, see Alan S. N ew ell, David Walter, and James 
R. M cDonald, “Historic Resources Study, Glacier National Park and Historic Structures Survey,” (Denver: 
NPS Denver Service Center, 1980), 169-179, copy on file in George C. Ruhle Library, W est Glacier, MT.
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preparations by improving roads, trails, and park facilities that would limit the impact to 
specified areas, in effect preserving the wilderness condition of the rest of the park.47
Not surprisingly, the pro-development aspect of the Mission 66 program 
provoked harsh criticism, far more than previous park development had faced. Leaders 
of the burgeoning environmental movement voiced their concerns directly to the public 
and to politicians and effectively broadcast their disapproval of national park 
management. Critics lambasted the proliferation of tourist facilities, road design, and 
excessive road construction, objecting to the modernization and urbanization of the 
national parks encouraged by the Mission 66 program.48 In 1963, ecologists, whose 
influence in the park service had waned towards the end of the 1930s, again produced a 
written report echoing many of the suggestions and critiques regarding park management 
included in the 1933 Fauna o f the National Parks. This time, however, their arguments 
reached a much wider audience and resonated much more powerfully.
Wildlife Management in the National Parks, more commonly known as the 
Leopold Report, appeared in 1963 and represented the first review of Park Service natural 
resource management conducted by experts from outside the bureau. The study reflected 
the growing awareness of ecology and received widespread publicity, contributing to the 
growing criticism of the commercialization of the national parks.49 Similarities between 
the Leopold Report and the Fauna o f the National Parks abound. Overall, the central
47 See Sellars, 181; Buckholtz, 93. Buckholtz claims the nature o f  the terrain in Glacier made tourists 
reluctant to leave the developed areas; thus, the developed areas succeeded in confining tourists to small 
portions o f  the park, thereby protecting and preserving the adjacent natural areas. See Buckholtz, 119.
48 For genera] critiques, see Sellars, 185. For criticisms specifically leveled at GNP, see N ew ell, Walter, 
and M cDonald, 180.
49 The report was reprinted in its entirety in Living Wilderness, Audubon, N ational Parks M agazine, and 
Am erican Forests.
theme of the report insisted that scientific management of the parks should replace strict 
protection of the parks’ resources in order to ensure their preservation.50
The stated objective of the Leopold Report mirrored that expressed in Fauna o f  
the National Parks. The “objective of every national park,” wrote Leopold and the gang, 
should be the maintenance and/or re-creation of a “reasonable illusion of primitive 
America.” The most quoted passage declared that a “national park should represent a 
vignette of primitive America.” The authors defined “primitive America” as “the 
condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man.”51 Thus, the
j
authors, like the early modern ecologists and preservationists in general throughout the 
1960s, adhered to and reinforced the widespread paradigm positing modern man as a 
disruptive and unnatural, presence in wilderness areas, assuming that Europeans were 
harbingers of widespread environmental degradation. They did not draw the dichotomy 
between Man and Nature as sharply, however, when addressing Native Americans. The 
report implied that native groups only minimally altered their environments and caused 
little to no adverse effects on the natural world. At the same time, it denied them any 
agency in the historical evolution of the American landscape. The authors endorsed 
manipulation of the environment by the Indians, particularly their use of fire. In 1967, 
the NPS reversed its long-standing policy of absolute fire-suppression in the majority of 
its parks; however, despite the report’s implication that native modification of the 
environment had been “natural,” the Park Service had neither the intention nor the means
50 A. Starker Leopold, S.A. Cain, C.M. Cottam, I.N. Gabrielson, T.L. Kimball, “W ildlife Management in 
the National Parks,” in The G reat New W ilderness Debate, 105, 108.
51 Ibid., 106-107.
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to make allowances for the extensive use of fire by Native Americans in its forests. 
Humans, including Indians, no longer were agents of “natural” change." ‘
The Park Service adopted the Leopold Report as policy soon after its appearance 
in 1963, and, as historian Richard Sellars has opined, much of National Park Service 
history since then has been shaped by the continuing struggle to change the direction of
Cl
national park management, particularly as it affects natural resources. The year after
publication of the Leopold Report, Congress passed revolutionary legislation, inspired by
the report and by the growing environmental movement, that would impact lands on a
much larger scale. The Wilderness Act of 1964 authorized Congress to set aside federal
lands, not just within the National Park System, as nature preserves without any overt
development. The act defined wilderness as
an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, 
where man himself is a visitor who does not rem ain.. .an area of 
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, 
without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected 
and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally 
appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the 
imprint of man’s work substantially unnOticeable...54
This act finally provided a legislative avenue for the preservation of areas conforming to
the primitive ideals envisioned by the authors of Fauna o f  the National Parks and the
Leopold Report. The act also presupposed that humans were not agents of natural
change.
Although the Wilderness Act of 1964 proved a sharp contrast to the goals of 
Mission 66, it too addressed the dual objectives of the park system. The Act articulated a
52 Runte, 206.
53 Sellars, 215.
54 “An Act To establish a National W ilderness Preservation System for the permanent good o f the whole 
people, and for other purposes,” Sept. 3, 1964, P.L. 88-577; 88 Congress.
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preservation rationale by prohibiting future development and human habitation in 
designated wilderness areas. The Act also expressly revealed a recreation rationale, 
declaring wilderness an “enduring resource.. .for the use and enjoyment of the American 
people,” thereby justifying wilderness because of its instrumental value as a setting for 
certain outdoor recreational activities and for solitude. Furthermore, in addition to 
addressing preservation and recreational use, the Act contained a group of pro­
development clauses that limited wilderness preservation.55 The Act did not specifically 
mention native peoples; nonetheless, it would become another sticky point of contention 
between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park. Proponents of wilderness designation 
in the “ceded strip” feared the impact that recognition of native rights could have on their 
efforts, whereas the tribe feared the effects that wilderness designation could have on the 
exercise of reserved usufruct rights.
Accompanying major developments in the national environmental agenda during 
the 19.60s were changes in cultural conceptions of native peoples. After WWII, popular 
opinion turned against the cultural pluralism embodied in the Indian New Deal as the 
Eisenhower administration proposed the termination of federal services and recognition 
as a challenge to tribal self-determination. Termination faded by 1960, and the 
philosophical legacies of Collier’s Indian New Deal influenced Indian policy in the 
decades that followed.56 Beginning in the 1960s, the counter-culture advocated a “back 
to the land” philosophy as it rebelled against the dominant culture and yearned for an 
alternative to an increasingly technological and materialistic society. In doing so, the
55 For an insightful analysis o f the W ilderness Act o f  1964 and its embodiment o f the dual objectives o f the 
national park ideal, see Mark W oods, “Federal Wilderness Preservation in the United States: The 
Preservation o f  W ilderness?” in The Great New W ilderness D ebate, 131-153.
56 See Dippie, 342-344.
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movement searched for a symbol that would epitomize its tenets, and, like primitivist 
movements had in the past, it emulated the folkways of people perceived as living closer 
to nature, in this case those of Native Americans. The environmental movement 
embraced the image of the “noble savage” as one imbued with ecological wisdom and 
extolled the romantic character of traditional tribal culture.57 Renewed respect for tribal 
culture, by the counter-culture and by society as a whole, influenced the NPS, which, 
beginning in the early 1960s, began to adopt new attitudes toward Native Americans.
Due to increased sympathy toward Indian causes by society as a whole, as well as 
increased militancy among native groups in the vicinity of existing park units and among 
tribal communities involved in attempts to establish new park units, the Park Service, by 
the early 1970s, displayed more sensitivity and respect for tribal viewpoints. As an 
example, the Park Service began to allow greater native uses of existing parks and 
included native concerns in the planning of new parks. Many of the sixty-four national 
recreation areas, national seashores, and national lakeshores the NPS created between
co
1963 and 1972 (all technically National Park Service units) allowed hunting.
Permissible hunting by any group in the national parks, however, remains a rare 
exception, whereas activities like regulated collecting of plant materials for specific 
purposes pose far less of a challenge to the ideals of the National Park System.
The tumultuous events of the 1960s, in addition to shaping the public’s opinions 
of native peoples, also caused reverberations in Indian country. Native communities 
across the country witnessed a resurgence of interest in traditional tribal culture and,
57 For more on changing cultural conceptions o f  Indians in the 1960s and 1970s, see Shepard Krech III, The 
Ecological Indian: M yth and History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 15-16, 20-22, 27; see 
also Deloria, 154-169.
58 For NPS policies regarding park units in the 1960s and 1970s, see Norris, 25-27.
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inspired by the success of African-Americans in the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, 
began actively to assert their rights again in the 1960s. Political activism thrived among 
many native communities, mostly urban ones, and gave rise to the Red Power Movement. 
The American Indian Movement (AIM) staged a number of high-profile demonstrations 
demanding recognition of tribal rights: the occupation of Alcatraz Island (1969-1971), the 
Trail of Broken Treaties march on Washington, D.C. and the trashing of the BIA building
(1972), and the heavily publicized reoccupation and protracted siege at Wounded Knee
(1973). AIM attracted several Blackfeet members into its ranks, and Woody Kipp, the 
man whose court victory in 1974 reinvigorated tribal pressures upon Glacier to recognize 
the usufruct rights in the Agreement of 1896, personally participated in the march on 
D.C. and the flare-up at Wounded Knee.59 The militant nature of tribal political activism 
did not escape the notice of Glacier Superintendent William J. Briggle, who wrote in 
February of 1973, regarding a proposed cooperative visitor center between the tribe and 
the park, that “[RJeflecting on the strained relationships with Indians in our country today 
and a possible worsening situation ahead, one of the ways we might help alleviate this is 
to work together cooperatively where opportunities are available.”60 Briggle’s attempt to 
defuse a potentially explosive situation proved ineffectual, and his premonition came to 
fruition less than a year later when a tribal member rekindled the fiery situation between 
the park and the tribe.
59 In 2004, Kipp published an autobiography detailing his experiences with AIM. See W oody Kipp, Viet 
Cong a t Wounded Knee: The Trail o f  a Blackfeet Activist, (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 2004), 
87-137.
60 Letter from Supt. W illiam J. Briggle to Director o f  the M idwest Region, February 22, 1973, GNPA: F19- 
13.
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Revival
On September 15, 1973, park rangers arrested Woody Kipp for entering the park 
without paying the entrance fee required by law. He appealed to the United States 
District Court For The District Of Montana, Great Falls Division, and the judge’s ruling 
on January 2, 1974 boded well for the tribe. The judge focused on the definition of 
public lands in the cession agreement. He noted that “public lands of the United States,” 
in strict legal terms, refers to lands subject to sale or disposal under general laws. By this 
definition, lands in GNP did not qualify as public lands. On the other hand, the judge 
acknowledged the definition of “public lands of the United States” in popular usage as 
referring to lands belonging to the government and open to the public. The judge 
reiterated the rule of interpretation stating that a “treaty with Indians must be construed, 
not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in 
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” The judge ruled in Kipp’s 
favor, arguing that it was “inconceivable that the Indians understood that there was 
hidden in the questioned phrase a privilege in the United States to terminate the reserved 
rights by changing the character of the public ownership...I conclude that the reserved 
rights were not extinguished by the act creating the park.”61 Although the judge upheld 
the right of free entry, he did not apply his ruling to the other rights of hunting, fishing, or 
wood-gathering. Nonetheless, park officials feared the potential ramifications of the 
ruling upholding any Blackfeet rights within the park.
Officials within the Park Service immediately lobbied to appeal the Kipp 
decision, for several reasons. Coinciding with the Kipp battle was an effort by the Park 
Service to establish some 917,600 acres within Glacier National Park, roughly 95%, as a
61 United States v. Kipp, January 2, 1974, 369 F. Supp. 774.
“wilderness area” as proposed by the Wilderness Act o f 1964. Since nearly half of this
i
acreage lay east of the Continental Divide, the proposed land was “subject to the alleged 
rights of the Blackfeet Indians to remove weed and timber, hunt and fish.” NPS Director 
Ronald Walker wrote in February of 1974 that “the arguments utilized to uphold the right 
of entry into the park might also be employed to support the right to remove timber from 
wilderness therein.” Aware that section 4(a)(3) of the Wilderness Act provided that the 
act could not “ .. .modify the statutory authority under which units of the National Park 
System are created,” the Park Service included a provision accompanying the draft 
wilderness proposal repealing the “alleged rights of the Blackfeet Indians” and strongly 
recommending that the government appeal the “Kipp” decision. Since the Wilderness 
Act defined wilderness as federal “land retaining its primeval character and 
influence. ..with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable,” then logging, 
wrote Walker, “within a Glacier wilderness would violate the intent of the Wilderness 
Act.”62
Superintendent Briggle of GNP shared the Director’s desire to appeal the Kipp 
decision, but for different reasons. Labeling Kipp’s action an “obvious test case” in a 
letter to the Regional Director of the Midwest Region penned less than a week after the 
judge’s decision, Briggle noted that the decision acted only on the right of entry and did 
not pertain to any of the other claimed rights. However, fearing a precedent, Briggle 
worried: “[W]e are deeply concerned with Judge Smith’s decision because of the other 
rights claimed by the Blackfeet Indians,” and “are of the strong opinion that an appeal
62 Letter from NPS Director Ronald Walker to Assistant Solicitor o f Parks and Recreation, February 16, 
1974, GNPA: F19-13; 78 Stat. 893; 78 Stat. 891; the tribe opposed any efforts towards wilderness 
designation on the “ceded strip,” since such a designation would eclipse their traditional rights, see Philip 
Burnham, Indian Country, G o d ’s Country: N ative Am ericans and the National Parks, (Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press, 2000), 155.
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should be made on this case.” He admitted that while “it might be possible to live with 
the free entry aspect of the decision, any unfavorable decision about hunting and timber 
harvest that might be rendered would be completely unacceptable in a national park.” 
The Superintendent advocated taking a positive stand on “this lesser decision,” writing 
that “[W]e fully anticipate that test cases of the other rights will be forthcoming.”63 
Again, his prediction came true.
Inspired by Kipp’s victory, three tribal members next intentionally violated park 
regulations to test the usufruct rights in the Agreement of 1.896.64 At 3:45 P.M. on 
January 23, 1974, a park ranger apprehended three tribal members in the process of 
committing three separate violations near the St. Mary Visitor Center. George Kipp II, 
brother of Woody Kipp, had fired a Winchester 270 and was charged with hunting; 
Charles J. Momberg was caught in possession of fishing equipment in closed waters and 
was charged with fishing out of season; Darrell Momberg was apprehended cutting a 
small live tree and charged with destroying a tree branch. Charles Momberg and George 
Kipp pleaded nolo contendere to their charges and were given a fine of $100, later 
suspended, and were placed on a 90-day non-supervisory probation. Darrell Momberg 
entered a plea of not guilty. On July 9, .1.974, U.S. District Judge Russell E. Smith, the 
same judge who had acquitted Woody Kipp, found Darrell Momberg guilty of the crime 
as charged and fined the defendant $1.00. In his ruling, the judge concluded that the 
defendant had cut a piece of dead wood from a live tree “for the purpose of testing the 
Indian rights,” and not “for any of the purposes mentioned in the agreement.” The same
63 Letter from Superintendent Briggle to Regional Director, January 10, 1974, GNPA: F19-13.
64 A memo from GNP Superintendent Mart to the Regional Director of the M idwest Region, January 24, 
1974, related a call from an attorney in Browning indicating, before the transgressions occurred, that 
“certain unidentified Indians desired to be arrested for hunting and fishing in the park,” GNPA: F19-13.
79
judge admitted he had recently become aware of the 1935 Court of Claims finding that 
officially terminated tribal rights. Backtracking from his analysis in United States v.
Kipp, the judge upheld the earlier decision and the tribe’s window of opportunity all but 
disappeared 65 Tribal rights to free entry did remain intact, however.
The inconsistency of the judge’s ruling did not escape the attention of the tribe, 
and shortly after the Momberg ruling tribal lawyers teamed up with the Native American 
Rights Fund to write a petition to the Secretary of the Interior. Presenting a 
comprehensive analysis of previous cases and legal precedents, the petition requested that 
the Department recognize the usufruct rights guaranteed in the Agreement of 1896 and 
that the National Park Service enter into a cooperative agreement with the tribe to 
implement the reserved rights. Moreover, the petition asserted unequivocally that the 
establishment of Glacier National Park had not abrogated the reserved rights.66
The petition advanced two core arguments challenging the validity of the 
Department’s refusal to recognize the agreement rights. The first argument dealt with the 
rule of interpretation, or what legalists call the Canons of Construction. The Canons of 
Construction mandate that courts must examine the historical circumstances in which the 
government and tribes negotiated treaties/agreements and, relying on the negotiation 
process itself, must interpret treaties/agreements “in the sense in which they would 
naturally be understood by the Indians.” Judge Smith’s decision in the Kipp case adhered 
to the rule of interpretation, and the authors of the petition declared that the legal analysis 
in the “Kipp” decision should remain determinative; thus, the adverse ruling in the
65 For details about the transgressions and the Momberg decision, see above letter; S.A.R. 1974, GNPA; 29 
Stat. 353-354.
66 Philip E. Roy, “Petition o f the Blackfeet Tribe o f  Indians to the Secretary o f the Interior to approve a 
conservation agreement providing for the regulation o f Blackfeet reserved rights on the eastern portion o f  
Glacier National Park,” (Browning, MT, 1975), 1.
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“Momberg” case was unjustified as the 1935 Court of Claims finding should not set aside 
the determination in the “Kipp” case. Judge Smith had cited the 1899 Jones v. Meehan 
case as precedent, but in fact the Supreme Court first stated the basic rule in Worcester v. 
Georgia (1832), and Chief Justice Marshall’s express statement in the case established 
the standard for judicial interpretations of Indian treaties ever since.67
The second core argument advanced by the authors of the petition dealt with the 
inherent sovereignty of Indian nations spelled out in the 1832 ruling Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia. As sovereign nations with inherent powers of self-government, tribes retain the 
power to regulate the exercise of reserved rights both on and off reservations; however, 
the Lone W olf v. Hitchcock ruling in 1903 granted plenary power to Congress to 
unilaterally abrogate treaties made with tribes. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings 
determined that in order to exercise this power, Congress must issue an express statement 
of the intention to extinguish reserved rights. Noting that both the 1910 and 1914 statutes 
establishing the park and prohibiting hunting, respectively, made no mention of Blackfeet 
rights, the authors concluded that “longstanding principles of federal Indian law preclude 
abrogation where there is no clear legislative intention to do so.”
The Secretary of the Interior rejected the proposal. Interior Solicitor Austin 
concluded that “a legal basis does not exist for granting the petition and, therefore, the
67 Ibid, 25-26. Several other critics o f  court treatment o f Blackfeet legal rights have echoed many o f  the 
arguments set forth by the authors o f  the petition. For a more in-depth legal analysis o f the Blackfeet- 
Glacier story, see Kenneth P. Pitt, “The Ceded Strip: Blackfeet Treaty Rights in the 1980s,” unpublished 
paper on file at the Ruhle Library; Christopher S. Ashby, “The Blackfeet Agreement o f  1895 and Glacier 
National Park: A Case History;” Tarissa Spoonhunter, “Glacier National Park on Blackfoot Territory: The 
Assertion o f Rights on Traditional Lands,” (M .A. Thesis, American Indian Studies Department, University 
o f Arizona, 2001); Jim Kipp, “Blackfeet Oral Tradition o f  the 1895 Agreement,” (M.S. Thesis, 
Environmental Studies Department, University o f  Montana, 2003). For a more general critique o f  federal 
legal policy towards native rights and national parks, with special emphasis on a case in Olympic National 
Park concerning the Quinault tribe, see H. Barry Holt, “Can Indians Hunt in National Parks? Determinable 
Indian Treaty Rights and United States v. Hicks,” Environmental Law, v. 16 (Winter 1986): 208-254.
68 Roy, 5-6, 23, direct quote pp. 46.
81
petition must be rejected on legal grounds.” Like Judge Smith had done in the 
“Momberg” ruling, the Solicitor reiterated that the viability of the alleged rights had been 
previously litigated and decided by the Court of Claims in 1935, which declared that “the 
1895 reserved rights had terminated and that no compensation was due.” Agreeing with 
the petition’s allegations that Congress made no express intention to abrogate tribal 
rights, Austin responded “it is evident that Congress intended to prohibit hunting and 
timbering in Glacier National Park with no exception for the Blackfeet T ribe.. .on the 
face of the 1914 statute.” Thus, since Congress made no express provision to preserve 
the rights, “we interpret the 1914 statute as terminating those rights.” The Solicitor did 
uphold the right of free access for tribal members.69
Although the petition failed to produce its desired effect, the compelling legal 
arguments contained therein did not fall on deaf ears. In a letter sent to the Assistant 
Secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks and to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
Solicitor Austin admitted that the tribe’s arguments were not “totally unpersuasive or 
unworthy of consideration.” Perhaps aware that his rejection of the petition rested on a 
shaky legal foundation, the solicitor expressed concern that other legal bodies could 
arrive at a different verdict regarding the alleged rights. This concern held immediate 
importance because several wilderness proposals affecting the ceded strip were currently 
pending before Congress, and the Solicitor warned that “Congressional deliberations on 
these bills may provide an opportunity to seek legislation favorable to the tribe.” In a 
startling about-face, the Solicitor recommended that, in order to avoid a potential 
Congressional ruling officially recognizing tribal rights, “you may wish, as a policy
69 Letter from Solicitor Austin to Philip E. Roy, General Counsel o f the Blackfeet Tribe, Decem ber 17, 
1975, GNPA: F19-13.
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matter, to consider a legislative accommodation of the tribe’s request.”70 No effort 
towards legislative accommodation ever surfaced. Congress also never formally 
designated any land as “wilderness” areas in Glacier National Park.
The National Parks and Conservation Association, an environmental watchdog 
group that had condemned the petition by declaring that “Indian attempts to penetrate 
national Park lands for exploitative purposes.. .represent another sad commentary in 
Native American History,” took comfort in the legal rejection of claimed tribal rights.71 
Officials at GNP surely rejoiced as well. Nevertheless, park officials rightfully sensed 
tri bal backlash and took steps in the mid-to-late 1970s in hopes of preventing a souring of 
relations. The park increased efforts, at least on paper, to improve general relations by 
maintaining communication with tribal officials, working cooperatively with the tribe, 
and accommodating, when possible, tribal requests. Superintendent Iversen wrote in 
early 1975 that “[W]e are genuinely sincere in working with the Blackfeet to our mutual 
benefit and have recently demonstrated it by our actions,” noting that park officials 
withdrew a court case regarding cattle trespassing, established positive equal employment 
opportunity goals, and directed more park interpretive programs to appreciation of Indian 
cultures.72 A subsequent park press release announced that both tribal and park officials 
were “exploring ways to improve their neighborly relationship.”73
70 Letter from Solicitor Austin to Assistant Secretary of Fish, W ildlife, and Parks and to the Commissioner 
o f Indian Affairs, February 24, 1976, GNPA, F19-13.
71 See Ashby, 72.
72 Letter from Supt. Iversen to Mr. James Baker, V ice Chairman o f the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, 
January 10, 1975, GNPA: F19-13. The S.A.R. from 1975 stated that “Blackfeet Indian cultural programs 
and relationships with the park increased over the year,” citing the regular showing o f  the film  “The Sun 
Gave Man the Power,” the development o f an A/V Program on Blackfeet crafts, the performance o f dance 
and crafts in the St. Mary Visitor Center, and the involvement o f  Blackfeet leaders in training sessions.
73 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Blackfeet and Glacier Park 
Improving Neighborly Relationships,” September 22, 1977, GNPA: F19-13.
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Reciprocating park attempts to improve communications, Mr. Earl Old Person, 
Blackfeet Tribal Chairman, stated in 1977 that “neither the Blackfeet Reservation or 
Glacier National Park can operate successfully in administrative isolation.” He professed 
that “when neighbors learn to know each other better there will be a higher degree of 
mutual respect and understanding.”74 In what the park dubbed the first joint meeting 
between the tribal council and park staff, tribal officials echoed Earl Old Person’s 
sentiments and traced the source of most controversial problems between the tribe and 
the park to rumors, misinformation, and poor communications which, claimed tribal 
officials, “we are working to eradicate.”75 In kind, the park also worked to rectify 
problems related to misunderstanding.
Prior to the early 1970s, notable tribal contention over the denial of Blackfeet 
alleged rights within Glacier had largely subsided by the late 1930s. For many park 
employees in the late 1970s, the issue of tribal rights was either a faint memory, or more 
likely, to use the parlance of our time, “news to me.” The revival of the issue brought on 
by the high-profile court cases in the mid-1970s resuscitated a tense atmosphere, and park 
officials felt compelled to inform all park personnel, especially the park rangers who 
dealt directly with tribal members, on matters pertaining to tribal relations. A briefing 
statement posted to park personnel shortly after the Solicitor’s rejection of the tribal 
petition provided a brief background of the issue by describing, if  inadequately, the 
Agreement of 1896. After outlining the test cases brought to court and the ultimate 
rulings in favor of the National Park Service, the statement acknowledged that tribal 
“members continue to feel that certain rights were retained.” The statement made clear
74 Ibid.
75 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting Between Blackfeet 
Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA: F19-13.
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the park’s position: “If permitted these rights would allow Tribal members to undertake 
many activities contrary to National Park Service policies and regulations and lead to the 
decimation of the natural resources on the east side of the Continental Divide. The 
National Park Service contends that legislation subsequent to the Treaty of 1895, negates 
any remaining Blackfeet rights.”76
In addition to providing background and clarifying the park’s official position, the 
statement made recommendations as to necessary courses of action. It proclaimed that 
park personnel should work to maintain the best possible relations with the tribe on a 
local level; however, it warned that “the Treaty rights claimed sometimes makesfsic] a 
good working relationship more difficult.” It further demanded that park personnel 
exercise great care with law enforcement actions taken against tribal members and that 
cases involving treaty rights “must be very clear cut and without technical procedure 
faults in the execution of park actions.”77 Park staff doubtlessly hoped to avoid any 
confrontation that could exacerbate tensions and cause a public outcry, as did tribal 
officials.
The alleviation of public concern and the conveyance of a good working 
relationship between the two parties constituted important goals for both park and tribal 
officials.78 Since most visitors to the park also traveled through the Blackfeet 
Reservation, it was in the public interest that the park and the tribe work together in
76 Glacier National Park, “Briefing Statement: Blackfeet Treaty Rights,” December, 1976, GNPA: F19-13.
77 Ibid.— —  '
78,Pfanguage in correspondence letters and press releases supports this assertion. See Letter from Supt. 
dversen to Mr. James Baker, V ice Chairman o f the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, January 10, 1975, 
GNPA: F 19-13. A Letter from Supt. Iversen to the Regional Director dated September 12, 1977, claims 
that “the tribe is sincerely interested in bettering their public im age,” GNPA. See also U.S. Department o f  
the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting Between Blackfeet Tribal Council and 
Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA; U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park 
Service N ew s Release: “Blackfeet and Glacier Park Improving Neighborly Relationships,” September 22, 
1977, GNPA.
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serving the visitors: any tourist deterrents could have adverse financial ramifications for 
both parties. The fact that a good amount of tourist travel went through the reservation is 
of no small consequence. Park rangers did not deny the legally-sanctioned right of free 
access to tribal members; nevertheless, the tendency of non-Indians to pass through the 
reservation and into the park while claiming to be members of the Blackfeet Nation did 
not proceed unnoticed and generated much concern for park officials.79
Proximity considerations also engendered concerns over the desired aesthetics of 
the “Glacier experience.” As noted earlier, during the park’s early years officials 
unsuccessfully tried to extend the eastward boundary in order to protect ungulate 
populations that migrated east to lower elevations in the winter. Another motive for the 
proposed extension lay in the park’s desire to shield tourists from the realities of modern
Indian life: signs, stores, and unsightly shacks could offend some tourists during their
xowilderness excursions.
In spite of mutual efforts towards accommodation and positive feedback from 
joint meetings, park and tribal officials failed to preserve an amicable atmosphere along 
the contested park border.81 Some Blackfeet individuals took matters into their own 
hands and lashed out against park rangers. In the late summer of 1977, four tribal 
members assaulted two park rangers, and in the early 1980s, according to an anonymous 
retired ranger interviewed by historian Mark David Spence in 1994, a near state of war
79 See M emo o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council 
Members, May 10, 1979, GNPA: F20-8.
80 Keller and Turek, 61-62.
81 Tribal and park leaders expressed optimism after several meetings in the late 1970s. See Letter from 
Supt. Iversen to Regional Director re: M eeting with Blackfeet Tribal Officials, September 12, 1977, 
GNPA; U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting Between  
Blackfeet Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA; Memo o f M eeting 
between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council Members, May 10, 1979, GNPA.
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resurfaced and armed conflict nearly broke out on several occasions. Although park 
officials met frequently with tribal officials and enhanced their efforts to sensitize the 
Glacier staff and tourists to issues concerning the Blackfeet tribe in the decades that 
followed, they did not budge from their policy prohibiting native hunting within the park.
While a state of discontent festered along the eastern border of GNP in the early 
1980s, developments elsewhere rattled the foundations of the National Park System. 
Unlike in the contiguous United States, the federal government established national 
parklands in Alaska before extinguishing aboriginal title; thus, many parks in Alaska 
today allow inhabitation as well as hunting by indigenous groups. With the passage of 
the Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971, Congress officially 
extinguished all aboriginal title to land; however, lawmakers recognized that the 
termination of aboriginal title would have to be accompanied by legal protections of the 
natives’ continued subsistence use of the public lands.83 On December 2, 1980, Congress 
passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which 
designated 100 million acres, roughly 28 percent of the state, as conservation areas and 
added ten new units to the national park system, nine of which allowed subsistence use. 
The NPS maintained that subsistence activities, including hunting, could be compatible 
with wildlife conservation and the national park idea in Alaskan park units.84
Neither the NPS, Congress, nor the general public shared such an optimistic 
appraisal of native hunting in national parks in the lower forty-eight. The issue came 
under the national spotlight in January of 1984 when a judge dismissed charges against
82 For more on the assault on park rangers, see Letter from Supt. Iversen to Regional Director, September 
12, 1977, GNPA: F19-13. For more on general discord in the early 1980s, see Spence, 99-100, 169.
83 Theodore Catton, Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos, and National Parks in Alaska, (Albuquerque: 
University o f New  M exico Press, 1997), 81.
84 Ibid., 85.
two enrolled members of the Quinault Indian Tribe caught illegally hunting several elk 
within Olympic National Park, basing his decision on explicit treaty guarantees made in 
1855. The enabling legislation for the park, established in 1938, not only preserved 
Indian treaty rights but also failed to ban hunting in the park. Although Congress 
officially banned hunting in the park in 1942, the Quinault tribe had an unspoken 
agreement with park rangers: as long as tribal members used discretion when poaching 
within the park, stayed out of public view, hunted for ceremonial or subsistence purposes 
only, and did not abuse the privilege, rangers looked the other way and did not bother 
them. The judge’s acquittal of the two immediately sent shockwaves through the 
environmental and hunting communities and caused a public uproar. Raising the 
unsettling specter o f widespread uncontrolled Indian hunting on federal lands and 
remonstrating against a frightening precedent, the government pressured the court to re­
hear the case. The court reversed its decision, upheld Park Service regulations, and 
convicted the two tribal members.85 Court recognition of native treaty rights in the 
national park system enjoyed a short-lived reign of success, but in the end, the 
entrenched, federally-supported guidelines of the national park ideal triumphed over 
native claims to the cherished American landscape contained within park boundaries.
A quarter of a century after the “Momberg” case, another violation of park 
regulations revived the controversy over Blackfeet rights in the eastern half of Glacier 
National Park. On January 18, 2000, two NPS biologists surveying bighorn sheep on 
Spot Mountain spotted two tribal members illegally hunting sheep within the park and 
radioed the hunters’ location to Forest Service officers who apprehended the two tribal 
members on the Blackfeet Reservation. After being indicted with conspiring to violate
85 See Holt, “Can Indians Hunt?” 208-211, 243-244; Keller and Turek, 90, 122-124.
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the Lacey Act, one of the defendants, Bailey D. Peterson, appealed the case to test the 
reserved rights issue.86 Some observers held high hopes for the case. Indian Country • 
Today covered the story under the headline: “Blackfeet hunter case may resolve century-
0 7
old federal land dispute.” The tribe was divided in its support of Mr. Peterson, as the 
defendant was trophy hunting rather than subsistence hunting. The defendant had killed 
three bighorn sheep, but had just taken the heads and had not preserved the meat.88 On 
November 17, Judge Donald Molloy of the U.S. District Court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the case. The judge held that the Act of August 22, 1914, that 
officially prohibited hunting in the park applied to the Blackfeet in abrogating their right 
to hunt, as all hunting was prohibited in the park. Some tribal members consider this 
^ ,-case, like the “Momberg” decision, a setback for the Blackfeet in exercising their 
reserved rights and fear that it could be another obstacle in asserting reserved rights for
QQ
the tribe in the future.
Summary
The Blackfeet, like most tribes, conveyed vast tracts of land to the federal 
government, reserving pre-existing rights to themselves through treaties and agreements 
that specified the forms and limitations of the reserved rights. The Blackfeet Reservation 
borders Glacier National Park, and the exercise of these rights sometimes conflicted with 
the purposes of the national parks, making management inconvenient and difficult. Of 
the four reserved rights enumerated in the Agreement of 1896— unrestricted access, the 
cutting of timber, hunting, and fishing— hunting constituted the primary point of
86 See U.S. v. Peterson, November 17, 2000, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1309, CR 00-9-M -DW M .
87 Ron Selden, “Blackfeet hunter case may resolve century-old federal land dispute,” Indian Country 
Today, v.20 no.20 (November 2000): D5.
88 Spoonhunter, 66-67.
89 See U.S. v. Peterson; Spoonhunter, 66-67.
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contention between the Blackfeet and the park in the decades following the establishment 
of Glacier National Park. Blackfeet attempts to win recognition of hunting rights met 
with staunch opposition by park officials and official rejection by federal courts based on 
legal grounds. Several scholars, mentioned in this chapter, have leveled scathing 
indictments at the government’s interpretation of the Agreement of 1896. My objective 
here is not to join the chorus, but rather to place the act of hunting in Glacier within the 
larger context of hunting in the National Park System. More than any other, hunting 
represents an extractive activity that threatens the natural resources and the aesthetic 
quality of the parks, as well as the safety of tourists and hikers; thus, proponents of the 
national parks have deemed it an unacceptable practice in the sacrosanct National Park 
System.
The 1984 case of United States v. Hicks in which, under federal pressure, a judge 
overturned a favorable decision for tribal hunting rights, holds great significance for 
several reasons. First, it illustrates the leverage the government possesses and the extent 
to which it will use such leverage to prohibit hunting in the national parks. Second, the 
case shows that park officials and government agents are not the only steadfast opponents 
of hunting in the national parks. Public uproar by environmentalists and hunters 
threatened to turn the situation in Olympic National Park into a political nightmare. For 
these reasons, permissible hunting in the national parks by any group remains a highly 
unlikely possibility.
During a span of a few months in the 1970s, the Blackfeet tested all the explicit 
agreement rights: hunting, fishing, timber cutting, and free entry. The park charged 
George Kipp II and Charles Momberg, Jr. with hunting and fishing out of season,
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respectively, but neither of the defendants raised the treaty defense in their case and they 
both pleaded no contest. The defendants’ attorney stated that the tribe preferred to raise 
the agreement issues pertaining to hunting and fishing rights directly with the Secretary 
of the Interior rather than with a criminal court. In a 1985 M.A. thesis entitled “Blackfeet 
Agreement of 1895 and Glacier National Park,” Christopher Ashby wisely surmised that 
the defendants very likely adopted their position “due to the magnitude of the 
Government’s evidence for prosecution.”90
Historically, assertion of the reserved right of fishing has received little attention 
from the Blackfeet tribe. One possible reason is that traditionally, most Blackfeet 
considered fish taboo and only one small band actively fished for food.91 Of course, 
customs have changed. During a native-run interpretive tour of the park, tour guide 
Edward North Piegan informed the tour group that the Blackfeet did not traditionally 
harvest fish and would rather starve than consume the flesh reserved for the beings of the 
Underworld. After a slight pause, he jokingly remarked that “today we eat fish every 
Friday.” Furthermore, the park allows the general public to fish in its waters in-season 
and under regulation. The park currently requires that anglers release any bull trout 
caught because it is an endangered species, an obvious measure to safeguard the park’s 
resources for future generations. Park officials consider controlled fishing an activity 
compatible with the goals of the park system, but do not afford any special privileges to 
the Blackfeet. Perhaps park managers fear they could not control harvests out of season. 
Moreover, any special privileges for the tribe very well could engender unwanted and 
public hostility from environmental and sporting groups.
90 Ashby, 69.
91 For more on taboo flesh foods among the Blackfeet, see Ewers, 86-87.
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Darrell Momberg, charged with cutting a live tree in 1973, did plead not guilty to 
the charge and went before the judge to test the agreement rights. Judge Smith ruled that 
the defendant had not cut the tree for domestic purposes, as stated in the agreement, but 
rather to test the agreement rights and found him guilty. By skirting the issue, the judge 
prevented Momberg from using the Agreement as a defense for his violation. The 
removal of vegetative resources, like hunting, represents an extractive activity with 
potentially harmful results to the park’s resources and aesthetic presentation. The park 
has acknowledged that many plants in the region have religious significance for the 
Blackfeet and does allow the tribe to gather medicinal herbs under permit; however, as 
early as 1980 park managers expressed concern that increased harvests might cause
QOdetrimental effects to the park’s resources. The cutting of timber for domestic 
purposes, or for any purpose, closely resembles logging, an act incompatible with park 
ideals and certain to draw fire from environmental and logging groups. Considering that 
park officials have identified Blackfeet and Forest Service logging adjacent to the park as 
a primary threat to the park proper, permissible timber extraction on any scale by any
QTgroup within the park too seems an unlikely possibility.
Of the four explicit agreement rights, free entry remains the only one honored by 
the National Park Service. The fact that tribal members may enter the park without 
paying an entrance fee may irk some visitors who resent paying the modest fee when 
others are exempted, but acknowledging that Blackfeet tribal members may enter the 
park free of charge in no way confers special use privileges harmful of the park’s
92 U.S. Department of the Interior/National Park Service, “Summary o f Threats to Glacier National Park,” 
n.d./1980, pp. 2, GNPA: F13-10.
93 Both the “Summary o f  Threats to Glacier National Park” released in 1980 and many o f the 
Superintendent Annual Reports from the last two decades identify logging by the Forest Service and the 
Blackfeet Nation as external threats to GNP.
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resources or recreational capacity. The right of free access may have caused some 
administrative problems for park personnel at the entrance gates on the eastern side of the 
park, but overall it poses little challenge to the underlying goals of the national park 
system. Superintendent Briggle expressed this position concisely when he wrote in 1974, 
regarding the “Kipp” decision, that while “it might be possible to live with the free entry 
aspect of the decision, any unfavorable decision about hunting and timber harvest that 
might be rendered would be completely unacceptable in a national park.”94
Controversy over the Agreement and the reserved rights contained therein has 
underlain many of the problems between the park and the tribe. Many tribal members 
remain suspicious of the validity of the agreement as it appears on paper and the 
government’s interpretation of the agreement and maintain that the tribal representatives 
present at the negotiations intended to retain the opportunity for their descendants to 
subsist on the ceded lands indefinitely. For many Blackfeet in the modem era, 
subsistence transcends the activities expressly listed in the Agreement of 1896. The 
exercise of implied subsistence activities on the ceded strip in the modern era comprises 
the focus of the rest of this study.
94 Letter from Superintendent Briggle to Regional Director, January 10, 1974, GNPA: F19-13.
Chapter 3—The Modern Era: Livestock and Contested Terrain
The Great Northern Railway no longer owns the Glacier Park Lodge, but 
Blackfeet themes still have a visible presence in the historic lodge and continue to figure 
into the “Glacier experience.” Large canvases and flags portraying frontier themes, 
including Indians, adorn the walls of the hotel and hang from the rafters of the in-house 
restaurant. A teepee decorates the vast, manicured front lawn, and poles carved in the 
likeness of noble, stoic chiefs support the roof of the front porch. A picture-book near a 
stuffed mountain goat contains photos of Blackfeet groups greeting visitors to the lodge 
in the early twentieth century. No dancers entertain guests as in the past, but Curly Bear 
Wagner still holds his weekly “fireside chats,” begun in the 1980s as part of the “Native 
America Speaks” program, with guests in the lobby of the lodge. In early fall of 2005 ,1 
managed to catch Curly Bear’s last performance of the season. He injected a healthy 
dose of humor throughout his performance, regaling the crowd with tales of horse-theft, 
Blackfeet encounters with Lewis and Clark, and the important role women have played in 
Blackfeet culture. At one point he asked the audience what wildlife they had seen on 
their trip. After running down a list of famous Glacier wildlife without eliciting any 
answers in the affirmative, Curly Bear asked if anyone had seen any “slow elk.” He met 
with looks of confusion. After a silent pause interrupted only by the crackling of burning 
logs, a couple across the way burst into laughter— they got it. The female loudly 
proclaimed, “He’s talking about cows!” The audience joined in the laughter, with several 
raising their hands signifying that they had indeed seen cattle on their trip.
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Most visitors to the Glacier Park Lodge, or to Glacier National Park, likely do not 
include cows on their list of “hope-to-see” animals in the rugged and sublime Montana 
wilderness. What most tourists probably do not realize is that the Glacier Park Lodge 
does not reside in the park proper, but rather rests on reservation land. The official 
entrance to the park lies several miles away. Driving along the road to the Two Medicine 
entrance to the park, I spotted dozens of “slow elk” foraging in the valley on the eastern 
side of the road, the side farther from the park boundary. No tangible divide delineates 
the border of the park, which makes it quite simple for grazing livestock from the 
reservation to drift into the park. The ancient and persistent recurrence of such activity 
has generated much consternation and frustration for park personnel, and mitigation 
measures enacted by the park has in turn aggravated many in the Blackfeet community. 
Thus, the grazing of livestock on park land provides yet another point of contention 
between the two parties.
The disappearance of the buffalo, the “staff of life” for the Blackfeet, forced tribal 
members to adopt non traditional forms of subsistence. One enterprise promoted by 
government agents and embraced by some was cattle ranching. Traditional cattle grazing 
techniques on the reservation allowed livestock to roam at will with very little control 
over their movements, and tribal adherence to such methods throughout the twentieth 
century resulted in stock near the western border of the reservation, often grazing on 
lands within Glacier National Park. Park personnel considered grazing from the 
reservation illegal trespass that compromised the preservation and aesthetic goals of the 
park system. Tribal members evoked the oral history of the Agreement of 1896 to argue 
they held rights to use the land for grazing, as well as to claim that the current location of
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the boundary does not match the boundary described in the agreement. A legal ruling in 
1976 officially denied tribal grazing rights and park managers twice attempted to fence 
lengths of the boundary as a permanent and effective solution to the problem. Tribal 
resistance and political maneuvering halted both efforts as tribal members vehemently 
opposed a visible and permanent symbol of denied rights and alienation. Joint efforts 
have largely failed to alleviate problems associated with stock trespass, and it continues 
as an issue of contention to this day.
In its quest to “civilize” the Indians, the federal government sought to replace the 
traditional nomadic tribal activities of hunting and gathering with sedentary, “civilized” 
pursuits such as agriculture and the raising of livestock. The Agreement of 1896 
recognized that “the situation of the Blackfeet Reservation renders it wholly unfit for 
agriculture, and since these Indians have shown within the past four years that they can 
successfully raise horned cattle,” then “there is every probability that they will become 
self-supporting by attention to this industry.”1 As did many other tribes, the Blackfeet 
favored the herding of cattle over farming, for ranching somewhat resembled caring for 
horses, an honorable and prestigious activity in many tribal communities.2 Although the 
tribe made noticeable progress in the cattle business in the 1890s, drought and 
overgrazing became major problems for tribal ranchers. Local cattle barons, in violation 
of federal law, extensively ran herds of cattle onto the Blackfeet reservation that 
consumed much of the grass, thereby undermining tribal ranching efforts and
1 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, v . l ,  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1904), 607.
2 Ewers, 307.
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contributing to overgrazing. Agency corruption and illegal livestock trespassing on 
reservation land prevented the tribe as a whole from developing strong, profitable ties to 
the cattle market, and by 1918 only three percent of the population owned the estimated 
40,000 head of cattle on the reservation, while most owned none at all.4 By this time, 
Glacier National Park had come into existence and soon enough the Blackfeet, formerly 
victims of illegal livestock trespass, would become brandished by park officials as the 
transgressors.
Secretary of the Interior Walter L. Fisher instructed William R. Logan, Glacier’s 
first Superintendent, to protect the area from poachers, grazing interests, illegal timber 
cutting, or other “depredations” that threatened the park’s ultimate preservation.5 As 
noted in Chapter 1, preservation for early park managers, including Logan, meant 
selective protection of park resources and did not necessarily imply keeping the park in 
an unimpaired, natural state. Although Glacier’s enabling legislation specified the 
“preservation of the Park in a state of nature” as a primary goal, it also allowed Park 
superintendents to lease acreages within the park to private individuals. In addition to 
allowing timber production, the park’s early superintendents issued several grazing 
permits to private landowners in the region, thereby substantiating claims that Glacier’s 
early managers did not adhere to a strict program of resource preservation.6 Stephen 
Mather, first director of the National Park Service, reluctantly accepted the practice of 
cattle grazing in the national parks and argued that officials should restrict such activities 
to isolated regions where any evidence of destruction or resource utilization could escape
3 Jack Holterman, “The Blackfeet Agency and Glacier Park,” 1985, 5-11, 23-27, 32, unpublished paper on 
file at the George C. Ruhle Library, W est Glacier, MT.
4 Ibid., 37.
5 Buckholtz, 15.
6 Ibid., 19.
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the notice of tourists.7 According to one tribal member, the park continued limited 
grazing activities until the late 1940s.8
The park may have allowed grazing if approved and regulated by park officials, 
but it did not condone or permit such activity by unlicensed outside interests. On several 
occasions early in the park’s existence, park officials brought ranchers to court for 
grazing in the park without permits.9 But overall, the issue did not receive serious 
attention from park superintendents until the early 1970s. When it did, park officials 
pointed to the Blackfeet Reservation as the primary source of livestock wandering into 
and damaging the park. Nearly every park document addressing the issue claimed that it 
was an “ancient” or “long-standing” problem. Writing in 1970, a ranger from the Two 
Medicine administrative unit, on the eastern border of the park, labeled stock trespass an 
“historic problem in Two Medicine, and one that is mentioned in practically every ranger 
report from that area.”10 The issue received scant attention from park authorities until 
William J. Briggle began developing measures to address the problem in 1973. What 
prompted Superintendent Briggle and his successors to initiate formal proceedings and 
devote considerable attention to solving problems associated with livestock grazing 
within the park? Several factors may explain his break with tradition. Perhaps 
Superintendent Briggle had an assertive and active personality. Certainly, larger 
developments affecting the three concepts introduced in the first chapter, i.e. the two
7 Ibid., 44.
8 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
9 For a few  examples, see the Superintendent’s Monthly Report for September, 1922, and July, 1923, 
GNPA: F7-2, F7-3.
10 Glacier National Park, “Two M edicine Operations, 1970: Operations and Suggestions,” December 27, 
1970, pp. 16, GNPA: F13.-4.
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dialectic forces shaping park management (use vs. preservation) and perceptions Of 
American Indians, created a situation that required serious attention.
The recreation rationale underlying the park system necessitated action regarding 
stock trespass in order to maintain and present a desirable aesthetic package for the 
tourist industry. A park ranger complaining about stock trespass in 1970 surmised that 
perhaps “the main reason so little has been done to control trespass is because most of it 
is out of sight of visitors and administrators.”11 This statement implies that, historically, 
the eastern parts of the park most vulnerable to stock grazing did not receive heavy 
visitation. During the 1960s this began to change. Glacier’s “Mission 66” program 
stressed development to accommodate rising trends in tourism following WWII. In 1960, 
Glacier Park Inc. bought out the Great Northern and became the park’s primary 
concessionaire, and still is today. GPI immediately initiated an aggressive development 
policy, and with park support constructed more new buildings and improved more 
concession facilities between 1962 and 1967 than the Great Northern had in the previous 
three decades.12 Much of this development took place in the eastern portions of the park. 
Thus, increased visitation in the park forced park officials to pay closer attention to 
activities that impacted the aesthetics of the park. The same ranger quoted above 
exclaimed later in the report that “ [S]tock trespass is a problem that is visibly there— the 
cattle can be seen and effects of trampling and overgrazing are obvious.”13 Beginning in 
the mid-1970s, complaints about the presence of cattle filtered in from local 
conservationists and park visitors and compelled park personnel to take action. The
" Ibid.
12 Buckholtz, 105.
13 Glacier National Park, “Two M edicine Operations, 1970,” 17.
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“pristine” Glacier wilderness portrayed by park promoters and expected by tourists did 
not include livestock.
The preservation rationale also helps explain why officials in Glacier began 
earnestly to address grazing in the park in the early 1970s. As ecological ideas finally 
took hold and exerted influence on park operations in the 1960s, park observers began to 
recognize events occurring external to park boundaries as the cause of serious damage to 
park resources. Adjacent activities included road development, logging, agriculture, 
energy extraction, and grazing, just to name a few.14 Concurrent with this revelation was 
an increased emphasis on resource and habitat management within the parks. In the case 
of Glacier, grazing represented both an external and internal threat whose detrimental 
effects on park resources compromised the newly emphasized goal of maintaining and/or 
restoring parks to their “primitive” conditions. The same ranger quoted above noted that 
“now that the service is so conscious of resources management, something should be 
done.”15 Whether or not tourists could see the effects of grazing, ranger reports about 
resource degradation and the enhanced importance attached to resource management and 
preservation in general demanded that park officials actively take steps to resolve 
problems associated with livestock grazing.
Changes in perceptions natives held about their own identities and resultant 
actions also coerced park officials into intensifying efforts towards resolving livestock 
problems in Glacier. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1960s and 1970s native 
groups began proudly to embrace their identities as American Indians, and a resurgence 
of interest in tribal customs and history led Indians across the country actively to assert
14 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f  the Parks Report-1980,” pp. 1, GNPA: 
F60-14.
15 Glacier National Park, “Two M edicine Operations, 1970,” 16.
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their rights. The Blackfeet channeled this impulse into pressuring Glacier to recognize 
the reserved rights listed in the Agreement of 1896. Although the Agreement failed to 
include grazing explicitly, many Blackfeet read between the lines and claimed that they 
had retained grazing rights.16 Pressured by the tribe, park officials deemed it utterly 
necessary to take a firm and proactive stance on grazing within the park lest they appear 
submissive to tribal claims regarding alleged rights and indifferent to perceived threats to 
the park. Tribal members based much of their resistance to park mitigation measures on 
alleged rights derived from the Agreement of 1896 and viewed the problem as a treaty 
rights issue. The park viewed it as a clear-cut trespassing issue with legal ramifications.
A 1965 Solicitor’s opinion on cattle trespassing in Yellowstone National Park 
clarified the legal status of livestock trespassing on national park lands. The attorney for 
a defendant in a cattle trespass case argued that under Montana state law, cattle are not 
legally trespassing unless there is a legal fence between the parties. Moreover, Montana 
law does not require stock-owners to fence land. The Solicitor responded that the park 
was under exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and “with certain exceptions, not 
germane here, the laws of the state adjoining the Park have no force or effect within the
17Park.” Thus, federal law superseded state law regarding trespassing of domestic 
animals on federal lands. This opinion provided a clear course of legal action for 
officials at Glacier.
In the winter of 1973, Superintendent Briggle approved a memo laying out a 
three-year plan of control measures designed to eliminate domestic livestock trespass
16 See Glacier National Park, “Briefing Statement: Blackfeet Treaty Rights,” December, 1976, GNPA: F19- 
13.
17 M emo from Field Solicitor to M idwest Regional Director re: Cattle Trespass in Yellowstone, August 10, 
1965, pp. 1-2, available in the “Livestock Trespassing Binder” at the Chief Ranger’s O ffice in West 
Glacier, MT. Hereafter referred to as “Binder.”
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along the east boundary of the park. The plan included constructing a total of 30 miles of 
fencing consisting of drift fences, electric fences, and cattleguards on all east side 
entrance roads at the boundary. As an interim protective measure, the plan suggested 
employing a “cowboy herder type individual” with horse and dogs to patrol the boundary 
and ward off or remove trespassing livestock.18 In late summer of the same year, park 
personnel initiated enforcement of horse and cattle trespass violations, issuing notices and 
citing and fining several individuals. The Superintendent wrote that the “park will 
continue with its aggressive efforts to control trespass livestock.”19 Adhering to more 
strict management regimes, the park also removed horse concession facilities on the 
shore of Lake McDonald to prevent possible pollution and preserve aesthetic quality.20
As the park began to take proactive measures against livestock trespassing from 
the Blackfeet Reservation, tribal members in turn took proactive measures against the 
park and brazenly asserted their perceived rights on the ceded strip. Although Judge 
Russell E. Smith’s January 1974 decision in the “Kipp” case upholding the tribal right of 
free entry failed to address other rights listed in the Agreement of 1896, it did contain 
testimony from tribal leaders at the negotiations expressing their desire to reserve timber 
and grazing lands in the ceded strip. The minor victory troubled park officials and 
inspired subsequent premeditated test cases that ultimately failed to advance tribal 
interests. Nonetheless, the tribal petition submitted in 1975 demanding recognition of 
tribal rights and proposing a joint conservation agreement generated concern for park
18 M emo from C hief Ranger to District Manager, Hudson Bay re: Control o f  Livestock Trespass along Park 
Boundary, February 23, 1973, pp. 1, “Binder.”
19 S.A.R. 1973, pp. 6, GNPA.
20 Ibid., pp. 3.
21 See United States v. Kipp, January 2, 1974, 369 F. Supp. 774, pp. 6.
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officials, who stepped up demands to clarify the park’s position regarding livestock 
trespassing.
In December of 1975, Visitor Protection Specialist Robert A. Bums wrote that 
joint efforts to solve livestock trespassing problems “with the Blackfeet Tribe have not 
been successful and each attempt to do so seems to esculate (sic) the seriousness of this 
problem and to add recognition and validity to the Indian claims on Park lands according 
to the original treaty agreements.” He noted that recent court actions had proved 
ineffective and expressed disapproval over the option of impounding trespassing
livestock due to staffing issues and the certainty of straining “the friendly relations which
22we have been trying to maintain.” Burns also repeated an earlier request for 
information deemed crucial to defending the eastern portion of the park against alleged 
Blackfeet rights: basic quantitative data outlining adverse impacts from stock trespass.
In October of 1971 and again in July of 1975, Resource Management Specialist 
Clyde M. Fauley stressed the need for basic quantitative data to support ranger and 
naturalist claims of vegetative resource degradation and adverse impacts on grizzly, 
mountain sheep and other wildlife on the east side of the park resulting from extensive
' y ' j
domestic livestock trespass. Whereas the first request remained unanswered and largely 
ignored for nearly four years, tribal pressures upon the park several years later conferred 
a sense of importance and urgency to the issue. The Chief Park Ranger forwarded the 
request to the Superintendent, reminding him “that it was difficult to answer the question
22 M emo from Visitor Protection Specialist to Chief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact of 
Dom estic Livestock Trespass), December 19, 1975, pp. 1, “Binder.”
23 M em o from the Resource Management Specialist to the C hief Park Ranger re: Research on adverse 
impacts o f domestic livestock trespass, July 16, 1975, “Binder.”
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asked at the last Tribal Council meeting ‘What does grazing hurt?’”24 Park personnel
apparently believed that scientific data was required in order to make a firm, justifiable
stance against livestock trespassing. In a formal research proposal submitted in
December of 1975, the Visitor Protection Specialist, referring to the tribal petition then
under consideration by the Secretary of the Interior, wrote that
[SJhould the treaty claims or the conservation agreement recently submitted 
by the Tribe be seriously considered at higher Government levels a factual 
research package which verifies our claim of serious degradation of the 
natural resources will be the key to our defense of retaining land east of the 
Continental Divide as part of the National Park.25
In addition to defending the status of the park against treaty claims, the requested data
was “needed in order to determine courses of action to prevent trespass..., prepare
Of*prosecution actions for trespass court cases, and possibly justify funds for fencing.”
Funding for an extensive research program never appeared. The results of a field 
study conducted by a graduate student from the University of Idaho years later proved 
largely inconclusive and ineffectual. Echoing ranger reports, the study described 
extensive trail networks, trampling damage to beaver dams, and trampling around water 
sites. The author concluded that trespass had not greatly influenced the grassland type at 
the time and that overall effects of trespass on the vegetation appeared minimal. She
further concluded that competition between livestock and elk could not be evaluated
01without intensive further study. Due to insufficient funding for long-term research, 
most impacts have not been quantified and are still derived from park ranger, naturalist,
24 M emo from C hief Park Ranger to Superintendent, July 18, 1975, “Binder.”
25 Memo from Visitor Protection Specialist to Chief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact of  
Dom estic Livestock Trespass), December 19, 1975, pp. 1, “Binder.”
26 Ibid., 2.
27 Nancy A. Clifton, “Evaluation o f  Vegetation Composition and Utilization o f  Swiftcurrent Ridge Area o f  
Glacier National Park, with Reference to U se by Trespass Livestock,” College o f Forestry, W ildlife and 
Range Sciences, University o f  Idaho, n.d./1977: 1, 5, 8-10, “Binder.”
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and visitor observations and experiences.28 On a larger scale, the dearth of applied 
ecological research and the subjectivity involved with defining “overgrazing” have made 
it difficult to quantify the ecological impacts of grazing, and despite the significant 
growth in the literature in the last two decades, scientists continue to disagree over the
9Qextent to which grazing causes environmental disturbance.
Fortunately for park officials, defending the eastern portion of the park from 
alleged treaty rights, grazing or otherwise, did not require a “factual research package.” 
Events in the legal arena settled the issue. On July 20th, 1976, Judge Russell E. Smith 
found tribal member Lloyd Flammond guilty of allowing his cattle to trespass in Glacier 
National Park. The judge admitted that tribal negotiators in 1895 had bargained for a 
reservation of grazing rights, but “whatever may have happened to the fishing, hunting, 
and firewood rights which were reserved, no grazing rights were ever reserved to the 
Indians.” He further asserted that the law required all persons, regardless of ethnicity, to 
fence their cattle out of federal lands.30 The judge fined him $250 and placed him on 
unsupervised probation for three years. Superintendent Iversen wrote: “[W]e consider 
this a landmark case.”31
Just a few months prior to the ruling, the Interior Secretary had rejected the tribal 
petition and officially stated that Blackfeet treaty rights did not survive the creation of the 
national park. In conjunction, these two legal opinions created a near impregnable line of 
defense for the park against Blackfeet treaty claims. As Regional Solicitor John R. Little
28 Tamar Losleben, Glacier Program National Parks Conservation Association, “Livestock Trespass in 
Glacier National Park: Crossing the Great D ivide,” August 1, 2003, pp. 15.
29 See Debra L. Donahue, The Western Range Revisited: Removing Livestock from  Public Lands to 
Conserve N ative Biodiversity, (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1999), 41-42, 113-116.
30 United States v. Lloyd Flammond, July 20, 1976, CR 75-41-GF, pp. 1-2.
31 S.A.R. 1976, GNPA.
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wrote to the Regional Director of the NPS, since the Agreement of 1896 “is silent on the 
question of grazing... we do not believe the Blackfeet ever retained such rights... and, 
thus, have no right at present. Further, should such treaty rights exist by virtue of the 
treaty, the Solicitor’s opinion rendered on February 24,1976 would apply to the 
situation.”32 Simply put, the legal position was that the tribe never reserved grazing 
rights, and those rights they did reserve expired upon creation of the park. Park officials 
now possessed legal authority to prohibit and penalize stock trespass within the park.
Legal authority secured, park officials still faced the daunting task of actually 
preventing stock trespass, and this task proved rife with complication. In the years that 
followed, the park persisted in employing an array of measures in hopes of eliminating 
stock trespass from the reservation, but overall they met with little success. The park 
hired a cowboy with horse and dog for a summer to ward off and remove trespassing 
livestock, but the length of the border, roughly 64 miles, rendered the task a physical 
impossibility for a “lone ranger.” Rangers impounded cattle and horses and then fined 
the owners for the impoundment fees, but inadequate facilities hampered success and 
cattle and horses mysteriously escaped on several occasions. The park also attempted 
offering leeway to owners of trespass stock by sending warning letters alerting them to 
stock trespass and granting 72 hours after receipt of their letter to remove said livestock. 
After the grace period, the owners received citations and became subject to legal action. 
Convictions failed to deter further trespass.33
32 M emo from Regional Solicitor, Denver, to the Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Region, NPS, 
Denver, June 30, 1977, “Binder.”
33 For a summary o f  conditions, management actions, and results o f action, see handwritten M emo from  
Hudson Bay District Ranger Bob Frauson, March 9, 1977, pp. 1-2, “Binder.”
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The only measure that seemed to work was fences. By March of 1977, park 
personnel had constructed five miles of wire fence and one mile of electric fence. The 
absence of continuing programs for fence repair and maintenance, combined with alleged 
incidences of deliberate cutting and removal of fence portions, left many of the fences in 
poor condition. In March of 1977, the Hudson Bay District Ranger stressed that in order 
to eliminate stock trespass, the park needed to initiate a large program of fencing and 
cattle guards for the eastern and southern boundaries of the park.34 His impassioned plea 
for a fencing program was not new. Park personnel had identified fencing as the best 
solution and had proposed plans and recommendations for fencing parts of the boundary
-JC
for years. Now, armed with legal authority to prohibit grazing from the reservation, 
park officials took serious steps to get the job done.
Several obstacles stood in their way. One was funding. Federal law required that 
owners of livestock bear the burden of fencing cattle out of federal lands. In United 
States v. Flammond, Judge Smith acknowledged that this requirement, “though onerous,
36is legal.” The park rightfully assumed that ranchers on tribal lands held no desire to 
fund drift fences personally, so they successfully lobbied the National Park Service and 
received $53,000 to fund the fencing of the boundary.37 Another obstacle lay with 
maintenance of the boundary. Issues such as severe winter climate and questions
34 Ibid., 3.
35 See “Two M edicine Operations, 1970,” 16-17; Memo from Chief Ranger to District Manager, Hudson 
Bay re: Control o f  Livestock Trespass along Park Boundary, February 23, 1973, pp. 1-2; M emo from 
Visitor Protection Specialist to Chief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact o f Domestic 
Livestock Trespass), December 19, 1975, pp. 2; Memo from Chief Ranger to Management Assistant re: 
Outlines o f talks for advisory board visit, June 7, 1976, GNPA: F I -4; Nancy A. Clifton. “Evaluation of 
Vegetation Composition and Utilization o f  Swiftcurrent Ridge Area o f  Glacier National Park, with 
Reference to U se by Trespass Livestock,” 13.
36 United States v. Lloyd Flammond, pp. 2.
37 See M emo from Supt. Iversen to Regional Director, RMR re: Fencing Project, October 18, 1978, 
“Binder.”
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pertaining to responsibility over maintenance and continued funding complicated the
38proposal. According to tribal member Ted Hall, questions such as where to fence and
I Q
how to maintain it posed bigger problems than the cattle themselves. Problems over 
maintenance never arose, however, as the third obstacle, tribal opposition, forced park 
officials to abandon the fencing project.
Superintendent Iversen may have received mixed messages from the tribe 
regarding fencing of the boundary. At a meeting in 1975, the tribal council objected to a 
fencing project and the park abandoned its plans, and on several other occasions 
negotiations between the tribe and the park broke down on a joint fencing venture as the 
tribe was convinced that a fence would weaken claims to park lands.40 Yet, on May 31, 
1977, Superintendent Iversen received a letter from Leonard Mountain Chief, Land 
Committee Chairman for the Blackfeet, proposing negotiations on the boundary line. He 
wrote: “[W]e feel the Boundary is not proper at the present time, due to the fact, it is not 
fenced, which makes it impossible to keep the animals from the Park to remain in the 
Park and the animals from the Blackfeet reservation out of there.” Mountain Chief 
claimed that animals from the park ran on the road rights-of-way, “which is endangering 
our people.”41 Confused yet determined, Superintendent Iversen proceeded with the 
fencing plan and advertised the recently awarded contract.
When the tribe realized that the NPS was finalizing plans to approve the contract 
for construction of 35.2 miles of fencing along the park’s eastern boundary, opposition 
came fast and furious. Daniel Boggs, Chairman of the Blackfeet Tribal Business
38 See Letter from Field Solicitor to Research Specialist, February 19, 1975, GNPA.
39 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
40 See M emo from Supt. Iversen to C hief Ranger re: Meeting with the Blackfeet Tribal Council, June 17, 
1977, GNPA; M emo from Hudson Bay District Ranger Bob Frauson, March 9, 1977, pp. 2.
41 Letter from Leonard Mountain Chief to Supt. Iversen, May 26, 1977, “Binder.”
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Council, wrote to Glacier officials that “your recent action has created strong and totally 
negative reaction here on the Reservation.”42 An enclosed tribal resolution officially 
expressed strong objection to the construction of the fence and demanded that the 
National Park Service “cease and desist from any and all plans for construction of said 
fencing.” As grounds for its position and recommended course of action, the tribe 
accused the park of neglecting to consult with the tribe and failing to conduct an 
environmental or wildlife habitat study. Moreover, the “National Park Service has not 
consulted with the Blackfeet Tribe concerning the effects which the fencing would have 
upon well established treaty rights” on the ceded strip.43 If the park refused to “cease and 
desist,” the tribe promised legal action and threatened to take the matter to the 
congressional delegation and to the media 44
The National Park Service cancelled, temporarily, plans to construct drift fences 
along the boundary. By highlighting the absence of an environmental study, the tribe 
exposed a legal flaw in the proposed project, and by threatening legal action, the tribe 
forced the park to postpone its plan for fear of potential litigation. Park officials soon 
dealt with these concerns, but issues surrounding treaty rights continued to plague the 
park as it strove to fence the boundary. The tribe had stated that the fence would impact 
“well established treaty rights.” Legal rulings had effectively denied the tribe grazing 
rights, among others, on the ceded strip, but the logic behind such reasoning failed to 
persuade many tribal members who remained convinced that the tribe held grazing rights. 
Drawing upon Blackfeet oral history of the Agreement of 1896, many within the tribal
42 Letter from Daniel C. Boggs to Supt. Iversen, August 4, 1978, “Binder.”
43 The Blackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution #208-78, August 4, 1978, copy available at the Tribal 
Documents Department, Browning, MT.
44 Letter from Daniel C. Boggs to Supt. Iversen, August 4, 1978, “Binder.”
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community believe that the Blackfeet retained the right to use the land below the tree line 
on the entire mountain front in the ceded strip. By analyzing the intent of the tribal 
signatories, many Blackfeet believe that they have a priority on utilizing these lands for 
grazing. A position paper issued by the Blackfeet Tribal Council stated that “[0]bviously 
we would have thought we could graze our cattle and horses on these lands should 
conditions such as drought require the use of these upstream mountain valleys.”45 
Furthermore, many Blackfeet reject a narrow interpretation of the Agreement that only 
recognizes the specific rights of access, fishing, hunting, and wood-gathering. By 
interpreting these rights in a broader sense, many Blackfeet claim that by retaining the 
four specific rights, essential to survival in 1895, the tribal signatories intended to reserve 
the ability of their descendants to subsist upon the ceded lands indefinitely and the 
explicitly-listed rights represent an implied right to continued livelihood 46 “Cattle,” 
Blackfeet Nation chairman Bill Old Chief told a Missoulian reporter in 1999, “are but a 
modern-day version of that old hunting right granted a century ago.”47
A more effective argument advanced by the tribe years later, and based on “well 
established” treaty rights, asserted that a fence could potentially impact the right of free 
entry recognized in the “Kipp” decision in 1974. Another major concern in the tribal 
community dealt with the actual location of the boundary, itself a hotly contested issue.
At several meetings with park officials the tribe expressed hostility towards fencing
45 See Blackfeet Nation, “Position Paper o f  the Blackfeet Tribe o f the Blackfeet Indian Reservation: 
Regarding that Portion o f Lewis and Clark National Forest which was in 1896 Divested from the Blackfeet 
Indian Reservation by an Act o f Congress,” pp. 6, attached to Tribal Resolution #162-85, February 7, 1985, 
copy available at the Tribal Documents Department, Browning, MT. See also Jim Kipp, “Blackfeet Oral 
Tradition o f  the 1895 Agreement,” 90-91. Kenneth Pitt takes a legal approach and concluded that the tribe 
retained the right to graze on the ceded strip. See Kenneth P. Pitt, “The Ceded Strip: Blackfeet Treaty 
Rights in the 1980s,” 40-46, 63-64.
46 Edward DesRosier, interview with the author, East Glacier, MT, March 21, 2005; Tiny-Man Heavy 
Runner, interview with the author, Browning, MT, March 23, 2005.
47 Michael Jamison, “Blackfeet take boundary dispute to W ashington,” Missoulian, 27 Novem ber 1999.
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because it would suggest an established boundary, and many considered the boundary’s 
location to be inaccurate. The language in the Agreement of 1896 delineating the 
reservation boundary is quite obscure and remains open to interpretation. “Beginning at a 
point on the northern boundary of the reservation due north from the summit of Chief 
Mountain, and running thence south to said sum m it...,” and so forth.49 In sum, the 
agreement described a boundary that ran from “peak to peak,” or “mountain to 
mountain.” In 1932, the Blackfeet unsuccessfully pressed for compensation for lands 
they considered lay on the eastern side of the boundary, arguing the boundary should be 
four miles further to the west. Again, in 1957, the tribe petitioned the park for 45,000 
acres of land that it considered part of the reservation. The federal Indian Claims 
Commission resurveyed the boundary with solar observation techniques, upheld the 
extant boundary, and dismissed the complaint.50 Nonetheless, many tribal members 
remain distrustful of the legal process and reject the current boundary.51
In Blackfeet Oral History and the 1895 Agreement, tribal member Jim Kipp 
utilized Blackfeet oral tradition to contest the location of the boundary. According to 
Kipp, corrupt reservation agents changed the original, accurate boundary map and altered 
the markings according to their own interests; thus, the negotiated boundary line differed 
from the one described in the ratified agreement. Furthermore, he accused government 
officials of incorrectly surveying most of the monuments used as landmarks in the
48 For example, see Memo o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal 
Council Members, May 10, 1979, pp. 4, GNPA: F20-8; Minutes o f  M eeting with Glacier National Park 
Staff and Blackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal Representatives, Novem ber 3, 1982, GNPA: FI 9-14.
49 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, v . l ,  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1904), 606.
50 See Ashby, 58; Burnham, 150.
51 See Michael Jamison, “Blackfeet take boundary dispute to W ashington,” Missoulian, 27 Novem ber 
1999.
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agreement, a sentiment shared by many Blackfeet elders.52 Some in the tribal community 
believe that at some point years ago, government agents surreptitiously moved the 
boundary eastward. Leon Rattler, chief of the Crazy Dogs Society, an organization 
dedicated to preserving Blackfeet language and traditional culture, claimed that many 
years ago a forest fire exposed long rows of concrete blocks, the old boundary markers, 
located many miles to the west of the current boundary.53
Besieged by vociferous tribal opposition, officials at Glacier halted plans to fence 
the boundary, but they did not desist in trying to eliminate stock trespass. The release of 
the “State of the Parks Report” in 1980, the National Park Service’s “first Servicewide 
survey designed to identify and characterize threats that endanger the natural and cultural 
resources of the parks,” signified and mandated a serious commitment to dealing with 
previously neglected threats carrying the potential to cause significant damage to park 
resources or seriously degrade important park values or park experiences.54 The Report 
included grazing among 73 identified threats and attributed to the practice aesthetic 
degradation, physical removal of resources, and exotic encroachment, all unacceptable 
conditions in the national park system.55 The “Summary of Threats to Glacier National 
Park” listed illegal domestic livestock trespass as one of seven primary existing threats to 
the park. The report identified the Blackfeet Reservation, as the specific source of the 
threat, but also acknowledged that non-Indians owned much of the trespassing livestock. 
The report also stated that “Blackfeet claimed treaty rights adversely affectsCsfc) much of
52 See Jim Kipp, 60, 81-91.
53 Leon Rattler, interview with author, Browning, Montana, March 23, 2005.
54 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f the Parks Report, 1980: Executive 
Summary,” pp. 1, GNPA: F60-14.
55 U .S. Department o f  the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f  the Parks Report-1980,” pp. 4-5, GNPA: 
F60-14.
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the park resource planning on the east side of the park.”56 Even if they so desired, 
officials at Glacier could not allow or ignore illegal livestock trespass within the park.
Park officials continued to implement new measures, both with and without tribal 
cooperation, in hopes of alleviating trespass problems. At meetings, park personnel 
insisted that drift fences were the best solutions, and claimed that fencing of 10% of the 
boundary would solve 90% of the problems. Tribal representatives continued to oppose 
the project. In 1981, legal experts advised against park plans to obtain an injunction 
aimed at reducing cattle trespass, citing lack of proof of irreparable damage and the 
difficulty involved in naming specific defendants.57 Both the tribe and the park expressed 
interest in a joint “range rider” program consisting of hired hands patrolling the
CO
boundary, but both parties suffered from funding problems. In May of 1983, the NPS 
issued a Law Enforcement Directive stating that “there are no easy solutions to the 
recurring problem, therefore, law enforcement will continue to be our primary tool.”59 In 
spite of these initiatives, trespass continued and the Superintendent wrote in 1983 that the 
“Park will continue to work towards an agreement with the Tribe on fencing as the only 
permanent solution to the problem.”60
In September of 1985, the Park received an unexpected token of support when 
five local cattle ranchers, most of whom were Blackfeet, sent a letter to the park, the 
Blackfeet Tribal Council, and the BIA requesting limited fencing along the contested
56 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Summary o f  Threats to Glacier National Park,” 
n.d./1980, pp. 1-3, GNPA: F13-10..
57 M emo from Visitor Protection Specialist to the Chief Ranger re: Discussion regarding injunction,
October 30, 1981, “Binder.”
58 See Memo o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council 
Members, May 10, 1979, pp. 4, GNPA: F20-8; Minutes o f M eeting with Glacier National Park Staff and 
Blackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal Representatives, November 3, 1982, GNPA: F19-14.
59 U.S. Department o f  the Interior/National Park Service, “Law Enforcement Directive No. 18,” May 24, 
1983, pp. 1, “Binder.”
60 S.A.R. 1982, pp. 16, GNPA.
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boundary. In agreement with park officials, the ranchers admitted that past approaches 
had failed to curtail trespass problems, but for the first time the ranchers described how 
unsuccessful measures adversely affected those residing on the east side of the boundary. 
They blamed cost, in terms of wages and supervision, and the “necessity to ride range 
routinely and in inclement weather” for undermining the success of the range rider 
program. They continued that regulation enforcement and fines levied by the court 
system “created an atmosphere of contempt toward the Park Service and a feeling of 
‘helplessness’ as to what could be done.” Moreover, the long hours spent herding cattle 
out of the park in order to avoid court penalties meant less time for other important tasks, 
which, indirectly, inflicted heavy financial costs upon the ranchers. Existing limited 
cattle fencing, according to the authors, represented the only successful measure to date, 
and they thought “that the same accomplishments can be made in our area with minimum 
fencing along major cattle routes.” Proclaimed benefits included improved working 
relationships, reduced resource damage in the park, greater ability for ranchers to control 
their cattle, and the elimination of legal actions and associated costs for ranchers, the 
park, and the tribe.61
The park’s first attempt to implement a fencing program years earlier had failed 
for two main reasons: the lack of support from local interested parties and the absence of 
an environmental assessment for the proposed fence. With the letter from the local 
ranchers, the park secured some measure of support from local interests and, intent on a 
fencing project, began preparing an environmental report. Superintendent Haraden wrote 
to Chief Old Person that the letter from local ranchers “accurately summarizes the long­
term problem of livestock trespass into the park” and, after briefly listing the previous
61 Letter from five local cattle ranchers to GNP, BTC, BIA, September 21, 1985, “Binder.”
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and unsuccessful measures aimed at alleviating the problem, claimed that federal 
regulations coupled with complaints from conservation groups and concerned individuals 
necessitated that park superintendents “take action, as needed, to protect the Park 
resources and enforce regulations.” He further alerted the Blackfeet Tribal Council to 
park plans to begin construction of selected and minimal fencing in the fall of 1985 62 
Tribal response surprised no one. A reply stated official objection to fencing based on 
familiar grounds: failure to consult with the tribe, potential impacts on treaty rights, and 
concern for game migration and habitat.63 Superintendent Haraden assured the tribe that 
the park would comply with NEPA requirements regarding fence construction and 
invited Tribal Council representatives to discuss the issue and review the proposed 
fencing plans.64
A boundary fence constructed in the fall near the St. Mary entrance to the park
virtually eliminated stock trespass in the area and confirmed the efficacy of fencing. A
temporary cessation of grazing leases adjacent to the Boulder Creek drainage almost 
eradicated stock trespass in that area.65 Overall, 1985 witnessed some promising 
developments curbing stock trespass into the park, and events in early 1986 generated 
further optimism for park officials. In February, the park received $42,000 for fencing 
projects on the eastern boundary.66 In March, the Acting Regional Director of the NPS 
approved the environmental assessment prepared by GNP’s Resource Management 
Division. Justifying the purpose and need for the project, the report asserted that “use of 
Park lands by livestock alters the natural environment, reduces the carrying-capacity of
62 Letter from Superintendent Haraden to Chief Old Person, October 24, 1985, “Binder.”
63 Letter from Chief Old Person to Supt. Haraden, November 14, 1985, “Binder.”
64 Letter from Supt. Haraden to C hief Old Person, November 26, 1985, “Binder.”
65 Glacier National Park, “Cattle Trespass: 1985 Annual Report,” “Binder.”
66 Memo from C hief Ranger to Hudson Bay District Ranger, February 12, 1986, “Binder.”
115
native wildlife, reduces visitor safety, and violates the National Park Service’s mandate to 
maintain those lands as a naturally functioning ecosystem.”67 The environmental 
assessment failed to move the Tribal Council, which continued to oppose the fencing 
project.68 After consulting with the tribal council, park officials revised the 
Environmental Assessment to address issues of concern. The revised report promised 
that if “livestock grazing ceases on neighboring lands as part of a long-term management 
plan, the fence will be removed. The fence is solely to exclude livestock and is not meant 
to symbolize a property boundary, legal or otherwise; no abrogation of perceived or real 
treaty rights is implied.”69
Responding to tribal opposition and following through on pledges to involve 
tribal input on fencing proposals, park officials held an open house meeting at the St.
Mary Dormitory and on several occasions tried to arrange meetings with tribal 
representatives in the spring of 1986. Attempts to gain tribal input proved fruitless, and 
in the summer park personnel began construction of temporary fence segments.70 
Judging by a history of outspoken antagonism, silence from the east surely must have 
come as a surprise to park officials. Maybe the tribal council had other more pressing 
issues? Maybe they had given up? Or maybe they were enlisting aid from important 
people in important places?
As the park was hoping to gain tribal input and finalizing fencing plans along the 
eastern boundary, tribal representatives approached Senator John Melcher, D-Mont., to
67 Glacier National Park, Environmental Assessment: Construction o f Fence A long Selected Portions of  
Boundary- Glacier National Park,” February 13, 1986, pp. 1, “Binder.”
68 Letter from Earl Old Person to Acting Supt. Alan O’Neil, n.d./mid-late March, 1986, “Binder.”
69 Glacier National Park, Revised Environmental Assessment: Construction o f  Fence A long Selected 
Portions o f Boundary-Glacier National Park, pp. 1, June, 1986, “Binder.”
70 See Glacier National Park, Case Incident #860102; “Meeting for public input to livestock trespass 
fencing proposal,” May 7, 1986, “Binder;” Glacier National Park, Cl #860272: “Blackfeet tribal input to 
livestock trespass fencing proposal,” June 14, 1986, “Binder.”
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voice their opposition to fencing and enlist him in their cause. Tribal officials pointed to 
treaty provisions guaranteeing tribal members access to the park, cited the “Kipp” case 
that officially recognized the right, and vowed that they would not accept even the 
smallest infringement that a fence might constitute.71 At the request of the tribe, Senator 
Melcher met with National Park Service representatives in Washington, D.C. in early
72September. At the meeting, Senator Melcher testified that “there is some fencing 
started by the Park Service ill advisedly because the clear state of the law is the Indian 
treaty where the Blackfeet Tribe ceded land they have that became the bulk of Glacier 
Park. That treaty says it cannot be fenced in, that they have to have access to it.” The 
Senator’s testimony had its desired effect, and the NPS committee agreed to direct 
Glacier Park to cease fencing activity until formal agreement had been reached with the
73tribe. In a subsequent press statement, Senator Melcher accused Glacier of ignoring the 
legal rights of the Blackfeet and called the fencing of national parks a highly questionable 
activity equivalent to “making national parks nothing more than big zoos.”74
Congressional intervention dealt a near-fatal blow to park fencing plans and 
transformed a dispute between neighbors into an explosive political issue. Glacier 
officials could no longer fence without express approval from the Tribal Council, an 
unlikely condition then and one that has yet to materialize. In a letter to Montana Senator 
Max Baucus sent in the weeks following Melcher’s intervention, Superintendent Gilbert 
Lusk succinctly expressed the park’s unwavering interpretation of the grazing issue:
71 See Blackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution #292-86, September 9, 1986, Tribal Documents Department, 
Browning, MT.
72 See “Park halts work on fence project: Glacier officials, Blackfeet Tribe to try and resolve cattle grazing 
issue,” Associated Press, 18 September 1986.
73 Congressional Record- Senate, September 16, 1986, S 12612.
74 “Park halts work on fence project: Glacier officials, Blackfeet Tribe to try and resolve cattle grazing 
issue,” Associated Press, 18 September 1986.
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[W]e view the situation as a livestock trespass issue only, and its 
resolution should not be complicated by the treaty issue. The treaty issue,, 
as we view it, was clearly resolved in the April 8, 1935, Court of Claims 
ruling. If the tribe wishes to Challenge the 1935 ruling, it should take 
place within the framework of the court system, not the NEPA process.
Unless such a challenge occurs, resulting in a different ruling, the treaty 
issue is a moot point.75
Yet park officials failed to obtain political support for fencing projects from Senator 
Baucus or from members of Montana’s Congressional delegation in the years that 
followed, and the 1986 Congressional hearings essentially prohibited future fencing of 
park lands as a way of dealing with the problem.
In the years following the park’s second failed attempt to fence the boundary, 
park officials worked with the tribe to develop new measures aimed at reducing trespass 
incidences. None of the measures proved successful, and law enforcement remains the 
primary tool for preventing livestock trespass. In the days after Senator Melcher ordered 
Glacier to cease fencing operations, park officials met with tribal representatives to 
discuss the gradual establishment of a wildlife management buffer zone along the 
boundary as an alternative to fencing. Superintendent Lusk wrote that the park was “very 
supportive philosophically to the concept of a Tribal buffer zone next to the Park,” and 
the parties set up a working group composed of tribal and park representatives to develop 
some workable concepts dealing with wildlife management buffer zones. Both 
organizations initially agreed that a mutual wildlife zone and a cooperative management 
approach would be beneficial and hired wildlife biologists to work towards such a goal.76 
In the years that followed, the tribe placed some restrictions upon grazing allotments in
75 Letter from Supt. Lusk to Senator Max Baucus, October 10, 1986, “Binder.”
76 See Letter from Supt. Lusk to Roland Kennedy, Chairman o f the Blackfeet Land Board, October 15, 
1986, “Binder;” S.A.R. 1986; S.A.R. 1987.
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order to enhance wildlife buffer zone programs, but, according to park documents, it did 
not follow through with buffer zone designations, and instead issued revenue-producing 
grazing lease's.77
In addition to the wildlife buffer zone concept, park officials also attempted to 
involve the BIA in round-up operations as a new approach to curbing stock trespass. For 
several years beginning in 1987, the tribe temporarily quit offering grazing leases on 
tribal trust lands adjacent to the park and cattle trespass virtually disappeared in certain 
areas along the boundary.78 In a letter to Chief Earl Old Person, Superintendent Lusk 
expressed his pleasure over the drastic reduction of trespass cattle in the park, but also 
alerted the council chairman to the worsening problem of horse trespass. Noting that the 
horses “all are very wild,” the superintendent blamed the beasts for causing heavy impact 
in the sub-alpine meadows, with “deep trails and attendant erosion, dusting pits, and very 
heavy grazing which decreases the carrying capacity for our shared elk herd.”79 Old 
Person responded that “the best way to handle this problem would be to treat these 
animals as if they were trespassing on the reservation, round them up, pen them, advertise 
for the owners to appear, charge the owners for expenses, and sell the unclaimed horses.” 
He recommended that the park work with the BIA, as the bureau had successfully 
resolved such problems on the reservation in recent years through such measures.80
Over the next several months, park officials met with BIA employees in hopes of 
drafting a cooperative agreement to round up trespassing horses in the park. Initially, the
77 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in 
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
78 See M emo on meeting with BIA Resource Manager Ted Hall and Ranger Conservationist Bill Draught 
with Steve Gniadek re: Trespass Livestock, December 4, 1987, “Binder;” S.A.R. 1987; S.A.R. 1988; “GNP  
Livestock Trespass records 1984-95,” “Binder.”
79 Letter from Supt. Lusk to Chief Old Person, October 8, 1987, “Binder.”
80 Letter from Chief Old Person to Supt. Lusk, October 30, 1987, “Binder.”
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project appeared to hold serious potential. The park assured the tribe it would hold no 
fiscal responsibility for round-up operations, park personnel met with BIA employees and 
verbally agreed upon a joint round-up operation with specified responsibilities, a draft 
memo of understanding officially outlined the project, and the Glacier Reporter, a local
o j
newspaper, published an impoundment notice in the spring of 1990. In spite of these 
promising signs, the joint effort for removal of horses in the park, like previous 
cooperative measures, fell through the cracks and never came to fruition.
Park documents in the 1990s reveal a heightened sense of urgency and 
responsibility felt by park managers to deal with stock trespass. Several documents 
supported the position that due to “recurring and unacceptable resource degradation, 
prompt resolution is imperative.”82 Park officials added to the list of perceived 
environmental threats the unknown potential for disease transmittal from domesticated 
livestock to bighorn sheep, including a documented occurrence between domesticated 
animals and desert bighorn sheep.83 Expressed dismay levied by conservation groups and 
private park users over the park’s policy of “allowing” trespass to happen also compelled 
the park to adopt a hard-line stance against trespassing.84
The same documents also reveal deepening frustration with failed cooperative 
measures aimed at eliminating stock trespass. The park even encouraged the
81 See Letter from Tribal Attorney Vicky Santana to Steve Gniadek, January 6, 1989, “Binder;” Draft letter 
to Tribal Attorney Vicky Santana, n.d., “Binder;” Draft Memo o f Understanding: Livestock Trespass in 
Glacier National Park, July 26, 1988, “Binder;” Memo from Steve Gniadek, GNP W ildlife Biologist, to 
Acting Chief Ranger re: East Side Livestock Trespass, February 2, 1989, “Binder;” “Impoundment 
N otice,” G lacier Reporter, 5 April 1990.
82 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in 
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
83 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Briefing Statement: Trespass Livestock A long  
Boundary with Blackfeet Indian Reservation,” April 12, 1990, “Binder.”
84 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in 
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
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establishment of a game park, with permissible in-season hunting of reintroduced bison 
and on-reservation fencing to protect the park from livestock, contiguous with the park 
boundary, provided that management of the game park was consistent with the protection 
of park resources. However, park officials expressed doubts over the success of the 
program because of a history of proposed buffer zones yielding to grazing leases.85 Park 
managers expressed willingness towards reaching a consensus agreement on resolution 
with the tribal community, but, noting that negotiations with tribal representatives had 
resulted in few positive actions in the past, threatened independent action should the 
parties fail to reach joint resolution.86
In 2003, the park set out to devise a strategic fencing plan, secure internal NPS 
funding, and begin compiling information for an environmental assessment. Hesitant to 
jeopardize the possible project, park managers planned to involve tribal input only after 
they had drafted a complete plan with ecological studies, impacts, and rationale.87 As of 
November of 2005, the park has developed a more detailed plan, involving consultation 
with the tribe and the BIA, to deal with the issue.88 Until this plan is implemented, 
regulation enforcement remains the primary mitigation measure.
Enforcement is weak, however, and trespassing persists. Written complaints by 
park personnel in recent years testify to the low priority placed on enforcing trespass 
regulations and the resulting negative impacts. A law enforcement ranger wrote in 1998 
that “it is almost like we are begging the person/persons to obey park rules and 
regulations.” He acknowledged that trespass was a “sensitive” issue with the park, but
85 See Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Cattle Trespass, June 1, 1992, “Binder.”
86 See Glacier National Park, “Task Directive: East Side Trespass Livestock,” April 12, 1990, “Binder.”
87 Losleben, pp. 9.
88 Steve Thompson, Program Director for the Glacier Chapter o f  the National Parks Conservation 
Association, telephone interview with author, Novem ber 21, 2005.
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exclaimed that the “park needs to be more aggressive...[W ]e can’t sacrifice our 
resources just because this is a ‘sensitive’ issue. There comes a point in time when
o n
enough is enough!” Another ranger labeled it an “unacceptable situation” and argued 
that “besides noxious weeds replacing native vegetation, ...cattle trespass and the damage 
from livestock is the number one resource problem facing the Park.” In addition to 
detailing visible resource damage and threats to threatened species and predators, the 
ranger described how stock trespass detracted from visitor experiences. He noted how 
cattle jeopardized visitor safety by physically charging hikers, endangering drivers on 
park roads, and fouling drinking water. With graphic imagery he depicted the 
proliferation of unavoidable “cow pies” and claimed “it was impossible to not get cow 
excrement on your shoes and legs...[T]he area smelled like a barnyard.” He continued 
that if “we had been visitors, the impacts and the threats from the cows at Slide Lake 
would have ruined our visit to Glacier.” In perhaps the most poignant example of the 
extent of cattle trespass in the park, a park visitor innocently commented to a park 
naturalist that the park “must be making a lot of money from cattle grazing, with all the 
cattle I saw at Two Medicine.”90
Some tribal members disagree with park claims over adverse impacts of stock 
trespass. Ted Hall, former BIA Resource Manager with long and extensive experience 
dealing with livestock trespass issues with the park, argued that cattle only minimally 
impact park resources and that the biggest threat is the park’s own re-vegetation projects. 
For example, when the park refurbished certain roads, it used topsoil from the west side
89 Letter from Law Enforcement Ranger Joe Manley to Jack Potter, October 13, 1998, “Binder.”
90 Letter from Ranger Brad Blickhan to Glacier personnel, October 16, 1998, “Binder.” For another 
eyewitness account o f  widespread cattle trespass and its effects, see Letter from Ellen J. Coffee, St. Mary 
Naturalist, to Resource Management, September 30, 1998, “Binder.”
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of the mountains and thereby introduced noxious weeds. Hall also believes that the park 
over-exaggerates threats to the aesthetics of the park and maintains that trespass is solely 
an east-side issue that only occasionally affects the Upper Two Medicine area and Babb. 
As to mitigation measures, Hall claims that impoundment of stock and jailing of owners 
creates tension and fails to accomplish anything of lasting consequence. Furthermore, by 
citing individuals instead of animals, the park technically violates the right of free entry 
for tribal members legally recognized by the ruling in the “Kipp” case in 1974. Overall, 
he agrees with park officials that efforts to alleviate the situation have largely failed over 
the years; however, he disagrees with park officials over where rightfully to place the 
blame.91
Livestock Trespass Areas
Glacier National Park
Efefl High to Very High Degree of livestock trespass 
P H  Low to  Moderate Degree of livestock trespass
Figure II: Livestock Trespass Areas, circa. 2003 (map taken from  “Livestock Trespass B inder”) 
91 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
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High-ranking park officials claim that in spite of numerous negotiations with 
tribal representatives, positive actions have been few. They blame past failures on the 
seeming “inability of (the) tribal council to make long-term commitments to courses of 
action,” and have warned the Interior Secretary that any joint resolution only holds
09temporary potential due to transitory and turbulent tribal politics. Accusations of intra-
tribal corruption in recent years have also generated further concerns over
accountability.93 Some rangers on the east side of the park blame bureaucratic apathy
and aversion to confrontation for the perpetual dire state of affairs. A park ranger wrote
in 1998 that he had heard that
politics is to blame for our lack of resolve on the cattle trespass issue, that 
we want to be good neighbors with the Blackfeet. I ’ve heard there are 
treaty issues that keep us from protecting the park ...If there are issues that 
must be settled in court, we still have a duty to protect the Park from 
extractive use until those issues are solved...W e need to make cattle
94trespass a priority.
Some within the tribal community have a different take on the situation. Ted Hall 
insists that the park basically talks the talk but has failed to walk the walk— a lot of lip 
service with no actual effort put forth. Park officials, according to Hall, do not want to 
spend money or create legislation and never propose solutions: they want someone else to 
take care of the problem. In an interview, Hall claimed that both the tribe and the BIA 
had been in favor of the proposed joint round-up operation in the late 1980s, but that the 
NPS never followed through on its pledge to fund the operation.95 Hall also clarified the 
wildlife buffer zone concept for me. He professed that both the park and the tribe wanted
92 Glacier National Park, “Task Directive: East Side Trespass Livestock,” April 12, 1990, pp. 2, “Binder.”
93 Examples include the B IA ’s takeover o f reservation police responsibilities due to negligence and an 
illegal fund diversion story covered by the Great Falls Tribune. See Losleben, 9.
94 Letter from Ranger Brad Blickhan to Glacier personnel, October 16, 1998, “Binder.”
95 Ted Hall, telephone interview by author, November 18, 2005.
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the buffer zone, but that in order to create it someone had to purchase the income 
interests of the ranchers owning the land under question. “Basically,” he said, “the 
ranchers need to get paid not to graze.” During his time as cultural liaison between the 
park and the tribe in 1994 and 1995, Hall proposed that the park implement a resource 
use tax at the gate or create new fees collection legislation to fund the buffer zone, but the 
park rejected the idea. According to this former BIA Resource Director, impoundment 
and legal action never accomplished anything and the park needs “to do something real 
that works.”96
Park officials are not the only ones opposed to grazing on park lands. Grazing on 
public lands has been a steady practice since the 1870s. Historically, range livestock 
producers have possessed political power disproportionate to their actual numbers and 
have managed, to a large degree, to defeat efforts by opponents to remove grazing from
97public lands. In the early years of the park system, the army made special effort to 
prevent encroachment by sheep and cattle in the parks it oversaw. However, in a bid to 
secure congressional support, Stephen T. Mather, first Director of the NPS, reluctantly 
supported grazing in the parks and the Organic Act of 1916 authorized the Interior
n o
Secretary to issue grazing leases. The grazing provision of the Organic Act of 1916 
remains on the books today, although administrative regulation that disfavors livestock 
grazing has mitigated the provision in recent years.99 In 2002, livestock grazing was 
permitted in 32 units of the park system.100
96 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
97 See Donahue, 5, 67.
98 See Sellars, 26, 84-85.
99 See 36CFR2.60, 2001, pp. 31.
100 Andy Kerr and M ike Salvo, “Livestock Grazing in the National Park and Wilderness Preservation 
System s,” 2002, <http://www.andykerr.net/Grazing/NWPSNPSNMGrazing.html>.
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As interest in the outdoor recreational opportunities public lands offered expanded 
and as the environmental movement attracted increasing numbers in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century, grazing on public lands came under increasing fire from both 
sports enthusiasts and conservation groups.101 Mounted efforts to impose federal 
authority and environmental regulation over public lands inspired “sagebrush rebellions” 
as ranchers openly defied regulations and demonized environmentalists in many parts of
i mthe West. In turn, environmental groups have vilified livestock interests, and 
campaigns aimed at ending abusive livestock grazing on public lands continue to this 
day.
In spite of holding a general antipathy towards grazing on public lands, 
conservation groups do not lump livestock interests into a homogenous entity. For 
example, the Sierra Club states on its “Federal Public Lands Grazing Policy” webpage 
that
The Sierra Club recognizes that restrictions on grazing may have negative 
impacts on the cultural and economic stability of some communities.
These impacts are apt to be most severe in Native American, minority and 
low-income communities. We are committed to developing partnerships 
with community members to identify and implement strategies to protect 
both traditional communities and the ecological integrity of public lands, 
without sacrificing either.103
As discussed earlier in this chapter, officials at Glacier claimed they had received
complaints from local conservationists regarding livestock trespass in Glacier National
Park. Unlike with written complaints from park personnel and naturalists, I was unable
to locate any complaints from conservationists in the park’s archives or in the files at the
101 See Donahue, 247-249.
102 Ibid., 106-107.
103 Sierra Club, “Federal Public Lands Grazing Policy,” Adopted by the Sierra Club Board o f  Directors, 
September 24, 2000, <http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/grazing.asp>.
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Chief Ranger’s Office. Perhaps environmental groups have been reluctant to weigh in on 
an issue with such special circumstances. Perhaps the Park Service keeps such files 
elsewhere.
In January of 2003, the NPCA named Glacier one of the ten most endangered 
national parks, and the private watchdog organization considers illegal livestock grazing 
within the park as a serious threat to the natural resources and landscape the NPCA seeks 
to protect. In August of 2003, a program assistant for the Glacier chapter of the NPCA 
issued a report that provided a brief overview of the livestock trespass issue in order to 
inform the NPCA of how best to work with GNP and the Blackfeet Tribe, as well as to 
help the organization decide what kind and level of involvement it wishes to pursue.104 
The organization continues to encourage the park and the tribe to work together towards 
resolution of the issue.105 The positions advanced by officials at Glacier and by the 
representative body of the Blackfeet tribe regarding the stock trespass issue have been 
distinct and relatively constant, and this chapter has focused on the interplay between 
these two parties. The involvement of the environmental community, however, has been 
less visible and remains a topic for further exploration.
Summary
Although the Agreement o f 1896 mentions nothing about Blackfeet grazing rights 
on the ceded strip, many Blackfeet interpret the pact to mean that they did retain grazing 
rights. The tribe has failed to gain recognition of perceived grazing rights on the ceded 
strip, but they have managed to prevent the park from fencing the boundary. To many 
within the tribe, park enforcement measures and fencing proposals violate the terms of
104 See Losleben, 2-3.
105 Steve Thompson, telephone interview with author, Novem ber 21, 2005.
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the Agreement of 1896 and the intentions of the tribal signatories. Controversy over the 
boundary and alleged implied grazing rights are based largely on oral history, important 
in Blackfeet country but largely dismissed by American courts o f law. The recognized 
right of free entry and the written agreement stipulation that the ceded strip cannot be 
fenced have served as more pragmatic and efficacious arguments in challenging fencing 
projects and such reasoning successfully secured Congressional support in 1986. In 
addition to accusing Glacier of ignoring tribal rights, Senator Melcher called fencing of 
national parks a questionable activity equivalent to “making national parks nothing more 
than big zoos.” This is a telling statement because it implies that fencing, proposed by 
the park as a way of eliminating an activity that offends tourist expectations, would also 
detract from the desired aesthetics of the national park system. Due to such 
considerations* it is likely the tribe would find numerous powerful allies if the park 
attempts to fence the boundary again.
Some tribal members have not abandoned hope over gaining recognition of 
grazing rights on the ceded strip and point to a case decided elsewhere as a possible 
precedent in achieving their objective.106 In 1983, the 9th Circuit Court upheld the right 
of the Shoshone-Bannock tribes to graze within Caribou National Forest in Idaho, 
formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation, in Swim  v. Bergland. Article IV of an 1898 
land cession agreement provided for tribal grazing and other use rights “[S]o long as any 
of the lands ceded.. .remain part of the public domain,” a determinable cause similar to 
the one included in the Blackfeet Agreement of 1896. Adhering to the Canons of 
Construction, the judges affirmed that there “is no evidence the tribe originally 
understood the Article IV terms ‘public domain’ and ‘public lands’ in a narrow, legalistic
106 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005; see also Jim Kipp, 91.
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sense.” The judges found that subsequent Executive actions did not extinguish reserved 
grazing rights and that such rights held priority over non-tribal grazing leases.107 Some 
Blackfeet interpreted this decision to mean that tribal members have a priority on
1 ORutilizing lands on the ceded strip for grazing purposes.
Despite some similarities between the situations encountered by the Blackfeet and 
the Shoshone-Bannock, striking differences cast doubt over possible similar resolutions. 
First, the Shoshone-Bannock agreement explicitly reserved grazing rights whereas the 
Agreement of 1896 did not. Moreover, the Interior Solicitor on several occasions denied 
those rights explicitly reserved in the Agreement of 1896. Second, although the Caribou 
National Forest and Glacier National Park both fall under the category of federal lands, 
vastly different management philosophies make national forests and national parks 
disparate entities. The grazing of livestock, like hunting and logging, is an extractive 
activity that affronts both the preservation and recreation objectives of the National Park 
System. Its effects, according to park personnel, cause resource degradation and detract 
from the aesthetic expectations held by the tourist industry. Unlike hunting and logging, 
both prohibited activities for Indians and non-Indians alike in Glacier, the intention to 
reserve grazing rights on the ceded strip never made it to the ratified and official written 
agreement. By placing the situation within the context of the founding and guiding 
principles of the National Park System and by analyzing the history of selective 
subsistence permission and rejection of reserved usufruct rights, the denial of grazing 
within Glacier National Park is not surprising and future efforts to reverse this position 
would very likely encounter stiff resistance.
107 See Swim  v. Bergland, January 13, 1983, 696 F.2d 712, pp. 2, 8-12.
108 Jim Kipp, 91.
129
Chapter 4—The Modern Era: Wages and the Service Economy
On my first trip to the Glacier region in the summer of 2004,1 set out for Babb, a 
small town on the northwestern comer of the Blackfeet Reservation near the borders of 
the park and Canada. As I entered the Blackfeet Reservation and came upon East 
Glacier, I veered off Highway 2 under an overpass proudly welcoming visitors to the 
park, wound north on Highway 49 past the historic Glacier Park Lodge, and pulled into a 
small tourist area dotted with motels, diners, and convenience stores. Unsure of how best 
to proceed and having forgotten the trusty road atlas, I entered a convenience store to 
inquire as the best route to take. After repeating my query several times to the young 
women working behind the counter, one responded, in broken, East-European English 
that she could tell me how to get to Warsaw but had never heard of Babb.
Somewhat startled, I got back on Highway 2 and headed north towards my 
destination. During the rest of the journey, the fact that two Polish women were running 
the store pressed more heavily on my mind. I recalled reading about the staggering 
unemployment rate on the reservation, ranging from 40 to 80%, and found it odd that 
Eastern Europeans from halfway across the globe could secure jobs where struggling 
Blackfeet Indians, residing just a stone’s throw away, could not. Several questions 
jumped into my mind. Were Eastern European workers an anomaly near the park? 
Perhaps, I pondered, the young Polish women had ties to the park, maybe relatives or 
acquaintances? If this were not the case, how did tribal members feel about distant 
foreigners landing much-needed jobs near the neighboring tourist mecca that is Glacier 
National Park?
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As I researched the history of tribal attempts to procure an economic stake in the 
park in the months that followed, I found answers to most o f my questions. I never did 
learn more about the young Polish women’s family history or the status of their trans- 
Atlantic connections. I did learn, however, that Eastern Europeans were not strangers 
behind the counters of businesses on the eastern edge of the park, and that the practice of 
importing workers from overseas certainly did generate resentment and indignation 
among many in the Blackfeet community. The difficulty encountered by tribal members 
in trying to secure gainful employment from the park or its concessionaires further 
contributed to the widespread feeling of betrayal that pervades the reservation as 
questionable business licensing and hiring practices have made it difficult for the 
Blackfeet to gain an economic stake in the lands they once controlled. Deprived of their 
former subsistence base, many Blackfeet in the modern era rely on the cash economy and 
wage labor to put bread on the table. The transition from a land-based economy to a 
service economy has not been easy. Convinced that the Agreement of 1896 implies 
rights of preference and guarantees the opportunity to eke out a living on the ceded strip, 
many within the tribal community have denounced park policies and the issue of 
employment and business rights in and around Glacier National Park provides yet another 
point of contention between the modern Blackfeet and the 21st century National Park 
Service.
The Blackfeet Nation, like many other Indian tribes, possesses a long history of 
tribal unemployment and economic hardship. Unlike many tribes, the Blackfeet 
reservation borders a world-famous national park that boasts more than two million 
visitors a year who liberally spend cash dollars treating themselves to an unforgettable
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excursion into the Montana wilderness. The park’s existence, however, has not served as 
a panacea for the tribe’s economic woes. Historically, tribal members have held few jobs 
with the Park Service or with its concessionaires, and, unlike many surrounding 
communities that thrive on catering to the well-to-do tourists that visit the park every 
summer, have generally failed to capitalize on the tourist industry that supports the park. 
One tribal member’s struggle to obtain business rights within the park in the early 1990s 
instigated a grassroots campaign protesting hiring practices that blossomed into a larger, 
unified tribal movement reasserting tribal rights on lands formerly owned by the tribe. 
Drawing upon a broad interpretation of the Agreement of 1896, some tribal members 
have clamored for preference rights in hiring practices and business licensing. Although 
the tribe has failed to win recognition of these alleged rights, carefully-planned and 
nonviolent tribal protests pressured the park and its primary concessionaire into striking 
agreements with the tribe to improve hiring practices and support of native artisans.
The roots of economic duress in Blackfeet country date back to the early years of 
the reservation era. The federal government, in keeping with its paternal practice of 
treating Indian nations as wards unable to manage their own affairs, did not make funds 
from land cessions available to Blackfeet members and instead held the monies in trust 
and doled out the proceeds as annuities to the tribe. The national nefarious corruption 
involved with the management and distribution of these funds did not bypass the 
Blackfeet Reservation. Around the turn of the century, agents on the reservation 
considered discontinuing issuing rations to the tribe, but the tribe vehemently opposed the 
proposition and stressed that employment opportunities virtually did not exist. Irrigation 
projects undertaken after 1907, aimed at promoting farming and providing employment,
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failed miserably.1 Few Indians owned livestock or other assets, and unemployment and 
poverty plagued the reservation. By 1918, agent Fred C  Campbell considered the 
reservation bankrupt.2
Even if the tribe possessed large amounts of capital at the time of the 
establishment of Glacier National Park, it would have had to compete with very powerful 
interests to secure landholdings suitable for tourism near the park. Shortly after the 
creation of the park in 1910, the Great Northern Railway, with backing from the 
Department of the Interior, purchased a 160-acre tract of reservation land stretching from 
East Glacier to the actual entrance of the park. The sale included neither negotiations 
with nor compensation for the Blackfeet. With Congressional approval, the Great 
Northern subsequently purchased several hundred more acres in the area, taking land 
from townsites on the reservation for a nominal fee. The Reclamation Service received 
similar generous treatment from the Department of the Interior and leased property, 
formerly on the reservation, to a subsidiary of the Great Northern. These land transfers, 
according to historian Jack Holterman, “ruled out the chance for the Blackfeet to set up 
their own businesses near the Park.”3 From the beginning, big corporate money and 
political cronyism effectively prevented the Blackfeet from establishing a foothold near 
the anticipated tourist destination.
By 1913, when the Great Northern completed its magnificent Glacier Park Hotel 
within the boundary of the reservation, the railroad had spent nearly a million dollars in
1 W illiam E. Farr, The Reservation Blackfeet, 1882-1945: A Photographic H istory o f  Cultural Survival, 
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1984), 99-100.
2 See Holterman, 30-31, 38.
3 For more on early land transfers near GNP, see Holterman, 35, 39.
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and around Glacier National Park.4 As discussed in the previous chapters, the railroad 
employed some Blackfeet to entertain guests at the Glacier Park Hotel and thereby 
provided employment for tribal members. They did not, however, receive fair 
compensation from the railroad for their duties: after performances they passed around a 
hat and enjoyed some kitchen scraps.5 Over time the Indians tired of the charade and, no 
longer able to suppress feelings of exasperation over receiving poor pay to create a 
romantic image that benefited the Great Northern, quit entertaining at the Glacier Park 
Hotel. Many on the reservation considered it demeaning for a small contingency to act as 
showpieces for little pay. On the other hand, some who participated personally in the 
shows took pride in educating others about traditional Blackfeet culture. For some, 
rehashing the stories and rituals of old made for a good time and offered opportunities for 
Blackfeet orators to tell their stories.6 Some tribal members ventured off the reservation 
and capitalized on the tourist fascination for Blackfeet souvenirs by selling signed 
photographs, painted buckskins, and miniature teepees. The Indians participated in the 
railroad’s promotional efforts for nearly 40 years, and the earnings from their 
performances, posing sessions, and entrepreneurial endeavors represented some of the 
only material compensation the tribe drew from the park’s existence during that time.7
The reservation Blackfeet outside the promotional world of the Great Northern 
struggled to make ends meet. Investments in cattle and irrigation projects failed to
4 Burnham, 107.
5 A Senate investigator of the Blackfoot Agency commented on the disrespectful treatment and poor pay 
the Indians received. See Holterman, 40.
6 A March 21, 2005 interview with Ed DesRosier, whose mother worked as a traditional dancer for the 
Great Northern in the 1940s, informed the discussion on tribal opinions regarding the Great Northern’s 
promotional presentations. Earl Old Person also commented on his role in the Great Northern programs in 
the late 1930s. See Eileen Finan, “Indians say they feel alienated from land that was once theirs,” Great 
Falls Tribune, 6 June 1994.
7 For more on Blackfeet marketing in Glacier and the highly popular Winold Reiss calendar series, see Farr, 
191-192.
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ameliorate the desperate economic conditions that pervaded the reservation. A 
reinvigorated cattle business and gas and oil sales in the late thirties and early forties 
offered a glimpse of hope for some, but overall, according to historian William E. Farr, 
“the reservation and its institutions had failed,” and as the 1940s rolled around, “the 
Blackfeet were as dependent a people as they had been following the end of the buffalo.” 
The Blackfeet shows at Glacier Park Lodge came to an end in the early 1950s, and tribal 
members rarely succeeded in landing jobs in park hotels or with the NPS.9
Their economic ties to the park severed, some within the tribe devised a plan to 
draw tourist money to reservation lands near the park. In the early 1950s, the tribe 
approached the park with plans to develop a resort along the shore of Lower St. Mary 
Lake. Although the Park Service had no legal jurisdiction over the area, the tribe needed 
its support in order to obtain the capital investment necessary for the project. The park 
expressed willingness to work with the tribe; nevertheless, the tribe turned to the private 
sector. Ultimately, the project fell apart.10
Worn but not beaten, the Blackfeet Tribal Council persevered in its attempts to 
capitalize on the lucrative tourist revenue that the park attracted and, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, continued planning to develop a recreational tourist industry to serve those 
headed to the park: They hoped to accomplish this by improving the existing facilities 
outside the park and by constructing new ones to provide year-round services. Proposed 
projects included a year-round complex at Chewing Black Bones on the shores of Lower 
St. Mary Lake, a year-round complex featuring a ski area at Divide Mountain, other
8 Ibid., 97, 102.
9 Keller and Turek, 262.
10 For more on failed Blackfeet efforts to develop along the shores o f Lower St. Mary Lake, see Burnham, 
152-153.
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facilities around Browning and East Glacier, and an upgraded St. Mary Tourist Center at 
the park entrance, including lodges, restaurants, stores, and an information center. The 
tribe also offered to buy 40 acres of park property to develop a Blackfeet Interpretive 
center.11 Park officials questioned the feasibility of constructing an interpretive center 
within a thousand yards of the existing St. Mary Visitor Center and expressed concern 
over “an apparent duplication of certain facilities...if they would provide similar 
services.”12 Park officials further discouraged the acquisition of park land as only 
Congress could approve such a transfer of federal lands.13
After the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation made $550,000 available on a matching 
fund basis for development of a new St. Mary complex in 1972, Superintendent William 
J. Briggle responded to calls for interpretive changes in the content of the St. Mary 
Visitor Center by proposing to the Tribal Council a refitted, cooperative visitor center 
with new exhibits and cultural demonstrations.14 NPS officials agreed that it was 
“basically an excellent idea,” but relayed a number of recommendations and conditions 
ensuring the Park Service would maintain administrative control of the complex.15 
Bureaucratic complications and pressing tribal economic concerns eventually killed the 
project, and the tribe failed to capitalize on Glacier’s tourism.16 They did, however, 
continue to press for jobs within the park.
As described in the previous chapters, the events of the 1970s forced park 
officials in Glacier to pay more attention to their neighbors. Beginning in the early
11 Letter from Supt. Briggle to Director o f  the M idwest Region, August 25, 1972, GNPA: F19-13.
12 Letter from Acting Director o f  the M idwest Region to the Director o f  the NPS, September 20, 1972,
GNPA: F19-13.
13 Letter from Supt. Briggle to Director o f the M idwest Region, August 25, 1972, GNPA: Fl'9-13.
14 Letter from Supt. Briggle to Director o f the M idwest Region, February 22, 1973, GNPA: F19-13.
15 Letter from Director o f M idwest Region to Supt. Briggle, March 27, 1973, GNPA: F19-13.
16 Burnham, 154.
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1970s, the park encouraged tribal input on cultural programs and began to direct more of 
its interpretive programs towards appreciation of native cultures, even employing tribal 
members to give presentations on Blackfeet culture.17 Furthermore, communication 
between the two parties increased and joint meetings became more frequent. Since the 
park did not have a good reputation for integrating the Blackfeet into its workforce, tribal 
employment with the park frequently appeared among the subjects of mutual interest 
discussed at most of the meetings. Steps taken in the 1970s and 1980s to increase 
Blackfeet employment within the park included, to name a few, the establishment of 
positive equal employment opportunity goals, the posting of lists of locally-issued 
vacancy announcements, and recruiting sessions at Babb, the Tribal Employment Rights 
Office, Blackfeet Community College, and Browning High School career days.18 The 
park displayed some progress with wage grade jobs and various blue-collar jobs, but 
career-conditional and permanent jobs rarely went to tribal members.
Aware of this situation, the park felt obligated to detail possible reasons why it 
did not hire many Blackfeet onto permanent positions. Park officials claimed that many 
of the “non-discrimination laws and policies of the government are actually hampering 
the park’s efforts to hire more Blackfeet people.”19 For certain jobs, applicants had to file 
under the Park Service centralized Denver system, and a “number of the names of Indian 
youths showed up quite low on the registers so we could not hire them.” Other suggested 
obstacles included difficulties tribal members faced in filling out the necessary forms and
17 Many o f  the presentations were funded by the Glacier Natural History Association, not the park itself.
18 See Letter from Supt. Iversen to Blackfeet Tribal Council, January 10, 1973, GNPA: F19-13; M emo o f  
M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council Members, May 10, 1979, 
GNPA: F20-8; Memo o f Meeting with Glacier National Park and Blackfeet Tribal Council, Novem ber 3, 
1982, GNPA: F19-14; S.A.R. 1986, GNPA. Many o f  the memos o f  meetings discussed “plans” to improve 
em ployment practices, but questions over their actual implementation have led me to omit them.
19 U .S. Department o f  the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release, “Joint M eeting Between Blackfeet 
Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA: F19-13.
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lack of seasonal housing. Furthermore, the park placed points under Native American
• 00  Language, but many young tribal members did not know the Blackfeet language.
Efforts and excuses failed to please or appease tribal members who still considered park
hiring practices unfair; however, the Park Service was not the only source of employment
in and around the park. Glacier Park, Inc., the park’s primary concessionaire, exerted
huge economic impacts on the region and was equally, if not more, guilty when it came
to excluding the Blackfeet from sorely-needed wages.
For the first forty years after the park’s creation, the Great Northern Railway and 
its subsidiary, the Glacier Park Hotel Company, acted as the major developers and 
primary concessionaires within Glacier National Park. As the automobile became the 
preferred means of travel to and through the park during the 1940s, the Great Northern 
and its subsidiary suffered heavy losses. An NPS directive after WWII demanding that 
concessionaires at the National Parks spend several million dollars for expansion and 
modernization of facilities to accommodate growing numbers of visitors did not bode 
well for the company, which lost over $1.4 million in the 1940s. Thus, the Great 
Northern embarked on a decade-long venture to maneuver itself out of the Park 
concession business. In November o f 1960, Don Hummel’s Glacier Park, Inc., bought all 
the Great Northern’s holdings and became the major concessionaire in Glacier National 
Park, a title it still holds.21
In an interview with historian Philip Burnham, long-time Blackfeet historian Jack 
Holterman asserted that the real problem with jobs and money at Glacier lay not with the
20 Memo o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council Members, 
May 10, 1979, GNPA: F20-8.
21 For more on the downfall o f  the Great Northern and the rise o f GPI, see N ew ell, Walter, and M cDonald, 
174-178.
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Park Service, but with GPI.22 Ed DesRosier, who led a heated public campaign against 
both the park and GPI to run his own tour service into the park legitimately, agrees and 
accused GPI of “taking without giving.” GPI, according to DesRosier, never engaged in 
community involvement, cared little about local unemployment, and extensively 
recruited out of state and out of country. Overall, the “general feeling is that GPI was
9*3never a good partner to the tribe.” DesRosier did not sit idly by and passively submit to 
GPI’s perceived callous demeanor. He took matters into his own hands.
Ed DesRosier grew up near the park near Lower St. M ary’s Lake, the same spot 
that the tribe unsuccessfully had tried to develop in decades past. His mother, a full- 
blooded Blackfoot, had worked as a dancer for the Great Northern at the Glacier Park 
Lodge in the 1940s. His father was French-Irish. As a child his relatives instructed him 
in the oral history of the Blackfeet people and told him how the tribe had traditionally 
used the park for hunting, gathering, and spiritual purposes.24 Versed in traditional 
Blackfeet ties to the park and familiar with the region itself, DesRosier decided he could 
combine his business sense and long experience with the Department of Transportation 
with his cultural knowledge to create an interpretive tour of the park that focused on
25Blackfeet history and culture. Thus, Sun Tours was born.
In the spring of 1992, DesRosier approached Superintendent Gil Lusk with his 
plans to start a tour of the park. Accompanied by community leaders and tribal 
representatives and armed with a recognized tribal business license, DesRosier conveyed 
to the Superintendent that he was not only serious about his plan but also legitimate.
22 Burnham, 197.
23 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
24 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
25 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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Courteous but noncommittal, Lusk referred DesRosier to GPI president Dale Scott. At a 
meeting with the prospective entrepreneur, Scott outlined the special nature of CPFs 
transportation contract with the park.26 The act that established the National Park Service 
authorized the service to negotiate contracts without following the usual government 
bidding procedures. Under the terms of park concession law, concessionaires must 
operate under regulations and standards established by the Park Service, even if it means 
that portions of the concession may be operated at a loss.27 GPI was not the only 
concessionaire in the park, but it did hold an exclusive transportation contract with the 
park. Technically not a monopoly, the exclusive contract appeared as such to many tribal 
members who considered it unfair that large corporate interests with no concern for local 
affairs should control concessions in the park. Scott refused to negotiate and 
condescendingly offered DesRosier a bus-driving position. Insulted, DesRosier refused 
and moved forward with his designs.28
Still somewhat hopeful that the Superintendent would come through with a 
permit, DesRosier bought a van, printed and distributed brochures, assembled a staff, and 
started to conduct business without a permit.29 After a week of conducting tours, a park 
ranger pulled over a Sun Tours guide and wrote him a $100 ticket for doing business 
inside the national park without a permit. Similar arrests occurred the next two days.
The three defendants sought to have the citations against them dismissed, citing the 
recognized right of unrestricted access and claiming the right to do business in the park
26Ibid.
27 United States Department o f  the Interior/National Park Service, “General Information Concerning the 
Granting o f  Concessions in the Areas Administered by the National Park Service,” n.d./1970, GNPA: F17- 
3.
28 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
29 Ibid.
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under the Agreement of 1896. Like many others on the reservation, DesRosier and 
company believe that their elders had intended for future generations of descendants to 
benefit from the land that formerly belonged to the Blackfeet. In the modern world, that 
means jobs and continued livelihood. In early January of 1993, the federal magistrate 
who heard the case dismissed their objections and ruled that regulation of commercial 
enterprise in the park applied to all people. He also referred to the 1935 Court of Claims 
determination officially terminating Blackfeet rights in the park. U.S. Magistrate Robert 
Holter found the three guilty of the violations and fined them a total of $200.30
Six months passed between the transgressions and the judge’s verdict, but much 
happened in the interim. Infuriated over the arrests, DesRosier attended the first tribal 
council meeting in the week following the citations. DesRosier voiced his concerns and 
frustrations, and a councilman stood up and asked, “What are you gonna do, stage a 
protest?” After a pause during which he acquired an immediate affinity for the idea, 
DesRosier replied, “Well, if that’s what you’ve heard, then yes!”31 When I asked 
DesRosier how news of the imminent protest spread, he answered that the “moccasin 
telegraph” took care of it. Noticing my poorly-concealed look of incomprehension, he 
explained, “That’s reservation lingo for word-of-mouth.” The moccasin telegraph 
broadcast its message loud and clear, and less than two months later a large crowd of 
tribal protesters gathered at the Glacier Park Lodge to make their voices heard.
On Friday and Saturday, August 1 and 2, more than 50 tribal members and non- 
Indian supporters congregated on Highway 49 in front of the Glacier Park Lodge, GPI’s
30 For more on the citations and the rulings, see David Lee, “Rangers issue tickets to Indian tour service,” 
G reat Falls Tribune, 26 July 1992; “Blackfeet Guilty o f  running illegal shuttle,” Hungry H orse N ew s , 7 
January 1993; “Blackfeet fined for business venture,” G reat Falls Tribune, 5 January 1993.
31 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
32 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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base of operations, to protest the hiring and business practices of the park’s largest 
concessionaire. One purpose of the rally was to educate tourists and the company’s 
guests. Demonstrators lay in the highway halting traffic, passed out information sheets 
and questionnaires to tourists, and showcased signs reading “Boycott Glacier Lodges,” 
“United we stand,” “More jobs for Indians,” and “NPS, GPI Racist.”33 At one point, a 
protestor led a procession to the front door of the lodge and led a traditional tribal song. 
Many tourists wandered out of the lodge to discover what the commotion was all about 
and inquired into the causes of tribal discontent. Some were moved and asked how they 
could help.34
Although the arrests of the tour guides provided the initial spark for the protests 
and the main rallying cry centered on GPI’s hiring and business practices, other issues 
surfaced and, as DesRosier told the press, the rally was really “about Blackfeet rights in 
Glacier National Park.”35 Several Blackfeet Tribal Business Council members and area 
business figures attended the demonstration and addressed the crowd over loudspeakers. 
Speakers demanded that GPI prove it would comply with tribal employment rights laws 
and negotiate other points of contention, such as land and water rights, reminding those 
present that the company was located on the reservation and used Blackfeet water in the 
hotel and employee residences. An area businessman complained that the tribe had 
“ordinances that are being violated...non-Indian businesses are not recognizing tribal 
jurisdiction on the reservation. I ’m tired of the tribe accepting a passive role. We need to
33 For more details on the weekend protest, see David Lee, “Indians Protest at Glacier Lodge,” G reat Falls 
Tribune, 3 August 1992; “Blackfeet protest Glacier Park, Inc. business practices,” The D aily Inter Lake, 3 
August 1992.
34 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
35 David Lee, “Indians Protest at Glacier Lodge,” G reat Falls Tribune, 3 August 1992.
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take a stand on a wide range of issues threatening tribal sovereignty.” On Saturday a 
BIA police officer issued GPI President Dale Scott a citation for failure to have a tribal 
business license to operate the lodge on the reservation. Later in the day GPI staff
37produced the required permit.
The large non-violent protest received considerable publicity from the local media 
and the park reacted quickly to the rising tensions along its eastern border. Noting that 
most of the recent activity was directed at GPI and not the Park Service, park officials 
nonetheless felt compelled to issue a briefing statement to the Director of the NPS within 
days of the protest detailing the recent Blackfeet activities near the park. Admitting that 
the picketing had not been disruptive, the statement warned that there “may be potential 
for picketing at Many Glacier Lodge (the location for Secretary’s Advisory Board 
meeting) this coming Saturday, Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday.”
The park was correct in its prediction— the tribe planned on bringing their protest 
into the park proper during the anticipated convention. Tribal members distributed flyers 
advertising the rally and requesting of supporters, on behalf of the Blackfeet Tribal 
Business Council, “your support and attendance at a demonstration of unity at the Many 
Glacier Hotel,” scheduled for Monday, August 10, 4:00 P.M. What began as a protest 
against hiring and business practices blossomed into a community awareness movement 
on the reservation recognizing Blackfeet rights. In addition to demanding that the park 
offer Blackfeet businesses the opportunity to compete for tourism trade, the flyer insisted 
that the “National Park Service must respect its treaty agreement with the Blackfeet
36 Ibid.
37 “Blackfeet protest Glacier Park, Inc. business practices,” The D aily Inter Lake, 3 August 1992.
38 Glacier National Park, “Briefing Statement: Recent Blackfeet Activities near Glacier National Park,” 
August 6, 1992, GNPA.
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People, must fulfill the rights our grandfathers and grandmothers negotiated.”39 Thus, 
DesRosier’s struggle for business rights became a catalyst for the reassertion of tribal 
rights on federal land and rekindled widespread community activism, the likes of which 
had not been seen since the late 1970s after the “Kipp” and “Momberg” cases.
Park officials, concerned about the park’s public image and wary of a possible 
deterioration in relations with the neighboring tribe, contacted the Tribal Business 
Council to determine its plans for the upcoming publicized demonstrations and met with 
tribal representatives the day before the planned protest. Superintendent Gil Lusk 
promised to “work with them to facilitate their First Amendment rights.”40 The park 
followed through on its pledge to accommodate the tribe’s intentions and, in addition to 
authorizing a special use permit for the demonstration, provided shuttle and coordinated 
parking to facilitate transportation to and from the designated demonstration sites.41 GPI 
also provided large buses to transport individuals. Both the park and its major 
concessionaire hoped that the demonstration would proceed peacefully and would only 
cause minimal disturbances to visitors, concessioners, and NPS employees and property. 
As a precaution, the park detailed additional park rangers, referred to as a “Special Events 
Team,” in case the protest spiraled out of control 42
On Monday, August 10th, more than 100 tribal members and supporters gathered 
at the Many Glacier Hotel outside the National Park System Advisory Board Meeting to 
urge settlement of long-festering issues between the tribe and concessionaire Glacier Park
39 A copy o f the “Rally Rally Rally” brochure can be found at GNPA.
40 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Park Service Assists Blackfeet 
Demonstration,” n.d., GNPA.
41 The permit contained standard applicable regulations, such as the prohibiting o f solicitation, the selling  
o f items, aggressive or abrasive behavior, loud musical instruments that may hold the attention o f park 
visitors, littering, and so on. See U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Special U se 
Permit,” August 9, 1992, GNPA.
42 Glacier National Park, “Talking Points for Blackfeet Demonstration,” n.d., GNPA.
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Inc. Although a park directive instructed park personnel to inform protesters about the 
presence of the Special Events Team only if specifically asked, demonstrators 
immediately noticed the armed rangers and were somewhat taken aback and frightened 43 
Tribal members held aloft signs reading “More Jobs for Indians,” “Honor Blackfeet 
Rights,” and others addressing issues such as GNP’s and GPI’s alleged prejudicial hiring 
policies toward Indians, tribal rights for commercial activities in Glacier, and GPI’s 
disregard for Blackfeet water rights and business licensing rules. As promised, the Park 
Service invited the demonstrators inside to address the Board and discuss problems with 
both GPI and the park. During the meeting, the parties reached agreements on a variety 
of issues. GPI agreed to sign a lease for water the Glacier Park Lodge had been drawing 
from a reservoir on tribal land. The firm also promised to improve hiring of Blackfeet 
employees by extending help to the Blackfeet Community College to develop a 
curriculum for hospitality industry studies and by offering a “hospitality school 
scholarship” for Blackfeet students 44 GPI further pledged to support Blackfeet 
craftspeople by purchasing merchandise for sale in its retail outlets and concession shops. 
Finally, GPI agreed to negotiate a subconcessions agreement with Ed DesRosier to allow 
Sun Tours to operate legally in the park.45 The peaceful protest concluded with a 
friendship dance on the front lawn of the hotel.
To most observers, the events in early August proceeded smoothly and yielded 
positive results. In a resolution released the day after the protest at Many Glacier Hotel,
43 Ibid.; Ed DesRosier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
44 For more on the protest, the demands made by tribal members, and the agreements reached, see S.A.R. 
1992, GNPA; “Blackfeet Tribe protests yield Park agreements,” Hungry H orse News, 13 August 1992.
45 At a table with DesRosier and a few others, Supt. Lusk and GPI CEO Joe Fassler, aware they were under 
public scrutiny and caught in the moment, offered a subconcessions agreement and DesRosier accepted.
Ed DesRosier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
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the National Park System Advisory Board commended “the Blackfeet Nation and Glacier 
National Park for their mutual efforts to address common concerns, and for the progress 
made to date,” and encouraged “continued dialogue in a concerted effort to identify areas 
of agreement and understanding.”46 An observer from distant Illinois wrote a piece for 
the Hungry Horse News, a local newspaper, claiming that the peaceful demonstration 
“has brought together the present concessionaire and the Park Service into a significant 
relationship that all of us should welcome.” He further exclaimed: “What a tremendous 
and valuable opportunity exists between Browning and West G lacier... [W]e praise the 
leaders in this and wish them well!”47 Not all shared his celebratory appraisal of the 
situation. A local contributor to the same paper noted that many tribal protesters “made 
threats and were downright mad at Glacier Park Inc. and Glacier National Park,” and 
expressed disapproval over private confessions made by Park personnel that “Blackfeet 
in recent months have demanded they be hired for jobs though they aren’t qualified and 
they refuse to even fill out applications.” He concluded that tribal “authorities should be 
reasonable. Demands of this type and numerous threats to potential employers serve no 
purpose other than to aggravate the situation.”48
The same day the Advisory Board released its resolution, the tribe issued its own 
resolution that identified its three major concerns: the failure of GNP and GPI to hire 
members of the Blackfeet tribe, the sale of non-authentic Indian arts and crafts within 
park concessions, and difficulties tribal members were experiencing in taking advantage 
of economic opportunities within the park. To rectify these problems, the resolution
46 National Park System Advisory Board, “Resolution 108,” August 11, 1992, GNPA.
47 John Mauff, Chicago, IL, “Park history lives in Blackfeet culture” (letter to the editor), Hungry H orse 
News, 17 September 1992.
48 Brian Kennedy, “Cool heads and rain could help Blackfeet,” (opinion piece), Hungry Horse News, 13 
August 1992.
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proposed that GNP and GPI establish programs for the recruitment, hiring, and training 
of tribal members in all positions. It also suggested the National Park Service establish a 
policy of prohibiting the sale of non-authentic Indian arts and crafts within Glacier.49 
Tribal members surely took some satisfaction from the pledges made by GPI, but it stood 
to question whether the firm would follow through on its promises.
On July 13, 1993, GPI entered into a subconcessions agreement with Ed 
DesRosier authorizing Sun Tours, a Blackfeet-owned cultural and historical interpretive 
tour, to operate legally within the park until the end of the year. The agreement mandated 
that Sun Tours comply with the policies and directives of the NPS and of GPI, that ticket 
sales could not be available from locations in the park, and that nothing presented on the 
guided tour “shall denigrate National Park Service programs or policies.”50 A 
concessions management employee with Glacier admitted that the protests and the 
tensions it produced in part led park officials to pressure GPI into offering DesRosier a 
subconcessions contract. However, she also claimed the park felt that a native 
interpretive tour was an important aspect of the park that did not previously exist and 
officials welcomed the addition.51 In the subconcession agreement with Sun Tours, GPI 
also claimed that it desired “to supplement its tour services with interpretive bus tours 
conducted by Blackfeet Tribal members.” When confronted with these assertions, 
DesRosier scoffed and sarcastically and mockingly remarked, “Oh yeah, we agree this is 
a good thing.” Just short of labeling such claims bold-faced lies, DesRosier insisted to
49 Blackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution, August 11, 1992, GNPA.
50 Glacier National Park, “Operating and Maintenance Plan Between Sun Tours, Inc. and Glacier Park, Inc. 
Approved by the National Park Service,” July 13, 1993, pp. 1, 3-4, GNPA.
51 Jan Knox, Concessions Management Director o f GNP, interview with author, W est Glacier, MT, March 
1,2005 .
52 U.S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Subconcession Agreement for Blackfeet 
Interpretive Transportation Tour Services in Glacier National Park,” a.k.a Subconcession to CC- 
G LAC002-81. pp. 1, GNPA.
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me that the agreement came only “after we beat them over the head with it (our 
demands).”53
In addition to granting a contract to DesRosier, the park and GPI did achieve 
- some gains with regards to other promises they made in the wake of the nonviolent 
protests. The presence of an intermediary helped the parties involved work cooperatively 
and make real progress. In April of 1993, the park brought on tribal member and BIA 
employee Ted Hall as the Park’s Native American Coordinator to serve as consultant and 
liaison with the tribe and the BIA with the major focus directed toward employment 
issues.54 Hall’s appointment hardly represented an act of pure altruism, nor did it signify 
a proactive park initiative to enhance relations with its neighboring tribe. Rather, it 
resulted from a legal challenge mounted by Hall over none other than prejudicial hiring 
practices. In 1988, Hall had applied for an assistant superintendent position with Glacier. 
Boasting 18 years experience as a BIA administrator and meeting all five criteria for the 
job title, one of which was extensive knowledge of Indian treaties and affairs, Hall felt 
more than qualified for the position. The job went to someone else. Hall challenged the 
decision, citing the 1896 Agreement’s Indian hiring preference clause. After half a 
decade and numerous appeals, the park service settled out of court and offered him the 
liaison position for one year.55
As Native American Program Coordinator, Hall worked with the Concessions and 
Express Services departments of GNP, with GPI, and with the tribe to develop recruiting, 
hiring, and training programs for tribal members, and also worked with the Arts and
53 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
54 Other areas included wildlife management, cattle trespass, land development, and fire management. See 
Glacier National Park Release: “Native American Coordinator Detailed to Glacier,” April 14, 1993, GNPA.
55 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 2 4 ,2 0 0 5 . For more on the legal case, see H all v. Watt; Eileen  
Finan, “Blackfeet, Glacier live with uneasy relationship,” G reat Falls Tribune, 6 June 1994.
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Crafts coordinator to influence and evaluate the sales of authentic Indian arts and crafts in 
the park’s concession shops.56 The impact that the protests and Hall’s influence had on 
both the park and GPI was astonishing. In his annual report to the Director of the 
National Park Service, Superintendent Lusk devoted an unprecedented two and a half 
pages to affairs regarding tribal employment and detailed steps taken to enhance equal 
employment opportunity and gains made in hiring tribal members. Numbers still were
S7low, however, with only 36 of 367 positions held by tribal members. GPI’s hiring of 
Native American seasonal employees increased approximately 58% from 1992 to 1993,
CO
to a total of 200. Furthermore, the firm increased its purchases of Native American 
crafts for resale in its retail outlets and had purchased roughly $24,000 worth of crafts by 
the end of August in 1993.59
Despite the obvious improvements in hiring tribal members and in the overall 
relationship between the park, GPI, and the tribe, DesRosier pressed to obtain an 
independent contract from the park. In order to make available an independent contract, 
GPI had to waive its rights to provide interpretive vehicle tours from a Blackfeet 
perspective, an act company officials did not look upon favorably. At the end of the first 
year o f Sun Tours’s sub-contract, Glacier’s Superintendent suggested renewing the 
contract under existing terms. DesRosier objected and spent the winter of 1993-1994 
lobbying with the regional office, making phone calls and writing letters to people of 
importance in hopes of creating a special permit to accommodate his intentions. Finally,
56 See Glacier National Park, “Squad Notes,” May 17, July 13, July 27, August 3, August 10, August 17, 
1993.
57 See S.A.R. 1993, pp. 6-7, GNPA. Native Americans held 29 o f 260 (11.1%) temporary positions, and 7 
of 107 (6.5%) permanent positions.
58 Ibid, 8.
59 Glacier National Park, “Squad N otes,” August 17, 1993, GNPA.
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his work paid off and in the spring of 1994 GPI agreed to waive its right to provide 
Blackfeet interpretive tours. On June 14th, 1994, Ed DesRosier signed an independent 
concession permit with the Department of the Interior authorizing Sun Tours as a 
licensed concessioner in Glacier National Park.60
Sun Tours got off to a successful start, with its gross receipts and ridership 
numbers doubling within a year despite, according to DesRosier, GPI’s cut-throat and 
underhanded business practices.61 DesRosier’s concession permit forbade him from 
picking up within the park proper; nevertheless, GPI still felt threatened and even 
rearranged its schedules in order to steal some of its rival’s customers before the Sun 
Tours buses arrived for their scheduled pick-ups.62 Sun Tours survived GPI’s aggressive 
campaign tactics, and business has grown most years since 1994. Although he managed 
to take on mammoth powerful enterprises such as Glacier National Park and Glacier Park 
Inc. victoriously, thereby carving a special niche for himself and his employees, 
DesRosier perceives his personal victory as only scratching the surface of something 
much larger and of greater importance to the tribe as a whole: the recognition of tribal 
rights, sovereignty, and cultural self-determination.63
After his conviction in 1993 for operating a business within park limits without a 
permit, DesRosier, with tribal financial support, appealed the ruling based on the implied 
right to conduct business in the Agreement of 1896. In 1995, a court of appeals 
expunged his charges due to the fact that the defendant had eventually been allowed to do 
what he was originally charged with. Like many others on the reservation, DesRosier
60 See Department o f the Interior/National Park Service,Concession Permit #CP-G LAC010-94, GNPA.
61 For gross receipts and ridership information, see S.A.R. 1994-1995, pp. 18, GNPA.
62 See Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Concession Permit #CP-GLAC010-94, GNPA; Ed 
DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
63 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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believes that the government does not want to open up a proverbial “can of worms” by 
testing the rights guaranteed in the land cession agreement of 1896 for fear of having a 
weak precedent tested in the courts again. Confident and tenacious, DesRosier wanted to 
press for clarification of Blackfeet rights on the ceded strip even after the court threw out 
the case. The tribal council, however, encouraged him to drop the issue and settle for the 
expunged charges. DesRosier did not possess the resources to pursue battle in the legal 
arena, and without tribal backing he had no alternative but reluctantly to abandon his 
mission. He expressed in an interview that he has “strong feelings the issues could come 
up again sometime in the near future, and I hope they do.”64
Right around the time when DesRosier grudgingly forsook his mission to press 
the issue of tribal rights, the tribe lost its conduit of direct communication and influence 
in the upper echelons of Glacier National Park. In July of 1995, Ted Hall’s detail as 
Native American Program Coordinator came to an end.65 In 2005, Hall worked for the 
BIA Irrigation Department in Browning, MT, and spoke with me about the results of his 
work with the park during his year-long tenure as cultural liaison. Hall claims that during 
his assignment, park recognition of tribal employment and preference rights improved. 
Recruitment efforts succeeded in providing seasonal work for tribal members. 
Employment of native interpretive presenters increased, and the “Native Speaks” 
program grew considerably. More dancers performed at park visitor centers, and park 
officials held more conferences with tribal members. After his departure/according to
64 Ibid.
65 S.A.R. 1994-1995, pp. 9, GNPA.
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Hall, park policies towards improving tribal employment worsened and few Blackfeet 
have landed permanent positions in the park in the years since.66
Ed DesRosier also provided commentary on the lasting consequences of the 
agreements reached between the tribe, GNP, and GPI. Sun Tours has grown considerably 
since its inception, and now runs full-day tours out of East Glacier and half-day tours out 
of West Glacier. His personal relations with the park have improved, but his frequent 
referrals of tourists to GPI’s services have rarely been reciprocated. I asked if his success 
has opened doors for other tribal members desirous of starting businesses near the park, 
and he sadly admitted that, unfortunately, few have followed in his stead. He claims that 
park employment practices towards the Blackfeet have improved, but they still have a 
way to go. GPI still recruits tribal members through programs at the Blackfeet 
Community College, and, in addition to providing roughly 200 low-wage seasonal jobs, 
hires some locals on year-round at the Glacier Park Lodge as supervisors and 
maintenance workers. The Park Service also grants some Blackfeet summer positions. 
Overall, however, he feels that both GPI and GNP do not recruit aggressively enough.67
At my last meeting with DesRosier at a restaurant just outside of East Glacier in 
September of 2005, we happened to share the establishment with a crew of GPI 
employees at Glacier Park Lodge who were celebrating an end-of-the-season going-away 
party. Many employees at the lodge were in their twenties and, judging by their name 
tags, hailed from states on the East Coast. DesRosier explained that many Eastern 
college students still arrive en masse by bus, plane and train to work in the park’s hotels 
and restaurants, a visible symbol for many Indians on the reservation of GPI’s continued
66 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
67 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, September 28, 2005.
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disregard for local unemployment. Furthermore, GPI still imports workers from Eastern 
Europe in spite of the boisterous and repeated objections state politicians have raised at 
state tourism meetings in recent years. GPI cites a high turnover rate in low-paying, 
seasonal jobs as justification for this practice. Confined by work visas and the absence of 
nearby support networks, foreigners are less inclined than locals to quit mid-season. As 
DesRosier and I concluded our meeting, the remaining two GPI employees at the 
restaurant began chanting a song in unison. Neither Ed or I could identify the language 
used. As we made our final farewells, the owner of the establishment informed us that 
the young men were singing a Bosnian traditional folk song. DesRosier turned to me and 
good-naturedly, yet with solemn undertones, remarked, “You see...they’re still taking 
our jobs.”68
The Bigger Picture
Neither the situation around Glacier nor the accusations and grievances levied by 
the Blackfeet are unique to northwestern Montana. Plush resorts and facilities frequented 
by the well-to-do and lying adjacent to poor Indian communities are a common sight at 
many parks and historic sites across the West.69 Many native communities residing near 
park units continue to struggle as they seek to benefit from the enormous economic 
opportunities that parks offer. Direct employment with the parks or with their 
concessionaires provides one avenue for financial gain; the marketing of local 
commercial enterprises in and around the park units represents another. Employed by 
businesses as curiosities designed to draw tourists and revenue to the parks in their infant 
years, many tribal communities neighboring parks in the modem era do not share in the
68 Ibid.
69 Burnham, 206.
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prosperity begotten by high-profile tourist destinations and, like the Blackfeet, have felt 
alienated by the NPS and its concessionaires in recent decades.
As historians Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek ably demonstrated in their 
sweeping overview American Indians and National Parks, the variety in the relationships 
between native communities and national parks makes generalizing difficult and varying 
employment policies illustrate how complex park management can become.70 
Nonetheless, like the Blackfeet, many tribal societies adjacent to national parks feel 
underrepresented within the National Park Service. The Ute Mountain Indian 
Reservation shares a border with Mesa Verde National Park in southwestern Colorado, 
but despite park recruitment programs at local community colleges and native fairs, the 
NPS has had limited success hiring Indians. In 1994, Indians held only two of 120 
positions. Olympic National Park in Washington has ten tribes residing along its 
perimeter yet historically has hired few natives. At Grand Canyon National Park in 
Arizona, the NPS has rarely employed Indians in park management positions, and 
controversy over employment preference and NPS languor in promoting tribal enterprises 
contributed to a state of poor relations between the park and the Havasupai in the late 
1970s. At Canyon De Chelly National Monument, governed by the NPS and located in
7 ]the heart of the Navajo Indian Reservation, the Navajo make up 90% of the staff.
Keller and Turek posited several reasons that help explain the situation. Poor pay 
for entry-level jobs helps explain why the hiring and promotion of Indians progresses so 
slowly. Furthermore, administrators advance in the NPS through frequent transfers, 
oftentimes over long distances, and many natives prefer to stay near reservations and
70 Keller and Turek, xiii, 236.
71 For NPS employment at these park units, see Keller and Turek, 41, 133, 173, 235.
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family networks. A former NPS director opined that resistance to Indian employment 
exists within the service itself.72 A more important factor with regards to tribal demands 
for preferential hiring at park units is the inherent nature and mission of the National Park 
Service. At a meeting between Glacier staff and members of the Blackfeet Tribal 
Council in 1979, Emma “Pinky” Plume, National Park Service Indian Liaison for the 
Rocky Mountain Region, claimed that the “National Park Service system is not the best 
suited to Native Americans... [MJany of them apply to parks where they don’t stand a 
chance of getting a job at all due to high numbers of people applying and the tough 
competition to get a high rating on the registers.”73 The National Park Service is a large 
bureaucracy imposed within an even larger bureaucracy, the Department of the Interior. 
Federal employment regulations are strict and bear upon applicants indiscriminately. The 
national park ideal mandates that the NPS serve everyone, and this democratic ideal 
applies to all aspects of park services, including employment. An unfortunate 
consequence of this proclaimed egalitarianism for native communities with immediate 
interests and explicit rights is that the rights of all American citizens outweigh those of 
any individual group.
Controversy over Indian interests in the tourist trade has also affected native 
groups neighboring park units on a national scale. At a meeting between Glacier staff 
and the Blackfeet Tribal Council in the winter of 1982, a tribal representative complained 
that “Glacier Park Lodge is not displaying anything of the Blackfeet people and their
72 Ibid., 237.
73M emo o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council Members, 
May 10, 1979, pp. 3, GNPA: F20-8.
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culture,” despite the fact that the lounge was called the Medicine Lodge.74 Since the 
parks’ early years, concessionaires have capitalized on the tourist fascination with Indian 
themes and have marketed “Indian” products; however, many of these products have not 
been crafted by native artisans. In the early 1990s, the Blackfeet accused GPI of selling 
non-authentic Indian crafts in its gift shops and demanded that the firm promote 
authentic, Indian-made arts and crafts. Such sentiments were neither new nor limited to 
northwestern Montana. In the 1930s, concerned park officials expressed fears that an 
influx of cheap handicrafts could spell ruin for native craftspeople. In 1935, Congress 
created the Indian Arts and Crafts Board to protect native artists against the 
encroachment of mass-produced artifacts.75 In 1960, official NPS policy set concession 
standards for regulating crafts marketing, but many tribes have complained that the NPS
1 f thas failed in its commitment and that the policy exists only on paper. Contention over 
craft sales has been most pronounced at park units in the Southwest, most notably at 
Mesa Verde National Park and Grand Canyon National Park.77 In the 1970s, controversy 
ensued at Grand Canyon National Park as local Navajo artisans decided to bypass the 
middle-man and attempted to market their services within the park without official 
sanction, just as Ed DesRosier did decades later with much more ultimate success.
In the late 1920s, Navajo artisans, mostly women and children, established a 
Navajo roadside trade in rugs and silverwork outside of Grand Canyon National Park. As 
juniper necklaces became popular with young whites in the 1960s, the trade boomed and 
the profitable industry soon spread into the park. The marketing of Navajo jewelry inside
74 Minutes o f Meeting with Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal 
Representatives, Novem ber 3, 1982, pp. 3, GNPA: F19-14.
75 Burnham, 127.
76 Keller and Turek, 283.
77 See Burnham, 259, 279-280.
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the park threatened the exclusive long-term contract held by Fred Harvey, the park’s 
primary concessionaire, whose corporate monopoly included the sale of souvenirs, 
curios, and trinkets. Bound by a contractual obligation with a private business, the NPS 
erected signs, evicted and arrested Navajo transgressors, and effectively suppressed the 
trade by the early 1990s, an act that caused much resentment among the Navajo.78 Like 
the Blackfeet, the Navajo perceived NPS concession policies as unjust favoritism of 
corporate interests at the expense of local native communities, a tradition, according to
7 0scholar Philip Burnham, “under fire all over Indian country.”
Native communities were not the only ones resentful of national park concession 
policy. All over the country, communities neighboring parks felt disenfranchised by 
corporate bias as local businesses could not compete for contracts and were thereby 
excluded from providing services within the park. The vested interests of corporations 
did not escape criticism and proponents of concession reform scored a victory with the 
National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, Title IV of which dealt with 
concession reform, a product, according to NPS Deputy Director Denis Galvin, “of over 
20 years of work by legislators, departmental officials, and interested citizens who
o n
desired to change the concessions contracting process.” The Act made concessions 
contracts more accessible to the general business community by eliminating barriers to
78 Keller and Turek, 150.
79 Burnham, 13.
80 “Statement of Denis Galvin, Deputy Directory, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Before 
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic 
Preservation, and Recreation, Regarding Final Concession Regulations, June 8, 2000,” 
<http://www.nps.gov/legal/testimony/106th/concess6.htm>.
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competition, namely the preferential right of renewal for large operations, thereby ending, 
in theory, a long tradition of regulated corporate monopolies.81
For fifty years after Yellowstone’s establishment, the government liberally 
granted commercial leases to big firms for certain services and competition determined 
consumer prices and service quality. Unmanaged development plagued the early parks, 
and, beginning in the 1920s and continuing through the 1930s, the Park Service’s first 
two directors, Stephen T. Mather and Horace Albright, initiated policies to replace 
excessive competition with government regulated monopolies and long-term exclusive 
contracts. They considered unbridled Competition incompatible with the goals of the 
national parks and created a program of regulated monopolies to ensure reliable and 
respectable visitor services consistent with park values.82 Under NPS concession policy 
prior to 1998, parks awarded long-term contracts to large corporations without 
advertising or competitive bidding and included preferential rights of contract renewal.83
In the 1990s, public pressure to reform the concessions process intensified and 
some politicians banded together and proposed legislation to reform the granting of 
concessions in the National Park system. In 1993, Senator Dale Bumpers, D-AR, 
introduced a bill in the Senate to reform concession policy in the National Park System.84 
The bill passed by a huge margin in the Senate (90-9), and while pending before the 
House of Representatives, Representative Pat Williams, D-Mont., attached an 
amendment, at the urging of Blackfeet leaders, stipulating that the Park Service should 
give preference in awarding concessions contracts to qualified Indian-owned companies
81 See National Parks Omnibus Management Act o f  1998, November 13, 1998, 105 P.L. 391, Title IV, pp. 
403.
82 Keller and Turek, 148-149.
83 For a brief overview o f  concession policy development, see Burnham, 77-78.
84 National Park Service Concessions Policy Reform Act o f 1993, (first introduced 1/26/93), S.208.
or to those that demonstrate a commitment to hiring Indians.85 In testimony before the
House of Representatives, co-sponsor Tim Johnson of South Dakota explained that many
of our national parks, particularly those out West, were carved out of 
Indian treaty lands. When these lands were taken, the tribes lost a potential 
economic resource that, over time, one that is likely more valuable than 
are minerals, timber, or other nonrenewable resources. Since then, even 
though many reservations are close to the parks and suffer from up to 80 
percent unemployment, the tribes have not shared in the economic 
opportunities created by the presence of the parks. At most national parks 
near reservations, one finds few Indians employed by the National Park 
Service or by the concessionaires, few Indian businesses involved in any 
way in concessions, and little recognition of the culture and achievements 
of the Indian people.
He continued that the amendment “is designed to promote Indian employment, business 
utilization, and other involvement in existing as well as future concessionaire activities at 
parks located on or near a reservation.” The concession reform bill passed in the 
House, and after years of intense negotiations over the details and semantic clarification,
o n
it became Public Law in November of 1998.
Although the Act did not explicitly direct the Park Service to grant preference to 
Indian-owned companies, it did authorize the Secretary of the Interior to consider, as a 
secondary factor in selecting the best proposals, “the extent to which plans for 
employment of Indians (including Native Alaskans) and involvement of businesses 
owned by Indians, Indian tribes, or Native Alaskans (figures) in the operation of a 
concession.”88 The Act also promoted the sale of authentic United States Indian, Alaskan 
Native, Native Samoan, and Native Hawaiian handicrafts and exempted all revenue
85 See Eileen Finan, “Blackfeet, Glacier live with uneasy relationship,” G reat Falls Tribune, 6  June 1994.
86 House o f Representatives, “National Park Service Concessions R eform -H on. Tim Johnson, Extension o f  
Remarks,” May 11, 1994, pp. E897, <http://thom as.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/query/z7rl03:EllM Y4-349>.
87 For a timeline o f  major actions on Senate Bill #208, see “Bill Summary and Status for the 103rd 
Congress: S .208,” <http://tliom as.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/bdquery/z7dl03:SN00208:@ @ @ R>.
88 National Parks Omnibus Management Act o f  1998, 403.
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derived from such sales from any franchise fee payments, thus providing incentive for 
concessioners to purchase and market authentic native handicrafts.89 According to 
DesRosier, the terms of the 1998 concessions management reform are just starting to take 
effect and their success has yet to be measured.90
Summary
As with the alleged right to graze livestock, the Blackfeet have failed to gain 
recognition of the alleged rights to conduct business on the ceded strip and preference in 
hiring. The Agreement of 1896 does not expressly mention any right to conduct 
business, but it does contain a clause pertaining to preferential hiring. Article III of the 
Agreement states that it “is agreed that in the employment of all agency and school 
employees preference in all cases be given to Indians residing on the reservation.”91 This 
clause has formed the basis for tribal demands for preferential hiring, and Ted Hall based 
his legal appeals of his unsuccessful bid for Assistant Superintendent on this clause. By 
settling out of court with Hall, the NPS avoided engaging in a protracted legal battle 
dealing with the controversy over rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896 and lent 
further credence to tribal accusations that the park remains hesitant to test a weak 
precedent in the legal arena.
A strictly semantic reading of the clause would invalidate claims of preferential 
hiring, as the NPS is not the “agency” referred to in the agreement, nor is it a “school.” A 
reading based on the Canons of Construction, however, could conclude that the tribal 
signatories understood the clause in a more general sense and intended to reserve
89 Ibid., 416.
90 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
91 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties , v . l ,  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1904), 606.
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preferential hiring for tribal descendants in any institution that sprang up on the ceded 
strip. The issue has not been officially settled, but judging by a history Of rulings based 
on narrow, semantic interpretations dismissive of native rights and protective of the 
underlying principles of the park ideal, the likelihood of resolution in the tribe’s favOr 
seems unlikely. Preferential hiring of any sort compromises the democratic ideal 
embodied in the Park Service’s enabling legislation.
Through cleverly planned shows of tribal solidarity and community activism, the 
Blackfeet did succeed in forcing Glacier National Park and its primary concessionaire to 
alter their policies to provide more opportunities for local natives to benefit from the 
revenue generated by the park’s existence. Although concession reform was already on 
the national radar since the late 1970s, the nonviolent protests yielded immediate results 
that took effect before the enactment of concession reform policies that began in 1998. 
Whether or not the NPS and GPI will hold true to their pledges to improve employment 
of Blackfeet and marketing of Blackfeet crafts remains to be seen, but the opportunity for 
Indian-owned businesses to secure contracts for certain services is now a more readily 
attainable goal. Depending on the Interior Secretary’s discretion, Indian-owned 
businesses may receive extra points when vying for concession contracts, provided, of 
course, that the proposed services conform to the founding preservation and recreation 
ideals of the National Park System. Sun Tours represents such a service. By transporting 
tourists in high-occupancy vehicles, DesRosier explained, Sun Tours reduces automobile
Q?traffic in the park and thereby complies with park objectives.
92 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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Conclusion
On a sunny autumn day in late September of 2005 ,1 accompanied a private tour 
group on one of the last Sun Tours trips of the season. The tour guide, Edward North 
Piegan, told the group to call him by his traditional name, Mat-tson-war-nik-kap-pi. The 
group had difficulty pronouncing his name, so he told us it was all right if we used the 
English translation: “Sweetheart.” Like Curly Bear Wagner had done during his 
performance at the Glacier Park Lodge, Sweetheart added quite a bit of comic relief to his 
tour presentation. Above all, Sun Tours attempts to provide an entertaining and 
educational experience for tourists and includes neither political commentary nor 
condemnation of park policies. In addition to describing the history of the park and the 
natural resources unique to the area, Sweetheart interpreted the park’s resources from a 
Blackfeet perspective and described how the tribe had traditionally used the plants for 
medicinal purposes and the mountains for religious purposes. Once the van reached 
Logan Pass and the eastern parts of the park, the tour guide narrated in more detail how 
young Blackfeet warriors had traditionally ventured into the mountains for extended 
vision quests, seeking dreams and spiritual power. Edward DesRosier, founder and 
proprietor of Sun Tours, considers himself lucky and takes pride in being able to share his 
passion for his culture and the land with others.1
This short anecdote is symbolic for several reasons. Not only was the Glacier 
region important to the tribe for physical survival before the establishment of the park, it 
was also a place of great spiritual importance. This study has focused on Blackfeet 
material subsistence in Glacier National Park, but for some within the tribal community
1 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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the area holds equal importance for spiritual subsistence. When in the early 1990s oil 
drilling threatened sacred landscapes on the ceded strip in Lewis and Clark National 
Forest, Tiny-Man Heavy Runner notified the United Nations that the Blackfeet culture 
was under siege and that cultural genocide was imminent. Heavy Runner informed me 
that traditional Blackfeet education lay in the mountains, and that “this (the mountains) is 
our church.” In a classic example of shifting alliances, Glacier officials, environmental 
groups, and segments of the Blackfeet tribe banded together in the mid-1980s to oppose 
drilling in the Badger-Two Medicine Area of Lewis and Clark National Forest. Due to 
the relentless efforts of Heavy Runner and other tribal members, the tribe has managed to 
obtain designation of about 70% of the affected area as a Traditional Cultural District, 
which makes it more difficult, though not impossible, for oil companies to drill.
Many sites within Glacier National Park also continue to hold spiritual 
significance for some members of the tribe. In 1973, the Tribal Council declared lands 
on the ceded strip as sacred ground and resolved that they should not be disturbed.in any 
way without prior consent of the Blackfeet Tribe.4 One site, Chief Mountain, straddles 
both sides of the boundary and its protection from adverse visitor impacts remains a point 
of contention between some in the tribe and the Park Service. With the revival of 
traditional native religion in recent decades, traditional usage of Chief Mountain has 
risen. In the fall of 1977, the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council went on record to protect 
the Chief Mountain area from undesirable intrusion and closed certain surrounding areas
2 Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 24, 2005.
3 Keith Tatsey, Chairman o f the Tribal Badger-Two M edicine Management Committee, interview with 
author, March 25, 2005.
4 Blackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution #219-72, M ay 10, 1973, Tribal Documents Department.
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east of the boundary to camping, fishing, and other recreational activities.5 The following 
summer, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act that enabled 
native peoples to access and use sacred sites on federal lands.6 In December of 1981, the 
Blackfeet Tribal Business Council declared the Chief Mountain Area east of the 
boundary as off-limits to all persons except those entering the area for spiritual questing 
purposes, and requested that the National Park Service do the same on the western side of 
the mountain, claiming that “Indian people who have retreated to Chief Mountain for 
spiritual purposes have reported instances of being disturbed by tourists and other non- 
aligned curiosity seekers.”7
The NPS Regional Director replied that due to Congressional mandates, the Park
Q
Service could not remove any portion of the park from public access. In the early 1990s, 
Superintendent Gil Lusk issued a formal proclamation supporting tribal efforts to 
preserve traditional practices on Chief Mountain, as well as the area closures east of the 
boundary. The statement also promised that park personnel would extend special effort 
to inform climbers and hikers in the park of the religious significance of the site.9 
Superintendent Lusk also proposed nominating the site for designation as a National 
Historic Landmark, yet despite meetings attended by archaeologists and representatives
5 Blackfeet Nation, “Protection o f C hief Mountain as an Historic, Cultural and Spiritual Site,” excerpt o f  
minutes from Blackfeet Tribal Business Council M eeting, September 1, 1977, Tribal Documents 
Department.
6 See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, P.L. #95-341.
7 See Blackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution #140-82, December 3, 1981, Tribal Documents Dept. See also 
Letter from W oody Kipp to NPS Associate Director Stanley Albright, Decem ber 10, 1981, GNPA: F176-5; 
Blackfeet Nation, “Chief Mountain as an Historical/Contemporary Spiritual Retreat Area,” n.d., Tribal 
Documents Department.
8 Letter from NPS Regional Director James B. Thompson to Chairman Boggs, February 18, 1982, GNPA: 
FI 76-5.
9 U.S. Department o f  the Interior, “Management Directive 13.4: Visitor U se and Blackfeet Spiritual U se o f  
C hief Mountain,” Novem ber 1, 1993, GNPA.
164
from the tribe and the park, by 2005 nothing has so far come of the plan.10 Park officials
may support preservation of the area, but selective accessibility violates the democratic
ideal of the national park system. The official position advanced by NPS is that the “park
has been set aside for all people, not just Native Americans, and the closure of Chief
Mountain to all but Native American religious uses would not be legal or proper.”11
In addition to highlighting the spiritual importance of the area, the Sun Tours
anecdote is symbolic for other reasons. The tour service demonstrates that some things
have changed. Ed DesRosier considers it ironic that his mother worked as a dancer for a
big corporation, the Great Northern, for low wages to create a romantic image to draw
tourist dollars, and that fifty years later her son operates his own business in the park that
12proudly represents Blackfeet culture and its historical ties to the park. The official GNP 
website and park brochures list Sun Tours as a transportation tour service and openly 
acknowledge that the tribe has used the Glacier region for centuries, an admission that 
has only come very recently. In 1992, the National Park Service commissioned a report 
to inventory the ethnographic resources of the park and the traditional associations of the 
lands to the Blackfeet people. The result, Our Mountains Are Our Pillows: An 
Ethnographic Overview o f Glacier National Park by Brian Reeves and Sandy Peacock, 
was a hulking volume that described the myriad of ways in which the tribe has used the 
region for over a thousand years. Although the Park Service has opened the door to 
Indian-owned businesses and has re-integrated the Blackfeet into the history of the park,
10 See M emo from Cultural Resources Management Ranger Bruce Fladmark to Supt., Assistant Supt. 
GLAC re: Record o f  Meeting, Chief Mountain National Landmark Nomination, April 29, 1991, GNPA.
1' Briefing Statement prepared for Secretary Lujan re: Relations with the Blackfeet Indians: Religious 
Freedom, June 1, 1992, GNPA.
12 Ed DesRosier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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it remains reluctant to allow subsistence activities it deems unacceptable to the national 
park idea.
In this thesis, I have focused more specifically on the exercise of Blackfeet 
material subsistence in Glacier National Park in the modern era. A resurgence of interest 
in traditional tribal culture in the 1960s and the success of Civil Rights Movement 
inspired activism in Indian country and led tribal peoples across the nation to pressure the 
federal government into honoring native rights. The Blackfeet channeled this impulse 
into testing their rights in Glacier National Park. Proactive tribal measures taken in the 
mid-1970s forced the park officials in Glacier to pay more attention to its discontented 
neighbors. As a result, officials at Glacier began to consult the tribe on matters 
pertaining to park affairs and communications between the two parties improved. Tribal 
assertion of rights in recent decades, coupled with scholarly studies of traditional tribal 
use of park lands, forced the park to recognize the ancient ties that the Blackfeet hold 
with the lands in and around Glacier, a fact previously obscured and denied by park 
officials and scientists alike. The park geared more of its interpretive programs toward 
native themes and invited Blackfeet representatives to give presentations to tourists 
describing the historical importance of the Glacier region in Blackfeet culture. Although 
park officials have failed to recognize implied preferential business or hiring rights, 
opportunities for Indian-owned businesses to operate in the park have increased and the 
park and its major concessionaire have displayed a willingness to incorporate tribal 
members into the workforce and support native artisans. Overall, the park has become 
more accommodating to Blackfeet interests in recent decades than it has in the past, 
although some within the Blackfeet community question the sincerity of such efforts.
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When I told Leon Rattler that I was researching the historical relationship between the 
Blackfeet and Glacier National Park, he sarcastically replied: “What relationship?”13 
Recent attempts to force recognition of subsistence rights, reserved or implied, 
have made little headway and the park has surrendered little ground with regards to the 
permission of native subsistence activities in Glacier National Park. Park officials 
opposed to the exercise of Blackfeet reserved rights have enjoyed the unwavering support 
of federal legal representatives, whose rulings, questioned by many observers, have 
historically repudiated native rights and proved consistently protective of the underlying 
goals of the national park ideal. A judge affirmed the reserved right of unrestricted 
access in 1974, but the status of the other three reserved rights has not changed since the 
early years of the twentieth century. Hunting and wood-gathering are extractive activities 
inimical to the national park ideal and remain prohibited. The park allows the public to 
fish its waters under regulation and in-season, but affords no special rights for the 
Blackfeet. Grazing, an implied right not covered in the Agreement of 1896, compromises 
the objectives of the national park system and is also prohibited. Thus, although 
Blackfeet pressures upon the park have engendered policy change in recent decades, the 
founding ideals of the national park system have continued to trump native rights and the 
exercise of subsistence activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea 
still meet with strict interdiction.
13 Leon Rattler, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
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